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Abstract
In the social media era, it is commonplace to engage in written conversations. People sometimes
even form connections across large distances, in writing. However, human communication is in
large part non-verbal. This means it is now easier for people to hide their harmful intentions. At the
same time, people can now get in touch with more people than ever before. This puts vulnerable
groups at higher risk for malevolent interactions, such as bullying, trolling, or predatory behavior.
Furthermore, such growing behaviors have most recently led to waves of fake news and a growing
industry of deceit creators and deceit detectors. There is now an urgent need for both theory that
explains deception and applications that automatically detect deception.
In this thesis I address this need with a novel application that learns from examples and detects
deception reliably in natural-language dialogues. I formally define the problem of deception detec-
tion and identify several domains where it is useful. I introduce and evaluate new psycholinguistic
features of deception in written dialogues for two datasets. My results shed light on the connection
between language, deception, and perception. They also underline the challenges and difficulty of
assessing perceptions from written text.
To automatically learn to detect deception I first introduce an expressive logical model and then
present a probabilistic model that simplifies the first and is learnable from labeled examples. I
introduce a belief-over-belief formalization, based on Kripke semantics and situation calculus. I use
an observation model to describe how utterances are produced from the nested beliefs and intentions.
This allows me to easily make inferences about these beliefs and intentions given utterances, without
needing to explicitly represent perlocutions. The agents’ belief states are filtered with the observed
utterances, resulting in an updated Kripke structure.
I then translate my formalization to a practical system that can learn from a small dataset and is
able to perform well using very little structural background knowledge in the form of a relational
dynamic Bayesian network structure.
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Natural language is a medium for expressing information, intentions, desires, but also for making
other people act. It is a medium for influencing the outcome of things.
One of the areas that is of growing interest is understanding the sentiment, meanings, and
intentions expressed in language, beyond the syntactic meanings of words. Traditionally, these
topics are of interest to the machine learning world, but these are also areas where machine learning
does not have low hanging fruit. Its methods have had limited success in providing true value
and useful answers to deep understanding. Deep meaning here is a broad statement that covers
everything that language is used for, everything that is conveyed in the language, and everything
that language has impact on. So, machine learning has so far been applied to things that are easy for
traditional machine learning to represent and solve.
I believe that a combination of machine learning and knowledge representation technologies
are needed in order to go beyond these limitations. In particular, I believe that the combination
of machine learning and knowledge representation, when done right, can answer and provide
technologies that have much better performance in both quality and speed for a much wider range of
questions than presently tackled by machine learning. In particular, in this thesis, I present a machine
learning method relying also on knowledge representation technologies, to define deeper structures
on which learning can occur. I identify a number of structures that have broad applicability and lead
to efficient learning and inference for datasets that are available and are possible to obtain.
Detecting deceptive intent in written dialogues is an important problem. Dialogues occur
between people in many contexts, such as forming or strengthening interpersonal bonds, working
together on tasks, or trying to reach a consensus or middle ground in negotiations. In many cases,
dialogues result in agents’ joint or individual decisions to take actions. It is increasingly important
for dialogue agents, moderator agents, and data mining to understand and predict those decisions
and actions.
It is especially important to predict individual agent decisions when they might negatively affect
some of the other agents’ goals. When the agents involved in a dialogue have conflicting goals, they
are often motivated to use deception and manipulation in order to reach those goals. In particular,
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agents’ individual decision might negatively impact their own goals if other dialogue participants
are motivated to resort to manipulation and deception. Manipulation in real world can happen in the
context of commerce (via advertising), politics (negotiations), law (trials), personal relationships
(abuse, e.g. bullying or predatory behaviour).
Technological progress has made it commonplace for people to connect and communicate
across large distances. In environments such as social media and Internet forums, most often
the only signal is written language. Since the verbal component of communication is very small
(Mehrabian, 1981), intentions become easier to hide and harder to read. This increases the risk of
malevolent interactions, such as bullying, trolling, or predatory behavior. The harmful aspect of
such malevolent communication is that it is deceptive: the manifest intent of the speaker is different
from the speaker’s true intent. For example, the manifest intent of trolling (Herring et al., 2002;
Hardaker, 2010) is to discuss arguments that the speaker genuinely believes, whereas the true intent
is to annoy interlocutors and boost the troll’s self-worth.
Deceptive conversations in online forums are especially problematic for children and other
people ill-equipped to discern deceptive intent. It is thus important to build tools that interpret
malevolent deception in such contexts.
Deception detection in written dialogues is a difficult task. Deception has long been one of the
least studied areas in natural language processing. Furthermore, only 7% of human communication
is verbal (Mehrabian, 1981), while over 90% is comprised of tone of voice (38%) and body language
(55%) (the 7% Rule). Because of this, written dialogues are very difficult to process, since most of
the non-verbal communication is either missing or needs to be inferred.
Deception is related to intention and perception. I propose that the task of understanding
deception involves reasoning about two problems:
(a) when a speaker intends to deceive;
(b) when a listener perceives a speaker as sincere.
The problematic cases are at the intersection of the two: where a deceptive speaker is perceived
as sincere. In this thesis, I address both problems and show models capable of solving the underlying
task of deception detection.
The listener’s context and cognitive makeup play a large part in perceived sincerity. This invites
the question of how subjective the task of modeling perceived sincerity is. People adapt to each
other, learn about each other’s context, and model each other’s intent throughout the dialogue.
While a listener uses the context of the dialogue and the speaker’s utterances in order to form the
perception of deception, a liar also uses the listener’s feedback to attempt to alter this perception.
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Therefore, while sincerity perception is subjective, it is this subjectivity that a model of perceived
sincerity and ultimately of deception needs to capture. The models I introduce are capable of
modeling the dialogue participants’ changing subjectivity and perceptions throughout the dialogue.
Dialogue and deception have so far been modeled separately in NLP. Traditionally, dialogue
understanding uses either shallow features and machine learning (Ritter et al., 2010; Paul, 2012)
or inference in knowledge-rich models (Allen et al., 2001; Allen et al., 2007). Machine learning
methods are attractive because they can be applied broadly and easily, but many times have low
precision because deeper interactions are not captured by surface features. Model-based approaches
are more precise, but require domain modeling and are therefore harder to scale. Most recently, deep
learning approaches have had success in encoding the dialogue state and answering deep questions
about dialogues (Henderson et al., 2013; Henderson et al., 2014; Luan et al., 2016), but they require
large amounts of data that are not always available or relevant.
Deception detection has gained some attention in the NLP community (Mihalcea and Strap-
parava, 2009a; Ott et al., 2011; Jindal and Liu, 2008). The focus has mostly been on detecting
insincere reviews or arguments. However, there has been little work in detecting deception and
manipulation in dialogues (Hirschberg et al., 2005; Enos et al., 2007; Hung and Chittaranjan, 2010b;
Niculae et al., 2015), while perceived sincerity has only very recently gained attention (Schuller
et al., 2016; Loy et al., 2016). Especially in decoding perceived sincerity, the focus in the work to
date has been on audio or prosodic features, rather than written text. On malevolent interaction in
chat and Internet forums, there has been research both in the context of bullying (Mancilla-Caceres
et al., 2012) and predatory behaviour (Inches and Crestani, 2012; Cano et al., 2014; Gudnadottir
et al., 2013; Kontostathis, 2009a). However, these lines of work have not addressed deception and
sincerity.
One aspect of using and identifying deception that makes it hard to model computationally is
that it requires higher level cognitive processing. Indeed, experiments supporting the cognitive
load hypothesis (Vrij et al., 2011; Suchotzki et al., 2015) demostrate that lying is more cognitively
demanding than truth telling.
In this thesis, I develop models for understanding how deceptive intent reflects in conversations
and resulting decisions, by accounting for change in beliefs about deceptive intent and beliefs about
such beliefs. Intention detection happens both at utterance level (ostentative speaker intent) and at
dialogue level (conversation goal). Deception occurs between these two levels of intention.
The high motivation for using deception and the possiblity of tracking the effects on participants
throughout the dialogue sets this problem apart from identifying deception in nonce text fragment
where motivation is not immediately relevant.
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The Werewolf game is a simple domain for analyzing deception in dialogues. The Werewolf
game is an instance of such a dialogue where people are motivated to deceive and manipulate in
order to reach their goals. The setting is a village where at least one of the villagers is secretly a
werewolf. Each night, a villager falls prey to the werewolves. Each day, the remaining villagers
discuss to find the most likely werewolf to execute.
Players are assigned roles that define their goals and available actions. For my purpose, all
roles are collapsed together as either werewolf or non-werewolf. There are other important roles in
Werewolf, such as seer, vigilante, etc, the goals and available actions of which are not the focus of
this chapter. (Barnwell, 2012) provides a broader description of the game and roles.
Each player only knows her own role, as assigned by an impartial judge who overlooks the
game. The players with a werewolf role learn each other’s roles in the first round of the game. Every
round, they pick another non-werewolf player to be removed from the game. This happens during a
night phase and is hidden from the other players. The judge announces the identity and role of the
removed player.
All players are then allowed to remove one other player from the game before the next night
phase. They discuss and vote during a day phase. The non-werewolves are motivated to remove the
werewolves from the game. The werewolves are motivated to hide their roles, as in every round
there is a majority of non-werewolves. Any time werewolves become a majority, they win the game.
Any time all werewolves are eliminated, they lose the game.
Model. The game can be modeled with utterances as actions in Situation Calculus (McCarthy,
1983), based on Austin’s theory of performatives (Austin, 1975). A problem is accounting for
the indefinitely many perlocutionary acts, or possible effects an utterance may have on the hearer.
Belief Revision (Alchourron et al., 1985) enables modeling and reasoning about changes of beliefs,
including as a result of knowledge producing actions in Situation Calculus (Shapiro et al., 2000).
Applying Belief Revision to my domain is hard because the agents need to do reasoning about
beliefs over beliefs.
The underlying model combines a high-level logical approach, based on Situation Calculus and
Modal Logic, which allows reasoning about nested beliefs and actions, with Relational Dynamic
Bayesian Networks, capable of representing rich relationships and interactions in a flexible manner,
which lends itself to learning and probabilistic inference. The variables of the model refer to the
agents and the objects of their beliefs and intentions. The observed variables include the proposi-
tional content of each utterance, which I extract separately, as well as additional psycholinguistic
and sentiment analysis features (Chapters 5 and 6).
The evolution of the world is first modeled (Chapter 7) in Situation Calculus (McCarthy, 1983;
Reiter, 1991), where agents’ nested beliefs are represented using modality predicates for accessibility
4
relations on situations (Scherl and Levesque, 2003). To avoid modeling perlocutionary effects
and using the intuition that utterances only provide evidence for and affect agent beliefs, I model
utterances as observations. The observation model is used to filter agent beliefs, as an alternative
approach to Belief Revision. Based on this initial formalization I build a scalable Relational DBN
which I then train on two different datasets. I first use the Werewolf/Mafia game (Barnwell, 2012)
as a simpler domain, then move to real world speed dating data (Ranganath et al., 2009).
I use the models I build to detect deceptive stances in dialogues and to predict the decisions that
the participants make. For example, in the Werewolf game and chat logs, the deceptive participant
stances I predict are the werewolf roles, and my model outperforms models that do not take beliefs
over beliefs into account. The decisions I predict in the Werewolf dialogues are the players’ votes.
Contributions. This thesis makes the following contributions:
1. It defines the problem of deception detection and its subproblems, deceptive stance detection
and perceived sincerity detection
2. It introduces new psycholinguistic features useful in solving each of the subproblems for two
datasets
3. It uses the new psycholinguistic features experiments to offer insights into how language
connects to deception and its perception
4. It introduces a formal model of beliefs over beliefs for stances and perceptions in dialogues
and shows its usefulness for deceptive intent detection
5. It introduces a practical probablistic relational model of beliefs over beliefs for stances and




This chapter is an overview of the concepts needed to model the problem of deception detection.
I define deception in a dialogue to mean that a speaker has a deceptive intent that is not decoded
by a listener. This is more formally described in Chapter 3. In order to do so, it is important to
have an understanding of intentions in dialogue. I therefore start by discussing how intentions are
encoded and decoded in natural language communication.
I consider dialogues to be sequences of utterances that agents produce according to their beliefs
and intentions, with effects in other agents’ beliefs and intentions. In order to capture the meaning
of beliefs and intentions, I rely on modal logic. In order to capture a dynamic world, I rely on
situation calculus. In this chapter, I describe the language and semantics of modal logic, as well as
its embedding in situation calculus.
I then describe how modal logic can be extended to allow probablistic statements and proba-
bilistic reasoning. I also discuss Bayesian networks and dynamic Bayesian networks, which I use to
define the semantics of my models.
I build my new model on the basis of probabilistic modal logic (Fagin and Halpern, 1988;
Friedman and Halpern, 1994; Shirazi and Amir, 2007), which is a mathematical representation of
probabilistic belief about belief. Belief is represented as a probability distribution over states of the
world, given the current state of the world. Belief over belief are then distributions over those states
where beliefs are rooted. These conditional probability distributions over states of the world define
models called probabilistic Kripke structures, which define the semantics of probabilistic modal
logic statements. (Other models for probabilistic beliefs over beliefs and tradeoffs for choosing
probabilistic modal logic are discussed in Chapter 10).
My new models define belief over beliefs by means of conditional probability distributions
over world states. Due to the form of these conditional probability distributions and the Markov
assumptions they describe, I chose directed graphical models to encode conditional independences
between my variables of interest. This representation also makes it easy to capture the dynamic
component of a dialogue, as a dynamic Bayesian network (DBN).
Dynamic Bayesian networks (Murphy, 2002) are directed graphical models for modeling
sequential data. The evolution of time-dependent variables in a DBN is described by conditional
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probability tables that relate variables in adjacent time slices (transition models).
2.1 Intentions in Natural Language
An utterance is generally regarded as having three layers of communication (Austin, 1975; Searle,
1976): the direct meaning, or propositional content (locution); the manifest intention and desired
effect of the speaker (illocution); and the possible effects on the hearer’s side (perlocution).
The commonly accepted view on human communication is based on Grice’s cooperative
principle (Grice, 1975):
Make your contribution such as it is required, at the stage at which it occurs, by the accepted
purpose or direction of the talk exchange in which you are engaged.
So human communication is collaborative in nature: the speaker and listener work together and
split the effort of encoding and decoding, to ensure the intent that the speaker wants to communicate
correctly and efficiently reaches the listener. Grice (Grice, 1975) has identified four maxims that
emerge from this assumption:
(a) The maxim of quality states that people do not say what they believe is false or have insufficient
evidence for.
(b) The maxim of quantity states that people give exactly as much information as necessary for
the meaning to be inferred. They are neither more nor less informative.
(c) The maxim of relation states that people only say what is relevant to the meaning being
communicated.
(d) The maxim of manner states that people speak in a perspicuous, orderly manner, avoiding
ambiguity, obscurity of expression, and verbosity.
In this context, the illocution transmits the meaning that the speaker wants to communicate
and can be decoded by means of the propositional content and the assumption of cooperation. If
the propositional content is such that its direct meaning would contradict cooperation (e.g. by
flouting one of Grice’s maxims), the cooperative listener is invited to assume that the communicated
meaning is the one that is most likely given the dialogue participants’ mutual knowledge as it relates
to the direction of the talk exchance. The cooperative speaker thus ensures that this implicated
meaning is the one he wants to make manifest.
Understanding the speaker’s intention has a result a change in the listener’s belief state, as well
as on the listener’s behavior. The intended meaning encodes how the speaker manifestly wants the
listener to change their belief and behavior. The actual change in the listener’s behavior is encoded
by the perlocution.
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As intentional acts that have effects on reality by changing people’s thoughts and behavior
and can be performed according to certain felicity conditions, utterances have been modeled in
linguistics as actions called speech acts (Searle, 1976).
The felicity conditions of a speech act describe what properites the state of the world must have,
including participants’ belief states, in order for the speech act to achieve its purpose.
A speech act may encode a desire or intent of the listener to change the state of the world, which
the speaker makes manifest through the speech act. However, the purpose of a speech acts refers to
a change in the listener’s belief state, including that the listener becomes aware of the speaker’s
manifest intent. For example, an informative speech act has the purpose of making the listener
believe something that the speaker also believe.
As I describe in Chapter 3, deceptive intent also has the purpose to change the listener’s belief
state. However, this intended change is that the listener starts believing a statement that the speaker
does not believe. Furthermore, deception achieves its purpose if the listener does not become aware
of the speaker’s intention to deceive.
This does not mean that deception is different from human communication as defined so far.
Rather, it is a particular kind of communication in which a speaker has a deceptive intent as well
as a communicative intent. In this case, the communicative intent is subordinated to the deceptive
intent and is meant to be decoded by the listener. Deception then relies on the speaker correctly
decoding the manifest intent, in accordance to Grice’s maxims and the cooperative principle. The
result of this processing on the part of the listener is meant to produce a statement that leads the
listener to believe something that the speaker does not believe, satisfying the deceptive intent of the
speaker. Thus, even if the deceptive speaker does not conform to the cooperative principle, he relies
on the cooperative principle to be assumed by the listener.
2.2 Modal Logic – A Logic for Reasoning about Beliefs
Reasoning about statements that intelligent agents know or believe has traditionally been done using
epistemic modal logic.
Modal logic (Blackburn et al., 2006) extends classic propositional and predicate logic with
modality. Modality refers to any specification of interpreting the statement under modality as
grounded in a different moment, situation, or state of the world, than the here-and-now. For example,
in a modal logic of belief, a statement of the form belφ is used to mean that an agent believes the
statement φ is true. The modality is belief, bel, and specifies that the statement φ has to be grounded
not in the state of the world, but in possible states of the world that agent believes may be the case.
The semantics of modal logic needs to describe the way in which the state of the world (in
which the modal formula is grounded) relates to the possible states (in which the statement nested
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within the modality has to be grounded). For example, in Kripke semantics (Section 2.2.2), the most
commonly used semantics, this is done by means of an accessibility relation between possible (states
of) worlds. So in order to interpret a modal formula belφ, the nested statement φ is grounded in
states of the world that are accessible from the current one (i.e., the one in which belφ is interpreted).
This semantics allows nested modalities to be interpreted by iteratively unrolling the accessibility
relation with each level of nesting. Section 2.2.2 gives more details and formal definitions.
Modalities can refer to: possibility and necessity; knowledge and belief; or temporality.
Necessity (denoted 2) and possibility (denoted ) specify different ways of quantifying over
possible other states of the world. More specifically, if φ is a statement about the world, 2φ is true
iff φ is true in all (accessible) states of the world, whereas φ is true iff φ is true in some (accessible)
state of the world.
In Kripke semantics (Section 2.2.2), the shape of the accessibility relation between possible
worlds defines a frame. Different modal logic systems impose certain conditions over how the
current state of the world relates to the states of the world under quantification. These conditions
are called frame axioms.
Temporal logics have been studied in model checking research, where they are used to reason
about the formal properties of software systems. Formulas are interpreted in states of the software
system being modeled, rather than states of the world. A state s′ is accessible from state s if it
describes the system in the immediately following moment in time. Linear temporal logics (LTL)
consider time linear, whereas branching time logics such as CTL and CLT∗ allow time to branch
into multiple futures and enable quantification over possible futures.
In multiagent epistemic modal logic, each agent has individual knowledge and beliefs. Each
agent requires therefore a different modality. For example, if φ is a statement about the world
and a is an agent, belaφ states that a believes φ. Its interpretation requires grounding φ in the
states accessible from the current one via the agent’s belief accessibility relation. An agent’s belief
accessibility relation can be thought of as an agent’s attitude towards the world.
The BDI model (Georgeff et al., 1998) is an extension to classic multiagent epistemic logic
used to reason about agents’ beliefs, desires, and intentions. There is a different modality for each
agent’s belief, desire, and intention.
In general, a modal logic can be defined starting from any underlying logical formalism, by
defining a set of modalities, their semantics, and the interaction with the underlying formalism. I
describe the more general setting of modal logic in the following subsections. However, in this
thesis, the only modalities I am interested in are intention and belief. These will take a probabilistic
meaning which I discuss starting from Section 2.3.
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2.2.1 The Language of Modal Logic
I describe modal logic in the general sense where the underlying logical system can be propositional
logic, first order logic (FOL), or any other formalism.
A logical system consists of a formal language and a semantics. The formal language describes
the statements, or formulas, that can be built in the system. It is defined by:
(a) a finite set of symbols used to build formulas;
(b) a grammar which defines what a well-formed formula is in the language.
The semantics assigns meaning to the formulas in the language. In the following, semantics is
understood in the model-theoretical sense, where meaning is assigned by means of a set of models
of the system and a satisfaction relationship between models and formulas. The models describe
how the symbols of the language are interpreted, while the satisfaction relationship describes how
well-formed formula are evaluated with respect to the interpretation.
Well-formed formulas can be valid, satisfiable, or unsatisfiable, depending on whether they are
satisfied by all, some, or respectively none of the models.
Definition 1. A logical system is a tuple L = (S ,Σ,T, A, {Oi}i≥1, {Qi}i≥1,M, |=) where:
• S = V ] U is a set of symbols;
• Σ is a set of signatures built using symbols of S ;
• T : Σ→ Set is a function assigning to each signature a set of terms;
• A : Σ→ Set is a function assigning to each signature a set of atoms;
• {Oi}i≥1, {Oi}i≥1 are sorted set of operator symbols such that S ∩(∪i≥1Oi) = ∅ and S ∩(∪i≥1Qi) =
∅; Oi represent boolean operators and Qi represent quantification operators;
• M : Σ→ Set is a function assigning to each signature a set of models;
• |=: Σ → 2M×F is a function assigning to each signature σ ∈ Σ the satisfaction relationship
between the models and the formulas of σ, |=σ⊆ M(σ) × F(σ)
The formulas of L are F(σ) = ∪i≥0F0, where:
• F0 = A(σ);
• Fi+1 = FOi+1 ∪ F
Q
i+1;
• FOi+1 = ∪ j≥1{o( f1, ..., f j) | o ∈ O j, f1, ..., f j ∈ ∪0≤k≤iFk};
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• FQi+1 = ∪ j≥1,l≥1{q(x1, ..., xl, f1, ..., f j) | o ∈ O j, x1, ..., xl ∈ V, f1, ..., f j ∈ ∪0≤k≤iFk}.
For example, if L is FOL, then:
(a) V = {x, y, ...}, U = {a, b, ...}, and S = V ∪ U is the set of symbols;
(b) Σ = {(C, {Pi}1≤i≤n, {Fi}1≤i≤m) | C, Pi, F j ⊂ U finite,C∩Pi = C∩Fi = Fi∩Pi = ∅, for every i, j}
is the set of signatures, where:
(i) C is a set of constant symbols;
(ii) Pi is a set of predicate symbols of arity i;
(iii) Fi is a set of function symbols of arity i;
(c) T (C, {Pi}1≤i≤n, {Fi}1≤i≤m) = ∪i≥0Ti is the set of terms, where:
(i) T0 = C
(ii) Ti+1 = ∪ j≥1{ f (t1, ..., t j) | f ∈ F j, t1, ..., t j ∈ ∪0≤k≤iTk}
(d) A(C, {Pi}1≤i≤n, {Fi}1≤i≤m) = ∪ j≥1{p(t1, ..., t j) | p ∈ P j, t1, ..., t j ∈ T } is the set of atoms;
(e) O1 = {¬}, O2 = {∧,∨,→,↔}, Q1 = {∀,∃} is the set of logical operators;




)Fi}1≤i≤n) is the interpretation function,
where:
(i) U is the universe of discourse;
(ii) M requires the interpretation of constant symbols to be elements of the universe of
discourse C → U;
(iii) M requires the interpretation of predicate symbols of arity i to be subsets of U i, Pi → 2U
i
;
(iv) M requires the interpretation of function symbols of arity i to be functions from U i into
the universe of discourse, Fi → UU
i
;
(g) the satisfaction relationship is as follows, for σ = (C, {Pi}1≤i≤n, {Fi}1≤i≤m) ∈ Σ and m ∈ M(σ):
(i) m |= p(t1, ..., t j) iff (m(t1), ...,m(t j)) ∈ m(p), where:
• m(c) ∈ U according to m;
• m( f (t1, ..., t j)) = m( f )(m(t1), ...,m(t j));
(ii) m |= φ ∧ ψ iff m |= φ and m |= ψ;
(iii) m |= φ ∨ ψ iff m |= φ or m |= ψ;
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(iv) m |= ¬φ iff it is not the case that m |= φ;
(v) m |= ∀x1, ..., xl.φ iff for all models m′ of σ to
σ ∪ {x1, ..., xl} = (C ∪ {x1, ..., xl}, {Pi}1≤i≤n, {Fi}1≤i≤m)
such that m′|σ = m, it holds that m′ |= φ;
(vi) m |= ∃x1, ..., xl.φ iff m |= ¬∀x1, ..., xl.¬φ.
Generally, given a logical system and a set of new symbols called modalities, we can define a
modal logic as follows:
Definition 2. Given a set of modalities M and a logical system L, with a set {Oi}i≥1 of logical
operators, sorted by arity, we can define a modal logicM = (L,M) over it. The formulas ofM are
of the form:
• φ, where φ is an atomic formula of L;
• o(φ1, ..., φn), where o ∈ On is a logical operator of L;
• m(φ), where m ∈ M is a modality.
For example, if L is FOL and M = {bela}a∈Ag according to a set Ag of agents, the sentences of
M = (L,M) are:
(a) for any signature S = (C, P), where C is a set of constants and {Pi}i≥1 is an arity-sorted set of
predicates, and for each π ∈ Pn and set {a1, ..., an | ai ∈ C or ai < C is a variable, 1 ≤ i ≤ n},
π(a1, ..., an) is an atomic formula;
(b) if φ is a formula, then ¬φ is also a formula;
(c) if φ1, φ2 are formulas, then φ1 ∧ φ2 and φ1 ∨ φ2 are also formulas;
(d) if φ is a formula and x̄ = x1, ..., xn are variables, then ∀x̄φ and ∃x̄φ are also formulas;
(e) if φ is a formula and a ∈ Ag, then bela(φ) is also a formula.
I define the semantics of modal logic in the next subsection.
2.2.2 Kripke Structure Semantics
While the very first discussions on potentiality were started by Aristotle, modal logic took its current
form with the introduction of Kripke semantics (Kripke, 1963).
Kripke structures describes the possible states of the world and the relationships between them.
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Name Axiom and frame property Explanation
D 2φ→ φ, Rm serial for all w ∈ W, there is v ∈ W such that Rm(w, v)
T 2φ→ φ, Rm reflexive for all w ∈ W, Rm(w,w)
B φ→ 2  φ, Rm symmetric for all w, v ∈ W, Rm(w, v)⇒ Rm(v,w)
4 2φ→ 22φ, Rm transitive for all w, v, u ∈ W, if Rm(w, u) and Rm(u, v), then Rm(w, v)
5 φ→ 2  φ, Rm Euclidean for all w, v, u ∈ W, if Rm(w, u) and Rm(w, v), then Rm(u, v)
K 2(φ→ ψ)→ (2φ→ 2ψ) also known as the distribution axiom
Table 2.1: Commonly used frame axioms.
Definition 3. LetM = (L,M) be a modal logic formalism over a logical system L, with a set M of
modalities. A Kripke structure in this formalism is a tuple KM = (W, I, {Rm}m∈M) where:
• W is a set of models of L called possible worlds
• I ⊆ W is a set of initial worlds
• for each m ∈ M, Rm ⊆ W ×W is an accessibiliy relation between possible worlds, such that
for any w ∈ W, there is at least one w′ ∈ W such that (w,w′) ∈ R
Example 1. For example, if L is propositional logic with atomic propositions P, then a set of
possible worlds has the form W = (S , L) where:
(a) S is a set of world states
(b) L : S → 2P is a labeling function
Example 2. If L is predicate calculus, with constant symbols C and arity-ordered predicate set
P = ∪i≥1Pi, then the set of possible worlds has the form W = (S ,U, Lc, {Li}i≥1) where:
(a) S is a set of world states
(b) U is a set of objects, called the universe of discourse
(c) Lc : S → UC is a labeling function assigning, to every possible world, an interpretation of
constants into the universe of discourse, Lc(s) : C → U∀s ∈ S
(d) for each i ≥ 1, Li : S → (2U
i
)Pi is a labeling function assigning, to every possible world, an
interpretation of predicate symbols of arity i into subsets of U i, Li(s) : Pi → 2U
i
Each accessibility relation between possible worlds can be restricted by means of frame axioms.
Table 2.1 shows some commonly used frame axioms.
In my model (Chapter 7), I assume 4, 5, and K, i.e., the belief is distributive and belief
accessibility relations are transitive and Euclidean. In the context of epistemic modal logic, 4 and 5
are known as the positive and respectively negative introspection axioms:
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(a) Positive introspection (4): agents believe that they believe what they believe.
belaφ→ belabelaφ
(b) Negative introspection (5): agents believe that they don’t believe what they don’t believe.
¬belaφ→ bela¬belaφ
I also assume the agents are rational in the sense that they believe all valid statements. In epistemic
modal logic, this is known as the knowlege generalization axiom:
if |= φ then |= belaφ
Epistemic modal logic of knowledge also usually assumes T, called the knowledge or truth
axiom in this context, which means that everything that an agent knows must be true. This is not the
case for belief. However, I do make a weaker assumption for the model I introduce in Chapter 7,
namely, that everything agents knows about themselves must be true:
belaπ(a)→ π(a) for all unary predicates π (2.1)
Kripke structures make it possible to reason about the meaning of modal formulas. Specifically,
intepretation of modal formulas translates to interpreting formulas under the modality in worlds
accessible from the current world. The type of modality specifies in which of the accessible worlds
to do the interpretation, through the accessibility relation that the Kripke structure assigns to it.
Definition 4. Let M = (L,M) be a modal logic formalism and K = (W, I, {Rm}m∈M) a Kripke
structure for the formalims. Then formulas φ of formalismM are interpreted in K according to
states s ∈ W as follows:
• if φ is an atomic sentence of L, then K, s |= φ iff s |= φ;
• K, s |= o(φ1, ..., φi) iff {K, s |= φ1, ...,K, s |= φi} satisfies the interpetation of o in L;
• K, s |= m(φ) iff K, s′ |= φ for all s′ ∈ W such that (s, s′) ∈ Rm.
Generally, formulas φ of formalismM are interpreted in K as follows:
K |= φ iff K, s0 |= φ∀s0 ∈ I
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Example 3. For example, if L is FOL, Ag is a set of agents, M = {bela}a∈Ag is a set of modalities,
S = (C, {Pi}i≥1) is a FOL signature, then K = (S ,U, Lc, {Li}i≥1, I, {Ra}a∈Ag) is a Kripke structure,
where:
(a) S ,U, Lc, {Li}i≥1 are as in Example 2
(b) I ⊆ S
(c) Ra ⊆ S × S is a belief accessibility relation for each agent
Example 4. Let Ag, M, S , and K be as in Example 3. Then the interpretation of the formulas of S
for K and states s ∈ S is as follows:
(a) for π ∈ Pn and c1, ..., cn ∈ C: K, s |= π(c1, ..., cn) iff (Lc(s)(c1), ..., Lc(s)(cn)) ∈ Ln(s)(π);
(b) K, s |= ¬φ iff it is not the case that K, s |= φ;
(c) K, s |= φ1 ∧ φ2 iff K, s |= φ1 and K, s |= φ2 (analogously for ∨);
(d) K, s |= ∀x1, ..., xnφ iff for any assignment θ : {x1, ..., xn} → U, K ] θ, s |= φ, where:
(i) K ] θ = (S ,U, L′c, {Li}i≥1, I, {Ra}a∈Ag)
(ii) L′c : S → U
C]{x1,...,xn} such that for all s ∈ S , L′c |C= Lc
While the definitions discussed above apply to propositional logic as well as FOL, my models
refer to a restricted case that can be encoded in propositional logic. I also talk about relational
models, but I assume a known and fixed, finite universe.
2.2.3 Situation Calculus
Situation calculus (McCarthy, 1983) is a formalism of action and change over first order logic
(FOL), introduced to enable reasoning about planning.
In situation calculus, actions A are entities that change the state of the world. Situations
S represent action histories. These are specified by an initial situation s0 and function symbol
do : A × S → S .
The truth of certain predicates is evaluated with respect to situation. These predicates are called
fluents. In a FOL formalization, fluents take the situation as an additional argument.
An action is specified in terms of preconditions and effects. The preconditions of an action are
encoded by predicate Poss : A × S , where Poss(a, s) gives the conditions in which action a can be
executed in situation s.
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One problem in encoding effects is that it is computationally infeasible to specify them all, due
to the fact that there may be an unbounded number of effects each action may have on the world.
This is known as the frame problem.
Reiter proposed successor state axioms as a solution (Reiter, 1991). Successor state axioms
describe how each fluent is affected by each action. Specifically, for each fluent F, its truth value in
the situation do(a, s) that results from executing an action a in situation s depends on whether:
(a) F becomes true as a result of a. This requires a positive effect formula γ+F(x̄, a, s) such that:
Poss(a, s) ∧ γ+F(x̄, a, s)→ F(x̄, do(a, s))
(b) F does not become false as a result of a. This is encoded as a negative effect formula
γ−F(x̄, a, s) such that:
Poss(a, s) ∧ γ−F(x̄, a, s)→ ¬F(x̄, do(a, s))
Situation calculus reasoning has been implemented in the logic programming language Golog
(Levesque et al., 1997).
In a multiagent scenario, actions and their preconditions need to be particular to the agents who
execute them. In this sense, for a set Ag of agent, the transition function becomes do : Ag×A×S → S
and preconditions are defined using Poss : Ag × A × S .
Kripke structures can also be encoded in Situation Calculus using (agent-specific) accessibility
predicates. For example, believes : Ag × S × S encodes the belief accessibility relation between
situations. The Kripke semantics of the belief modality, bel, can be encoded as follows:
holds(bel(a, φ), s) ≡ ∀s′.believes(a, s′, s)→ holds(φ, s′)
where φ is a formula and a ∈ Ag, meaning that bel(a, φ) holds in situation s iff φ holds in all
situations s′ accessible through a’s belief relation from s.
In this thesis, I define deception in a modal logic in which I assume frame axioms 4, 5, and K,
as well as the particular form of T in Equation 2.1. I then embed this definition in situation calculus
in order to allow reasoning about a dynamic world. I describe this in detail in Chapter 7.
2.3 Probabilistic Modal Logic
The problem of combining reasoning about knowledge with reasoning about probability requires
attaching probability to sentences and possible worlds. This is difficult because it is not always
clear where the probabilities are coming from.
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Early ideas raised towards solving this problem (Halpern and McAllester, 1989; Fagin and
Halpern, 1994) augmented the definition of Kripke structures with probability assignments, which
assigned a subset of the world states, as well as a measure, to each agent and world state. Modal
formulas are then interpreted using Kripke semantics in the usual way (see Definition 6), while
formulas stating a lower bound on probability are interpreted by checking whether there is a
measurable subset with a measure that satisfies the probability constraint. In essence, this definition
paves the path of defining probability distributions over possible worlds directly as part of the
probabilistic Kripke structures.
In parallel to this work, Kripke semantics for probabilistic belief logics (Bacchus, 1990) defined
a probability distribution over possible worlds.
A broad and straightforward Kripke semantics was recently given for probabilistic modal logic
(Shirazi and Amir, 2007), as a continuation of both of these approaches.
The language of probabilistic modal logic adds real numbers between 0 and 1, as well as {=, <},
as new symbols to the language of modal logic. It also adds new sentences m(φ)αr, where m is a
modality, φ is a sentence, 0 < r ≤ 1 is a real number, and α ∈ {=, <}. For belief, these sentences are
of the form belaφαr and express that an agent a believes φ with probability r (belaφ = r) or with
probability at most r (belaφ < r).
Probabilistic Kripke structures assign meaning to such probabilistic sentences by modeling the
probability that an agent a believes a statement φ. As such, they can be used to answer queries
regarding the probability that an agent a believes a statement φ.
The intuition is that the probability that a believes φ holds is related to the probability that,
according to a, the world is such that φ holds. The world may be fully defined in a number of
possible ways which are mutually exclusive. These are the mutually exclusive possible worlds W
that the agent believes may be the case. Then the probability that a believes φ can be expressed as a
sum of probabilities that jointly: (a) φ holds in a world w ∈ W; and (b) w is the case. The condition
(a), that φ holds in a world w or not, can be deterministically checked. Therefore reasoning about
probabilistic belief statements reduces to reasoning about the probability of a possible world, i.e.
the probability that the world is in a certain way.
Definition 5. LetM = (L,M) be a modal logic formalism over a logical system L, with a set M
of modalities. A probabilistic Kripke structure in this formalism is a tuple KM = (W, P0, {Pm}m∈M)
where:
• W is a set of models of L called possible worlds
• P0 : W → [0, 1] is an initial probability distribution over possible worlds:
– 0 ≤ P0(s) ≤ 1 for each s ∈ W
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– Σs∈W P0(s) = 1
• for each m ∈ M, Pm : W ×W → [0, 1] is a conditional probability distribution over possible
worlds:
– 0 ≤ Pm(s′ | s) ≤ 1 for each s ∈ W
– Σs′∈W Pm(s′ | s) = 1
Definition 6. Let M = (L,M) be a modal logic formalism and K = (W, P0, {Pm}m∈M) a Kripke
structure for the formalims. Then formulas φ of formalismM are interpreted in K according to
states s ∈ W as follows:
• if φ is an atomic sentence of L, then K, s |= φ iff s |= φ;
• K, s |= o(φ1, ..., φi) iff {K, s |= φ1, ...,K, s |= φi} satisfies the interpetation of o in L;
• K, s |= m(φ)αr iff Σs′∈S ;K,s′ |=φPm(s′ | s)αr.
In Chapter 8, I use this formalization of modal logic to translate the model I define in Chapter 7
to a probabilistic setting. I define the semantics by means of dynamic Bayesian networks, which I
discuss in the next two subsections.
2.4 Bayesian Networks
A Bayesian network (Pearl, 2014) encodes a joint probability distribution over a set of variables and
a set of conditional independence assumptions between variables as a directed acyclic graph and a
set of conditional probabilities (of children given parents in the graph).
The intuition comes from using the chain rule to represent a joint probability distribution P over
random variables X1, X2, ..., Xn:
P(X1, X2, ..., Xn) = P(Xn)Σni=1P(Xi | Xi+1, ..., Xn)
For P(Xi | Xi+1, ..., Xn), if Pa(Xi) is a set of random variables such that Xi is independent of
{Xi+1, ..., Xn} \ Pa(Xi) given Pa(Xi), then we can write P as:
P(X1, X2, ..., Xn) = P(Xn)Σni=1P(Xi | Pa(Xi)) (2.2)
A Bayesian Network represents random variables as nodes in a directed acyclic graph, where
there is an arc from X j to Xi in the graph if X j ∈ Pa(Xi). We also have a conditional probability
table (CPT) representing P(Xi | Pa(Xi)) for each node Xi.
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Figure 2.1: Example Bayesian Network
Given a Bayesian network, there are several ways of describing the conditionally independent
subsets of variables. One of the most general criteria is d-separation.
Specifically, two sets of variables X and Y are conditionally independent given a third Z if the
two sets are d-separated given Z, i.e., if there is no active trail between any node of X and a node of
Y, given Z.
A trail is just an acyclic path in the undirected graph underlying the Bayesian Network.
A v-structure is a sequence Xi−1, Xi, Xi+1 along the trail such that in the directed graph, both Xi−1
and Xi+1 are parents of Xi.
A trail is active given a set of random variables Z if a node Xi ∈ Z is on the trail only if it is part
of a v-structure Xi−1 → Xi ← Xi+1 on the trail, and for every v-structure Xi−1 → Xi ← Xi+1 on the
trail, either Xi or one of its descendants is in Z.
2.4.1 Inference in Bayesian Networks
Given a Bayesian Network with random variables X, the inference problem is finding the marginal
probability of a set of query random variables Y ⊂ X given a set of evidence variables E ⊂ X.
Using Bayes’ rule and marginalizing out the unknown variables:






Essentially, the main problem here is computing
P(Y) = ΣwP(Y,w)
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where Y is a set of variables of interest (either observed or sought) and w ranges over the assignments
to the rest of the variables (these are the variables to be eliminated).
Inference in Bayesian Networks is #P-complete (Roth, 1993; Roth, 1996).
The simplest inference algorithm is variable elimination. Using the factorization of P as in
(2.2):
P(Y) = ΣwP(Y,W = w) = ΣwΠY∈YP(Y | Pa(Y))ΠW∈WP(W | Pa(W)))
The main intuition of variable elimination is that we can save extra computation by pushing the
sumation as inward as possible and saving the intermediate factors that appear in products. The
factors will have the form fA(B) and will initially be the conditional probability tables.
As the form above suggests, the variable elimination consists of an alternation of two basic
operations on factors:
(a) summing out - summing out variable V from fA(B) leads to factor fA\{V}(B \ {V})
(b) multiplication - when summing out factors fA(B) and fA′(B′), we get factor fA∪A′(B ∪ B′)
where:
fA∪A′(B ∪ B′ = b) = fA(B = b |B) fA′(B′ = b |B′)
Variable elimination can be seen as a flow of computations on a graphical representation where
we explicitly represent the scopes of the factors involved in summing out and multiplication, together
with edges between scopes that interact in these operations. This representation is called a cluster
graph.
Given a graphical model and a set of factors on it, a cluster graph represents the flow of
information between factors. Each node in this graph is a set of random variables (cluster) from
the initial undirected model. Each edge between two clusters Ci and C j is associated with a set
of random variables Si, j called a sepset, such that Si, j ⊆ Ci ∩ C j. Additionally, a cluster graph is
family-preserving, meaning for each factor there must be a cluster that contains the variables in its
scope.
A junction tree (clique tree, tree decomposition) is a cluster tree with the running intersection
property: for each pair of clusters containing a vertex in the original graph, the vertex is also
contained in every cluster on the path between them. This means that each sepset Si, j = Ci ∩ C j.
In order to build the junction tree for a Bayesian Network, the following steps need to be
performed:
(a) moralization: an undirected edge is added between any two parents of every node
(b) all the directed arcs are turned into undirected edges.
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The resulting graph is the moral graph. The parameters for this graph are the clique potentials
φ(C). In order to build these potentials, one starts with unit potentials for each clique and then,
for each CPT P(X | Pa(X)), the corresponding factor is multiplied into exactly one clique that
contains the scope of the factor.
(c) the resulting graph is triangulated: edges are added until there are no more cycles of size 4 or
greater without a shortcut - this is the chordal graph
(d) for the junction trees where the clusters are all the cliques in the chordal graph
Inference on the junction tree is called message passing. Each factor computes its potential from
the messages received from all its neighbors and then, from this potential, computes a message that
it will in turn send to all its neighbors.
For example, the two operations of variable eliminations will then be performed as follows:
(a) summing out in a factor represented by a factor Ci produces a message τi that is sent to all
factors that need it for multiplication
(b) multiplication is done in a factor Ci after all the messages have been received
So an edge is added between two clusters Ci and C j if τi is needed for the computation of τ j.
Variable elimination on the junction tree is performed from the leaves to the root of the tree,
updating the potentials for each cluster at each step.
Bayesian networks (BN) have been used to factor the conditional probability distributions over
possible worlds in probabilistic Kripke structures (Shirazi and Amir, 2008). This makes probabilistic
modal logic inference computationally feasible.
Definition 7. A graphical Kripke model (GKM) M on a set of random variables Z is a BN defined
as follows:







• P(Zh | Za) is defined by the edges of M.
• There are no edges between the nodes of Za.
The probabilistic belief-over-belief model I introduce in Chapter 8 uses this factorization of the
belief accessibility relation in order to make reasoning feasible.
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2.5 Dynamic Bayesian Networks
Dynamic Bayesian Networks (DBN) extend Bayesian networks to model dynamical systems (Dean
and Kanazawa, 1989).
In a DBN, the state at any point t in time is represented by a set Zt of random variables. It
is typically assumed that the system is first-order Markov, so that knowing the state at time t is
sufficient to reason about the state at time t + 1. The system can thus be represented by an initial
probability distribution over the state, P(Z0), and a transition distribution P(Zt+1 | P(Zt)).
A DBN can therefore be represented as a pair (B0, B→) of Bayesian Networks, where:
(a) B0 is a probability P(Z0) over state at the initial point in time;
(b) B→ is a conditional probability distribution P(Zt+1 | Zt) over state given the state at the
previous time step. This defines a two-time-slice Bayesian network (2TBN), containing the
variables in Zt+1 and the variables in Zt that are parents of variables in Zt+1. In the 2TBN, the
variables in the previous time slice, Zt, have no parents. The priors on Zt are the marginals
that result from reasoning in the previous time slice.
Typically, Zt = Xt ] Yt, where Xt are hidden variables and Yt are observed variables. The
observed variables Yt are assumed to be independent of other variables, given the hidden variables
in the current state Xt.
With these assumptions, the joint probability distribution can be factorized as:
P(Xt,Yt) = P(X0)P(Y0 | X0)ΠTt=1P(Xt | Xt−1)P(Yt | Xt) (2.3)
2.5.1 Inference in Dynamic Bayesian Networks
The goal of inference is to compute marginals P(Xit | Y0 = y0, ...,Yτ = yτ) for every Xit ∈ Xt. If
τ > t, this is a smoothing problem, whereas if τ < t, this is a prediction problem (Murphy, 2002).
There are various methods of inference in DBNs. The simplest algorithm is the forwards-
backwards aglorithm, which exploits the factorization in Equation 2.3 and the fact that the hidden
nodes Xt at time slice t d-separate the past (the nodes in time slices before t) from the future (the
nodes in time slices after t).
The basic idea is to recursively compute the following:
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(a) in a forward pass, αt(x) = P(Xt = x | y0:t), recursively according to:
αt(x) =P(Xt = x | y0:t) =




Σx′P(Xt = x′, yt | y0:t−1)
P(Xt = x, yt | y0:t−1)
∝
[
Σx′′P(Xt = x | Xt−1 = x′′)P(Xt−1 = x′′ | y0:t−1)
]
P(yt | Xt = x)
=
[
Σx′′P(Xt = x | Xt−1 = x′′)αt−1(x′′)
]
P(yt | Xt = x)
(b) in a backward pass, βt(x) = P(yt+1:τ | Xt = x), recursively according to:
P(yt+1:τ | Xt = x) = Σx′P(yt+2:τ | Xt+1 = x′)P(yt+1 | Xt+1 = x′)P(Xt+1 = x′ | Xt = x)
= Σx′βt+1(x′)P(yt+1 | Xt+1 = x′)P(Xt+1 = x′ | Xt = x)
(c) in a final computation, γt(x) = αt(x) = P(Xt = x | y0:τ) ∝ αt(x) · βt(x).
Of note is the interface algorithm (Murphy, 2002). The forward interface I is the set of nodes
that have children in the next slice. The nodes that are not part of the interface are called non-
interface nodes. The forward interface d-separates the past from the future (Murphy, 2002). Since
the interface is a subset of the set of hidden nodes I ⊂ Xt, the interface algorithm is at worst, as fast
as the forwards-backwards algorithm. In many practical scenarios, however, the size of the interface
is much smaller than that of the set of hidden nodes, making the interface algorithm preferable.
The interface algorithm creates a junction tree J1 for the initial time slice and a junction tree Jt
from the union of the interface for the previous time slice and the nodes in current time slice. J1 is
used to reason about the first time slice and Jt is used to reason about subsequent time slices.
In the initialization process, the interfaces in both J1 and Jt are transformed into cliques. For Jt,
the clique that contains the interface I1 of the previous time slice is called an in-clique Cin and the
clique that contains the interface I2 of the current time slice is called an out-clique Cout.
The first step is to apply the evidence y for the initial time slice at J1, and then marginalize the
out-clique potential to get the interface I1 potential:
α0 = ΣCout\I1φCout (2.4)
Then, for every step t > 0 until n − 1 (inclusively):
(a) The resulting interface potential αt−1 from the previous step is multiplied to the in-clique of Jt
to get junction tree J′t .
φ′Cin = αt−1 · φCin (2.5)
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(b) The current evidence cwy1 |x1 is applied to J
′
t and the beliefs are updated.
(c) The interface I2 is marginalized out from the out-clique potential:
αt = ΣCout\I2φCout
In the final step n, the out-interface potential αn−1 is again multiplied to the in-clique of Jt and
the last observed claim is applied to the junction tree.
The process for the backward pass is similar, distributing the evidence and passing messages
backwards.
Even while this significantly reduces the size of the cliques d-separating slices, in some cases
the forward interface can still be too large for inference to be feasible. One approximation (Boyen
and Koller, 1998) involves specifying further independence assumptions between sets of nodes in
the interface. These sets are called Boyen-Koller clusters. Assuming the interface can be expressed
as a disjunction of clusters K1, ...,Kn, I = K1 ] ... ] Kn. With this simplification, inference can
be done independently for each cluster. Then, the potential Φ(I) of the forward interface can be
approximated as Φ(I) = Πni=1Φ(Ki). Boyen and Koller prove that the approximation error remains
bounded indefinitely.
In the model I introduce in Chapter 8, I use the interface algorithm for inference. I also define
Boyen-Koller clusters to tackle the cases where the number of dialogue participants is too large.
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Chapter 3
Deception Detection – Problem Definition
The problem I focus on is that of identifying and modeling deception in dialogues. In this chapter, I
formally define what deception is and what the objective and success measure of my modeling is.
I describe a dialogue as a time-ordered sequence of speaker and utterance pairs. I attach to it the
time-ordered sequence of beliefs and intentions that each agent has throughout the dialogue. I then
define lying, intention to deceive, deceptive stance, sincerity, and perceived sincerity, in terms of
what agents believe about each other and what they want each other to believe. I define deception as
the conjunction of a speaker’s deceptive stance and his perceived sincerity by a listener. I further
introduce the problem of deception detection in terms of deceptive stance and perceived sincerity. I
then show a measure of success on this problem.
3.1 Beliefs and Intentions in Dialogues
In order to define deception in dialogues, I first introduce some preliminary notations and definitions.
First, I want to clarify what I mean by dialogue. A dialogue is a sequence of utterances
exchanged between a setA of agents, where each utterance is issued by a speaker who is in the set
A of agents.
I assume the utterances are strings in a vocabularyV shared by the agents. I use natural numbers
to describe the time order of the utterances in the dialogue: if two utterances are consecutive in the
dialogue, they have consecutive indices in the sequence.
I also assume that all the utterances in the dialogue are public, i.e. all the agents aware at every
point in the dialogue of both the current utterance and its speaker.
Definition 8. LetA be a set of agents,V a vocabulary shared by the agents. A dialogueD : N|n →
A×V∗ is a sequence of utterances, where each utteranceD(i) = (a, u) is defined by:
1. the time point i ∈ N in the dialogue when it is uttered
2. the agent a ∈ A who utters it
3. the propositional content u ∈ V∗, expressed using the vocabulary shared by agents
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Notation: If at point i in the dialogue,D(i) = (a, u), I use the following notation to identify the
speaker and respectively the utterance at this point:
(a) ag(D(i)) = a
(b) utt(D(i)) = u
In the next subsection, I define deception in terms of what agents believe about each other and
intend each other to believe. In order to do so, I now define beliefs and intentions. At every point in
the dialogue, every agent has a set of statements that they believe and an intention. Both the beliefs
and intentions are strings over some vocabulary. I assume that the agents’ shared vocabulary and
thought vocabulary are the same.
Definition 9. A belief sequence is a function B : N × A → 2V∗ where u ∈ B(i, a) (i ∈ N, a ∈ A,
u ∈ V∗) means agent a believes u at point i in the dialogue.
Likewise, an intention sequence is a function I : N ×A → V∗ where I(i, a) = u means that a
intends u at point i in the dialogue.
So far, both the agents’ statements and the content of their beliefs and intentions are string in
an underlying vocabulary. This vocabulary may allow them to express statements about the world.
However, there is no connection between such statements and expressing beliefs and intentions.
This also means that the content of the agents’ beliefs and intentions does not refer to other beliefs
and intentions.
In order to express nested beliefs and intentions, I define the concept of iterated belief or
intention. I introduce the new symbols say, bel, and ind. The meaning of say(i, a, v) isD(i) = (a, v).
The meaning of bel(i, a, v) is that agent a believes v at point i, and analogously for ind(i, a, v) and
intention. Iterated belief and intention at point i is then a closure of the set of possible statements
over application of these symbols, at point i in the dialogue.
The base case consists ofV∗, the set of all statements that can be expressed in the underlying
vocabulary, and the set of utterances that can be produced at the current point i by the current
speaker. The closure under beliefs and intentions iteratively adds to this set the set of all beliefs and
intentions that any agent can have at the current point, using the vocabulary iteratively built so far.
Definition 10. Given a time point i ∈ N, the iterated belief-intention set up to k, BIik is defined as
follows:
1. BIi0 = V
∗ ∪ (∪v∈V∗say(i, a, v))
2. BIik+1 = BI
i
k ∪ (∪a∈A,w∈BIik{bel(i, a,w), ind(i, a,w)})
Then the iterated belief-intention set BIi = ∪kBIik
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The iterated belief-intention set is the extended language of the dialogue. Using this extended
language, it is now possible to express nested beliefs and intentions as the content of agents’ beliefs
or intentions:
Definition 11. The iterated belief sequence is a function B∗ : N ×A → 2BIi where B∗(i, a) ⊆ BIi
is the content of agent a’s belief at point i in the dialogue.
The iterated intention sequence is a function I∗ : N × A → BIi where I∗(i, a) ∈ BIi is the
content of agent a’s intention at point i in the dialogue.
If w ∈ BIik, the semantics of bel(i, a,w) is that w ∈ B
∗
i (a), and analogously for ind(i, a,w) and
I∗i .
According to Definition 9, I(i, a) = u translates to agent a intends u at point i in the dialogue. In
the context of this application, this means that at point i in the dialogue, the next utterance agent a
intends to say is u.
Using these definitions, it is now possible to talk about the intentions of agents in dialogues. For
example, informative intent can be defined as follows:
Definition 12. (Informative intent) Given a dialogue D : |n → A × V∗ as above, agent a has
an informative intent w at a point i ≤ n in the dialogue if there is an agent a′ ∈ A such that
bel(i, a′,w) ∈ I∗i (a) (agent a intends a
′ to believe w, or agent a informs a′ of w).
In the following, I come back to the problem definition of this thesis and focus on deceptive
intent and deception.
3.2 Defining Deception
Deception means intentionally acting to create or mantain in another agent a belief that the deceiver
knows to be false. I define a deceptive stance as a state in which an agent intends to deceive.
Lying is a very particular kind of deception in which the speaker explicitly makes a statement
which he believes to be false.
Definition 13. (Lying) An utteranceD(i) = (a, v) is a lie if v < B∗i (a)
In general, people can be deceptive even without stating anything that they don’t believe. The
deceptive aspect is in the fact that their utterances, while conveying statements that are true in the
current world, are produced according to deceptive intentions.
Definition 14. (Intention to deceive) An agent a ∈ A has an intention to deceive at point i ∈ N in
the dialogue if there exists an other agent b ∈ A and an iterated expression w ∈ BIi such that:
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1. bel(i + 1, b,w) ∈ I∗i (a) (agent a intends b to believe w), and
2. w < B∗i (a) (agent a does not believe w)
An agent is in a deceptive stance during some interval of the dialogue if he has an intention to
deceive at each point in that interval.
Definition 15. (Deceptive stance) An agent a ∈ A is in a deceptive stance if there are points n < m
in the dialogue where for any i ∈ N with n ≤ i ≤ m, there exists an other agent b ∈ A and an
iterated expression w ∈ BIi such that:
1. bel(i + 1, b,w) ∈ I∗i (a) (agent a intends b to believe w), and
2. w < B∗i (a) (agent a does not believe w)
Assumption: Agents intend the propositional content of their utterances to be believed.
Theorem 1. An agent who is lying is in a deceptive stance.
Likewise, I define sincerity as not being in a deceptive stance. Like the deceptive stance, this
can hold for a particular point in the dialogue, a sequence of utterances, or the entire dialogue.
I first define relative sincerity to describe agents being sincere to particular other agents.
Definition 16. (Relative Sincerity) An agent a ∈ A is sincere to agent b ∈ A at point i in the
dialogue if for any iterated expression w ∈ BIi, if a intends b to believe w, then a also believes w:
bel(i + 1, b,w) ∈ I∗i (a)⇒ w ∈ B
∗
i (a)
This can be expressed as
sin(i, a, b) ≡ ∀w.ind(i, a, bel(i + 1, b,w))→ bel(i, a,w) (3.1)
This is helpful in defining perceived sincerity:
Definition 17. (Perceived Relative Sincerity) An agent a ∈ A is perceived as sincere to agent
d ∈ A at point i in the dialogue by agent b ∈ A if b believes that, for any iterated expression
w ∈ BIi, if a intends d to believe w, then a also believes w:
psin(i, a, b, d) ≡ bel(i, b,∀w.ind(i, a, bel(i + 1, d,w))→ bel(i, a,w)) (3.2)
With this, I describe the more general cases of sincerity and perceived sincerity:
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(a) (sincerity) an agent a is sincere if a is sincere to all other agents:
sin(i, a) ≡ ∀x.sin(i, a, x)
(b) (self-centered perceived sincerity) an agent a is perceived as sincere by agent b if a is
perceived by b to be sincere to b:
spsin(i, a, b) ≡ psin(i, a, b, b)
(c) (perceived sincerity) an agent a is perceived as sincere by agent b if a is perceived by b to
be sincere to all agents:
psin(i, a, b) ≡ ∀x.psin(i, a, b, x)
Definition 18. (Acting to deceive) An utterance D(i) = (a, u) is deceptive if there exists another
agent b ∈ A and an iterated expression w ∈ BI j such that:
1. bel(i + 1, b,w) ∈ I∗i (a) (agent a intends b to believe w);
2. w < B∗i (a) (agent a does not believe w);
3. B∗i (a) |= (bel(i + 1, b, u) → bel(i + 1, b,w)) (agent a believes that believing u will lead b to
believe w)
I use the shorthand notation dec(i, a, b) to mean a intends to deceive b at point i in the dialogue.
I also use the notation dec(i, a, b,w) to mean a intends to deceive b at point i on expression w, where
w is as in Definition 18.
Now I define deception as a successfully deceptive act in the context of self-centered perceived
sincerity on the part of the target:
Definition 19. (Deception) An utteranceD(i) is a deception if there exists an other agent b ∈ A
and an iterated expression w ∈ BI j such that:
1. bel(i + 1, b,w) ∈ I∗i (a) (agent a intends b to believe w);
2. w < B∗i (a) (agent a does not believe w);
3. ∀v.ind(i, a, bel(i + 1, b, v))→ bel(i, a, v) ∈ B∗i+1(b) (after the utterance, agent b believes that
agent a believed anything a wanted b to believe)
In other words, an utterance is a deception if the speaker a is deceptive and the target b of the
deception believes it is sincere.
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It can be seen that, if an agent is acting to deceive, then the agent is in a deceptive stance. It also
follows that, if an agent b believes that another agent a is sincere, then b also believes that a is not
acting to deceive.
Therfore, the following are consequences of deception:
(a) if an uterance is a deception, then ¬sin(i, a, b) ∧ bel(i, b, sin(i, a, b))
(b) if an uterance is a deception, then dec(i, a, b) ∧ bel(i, b,¬dec(i, a, b))
3.3 Problem Definition
I use Consequence 3.2 as evidence for deception and define my problem around this definition.
Problem Definition 1. Given a set of agentsA, a vocabularyV, and a dialogueD : N|n → A×V∗,
determine, for each point i in the dialogue withD = (a, u), whether there exist another dialogue
participant b such that:
• a is insincere to b, or in a deceptive stance: ¬sin(i, a, b)
• b believes a is sincere: bel(i, b, sin(i, a, b))
The ideal performance measure is the prediction corectness (e.g., accuracy, F1, or recall) against
labeled data.
Since in some cases my data does not have labels for either insincerity or perceived sincerity,
I use a proxy for this measure and instead optimize correctness for predicting the action inferred
from intention and belief.
For example, in the Werewolf game (Chapter 4), I do not have labels for perceived sincerity. For
this domain, I equate deceptive stance with deceptive role, or werewolf role (Hung and Chittaranjan,
2010a). The intuition is that all players have the motivation to make other people believe they are
not werewolves. For non-werewolves, such an intention is not deceptive, wheareas for werewolves,
this translates to an intention to deceive others regarding their roles. When non-werewolves vote,
they express their belief that the person they vote for is a werewolf, thus deceptive. I therefore use
each non-werewolf agent’s vote as evidence for perceived sincerity.
Definition 20. Given a dialogueD : N|n → A×V∗ and a set P of actions the agents can perform
after the dialogue, then:
• π : A× P → {0, 1} is the performance indicator function if π(a, p) = 1 iff agent a performs
action p after the dialogue;
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• ν : A × P → N is the performance count function if ν(a, p) is the number of times agent a
performs action p after the dialogue.
Then the problem of modeling perceived sincerity is to find a probability distribution over agents
and actions P : A× P → [0, 1] that maximizes the following objective:
OP(A,P, π, v) = Σa∈AΣp∈P(P(a, p)π(a, p))ν(a,p)
For the Werewolf problem, each action p of each agent a is p = vote(a′), that of voting for
another agent a′ , a. Furthermore, each agent votes once per day, so the problem is to find:
argmaxP:A×P→[0,1]Σa∈AΣa′∈A,a,a′P(a, vote(a
′))π(a, vote(a′))
In general, in games, it often happens that players cast their vote once and then change their
votes. In these situation, it’s only their first vote after the considered dialogue segment ends, that
should be taken into account. This is because the model reflects the interactions that take place
during the dialogue, not the way players influence each other’s beliefs by voting. However, a more
lenient performance measure may consider the number of times an agent has voted for another
agent as well, possibly penalizing later votes from the same agent by a certain factor, i.e.
ν(a, vote(a′)) = Σi≥1
π(a, vote(a′), i)
i
where π(a, vote(a′), i) = 1 iff a votes for a′ as its i-th vote (and 0 otherwise).
3.4 Problem Simplifications
As introduced, the definition of sincerity (Equation 3.1) contains higher order quantification over
expressions, which is further carried over to the definition of perceived sincerity (Equation 3.2).
This kind of quantification is hard to represent and reason about. In the following, I restrict the
problem to the case where there is only one kind of expression that the agents may be deceptive
about. This expression is an atom of the form π(x1, ..., xn), where π is an n-ary predicate and x1, ..., xn
are of type agent. I show in Chapter 11 how I can extend my results to the general case of multiple
deceptive intents.
More formally (see Definition 8), the vocabulary of the problem is
V = {π(a1, ..., an) | a1, ..., an ∈ A} ] {π(x1, ..., xn) | x1, ..., xn ∈ {x, y, z...}}
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With this Equation 3.1 becomes
sin(i, a, b) ≡ ∀x1, ..., xn.ind(i, a, bel(i + 1, b, π(x1, ..., xn)))→ bel(i, a, π(x1, ..., xn))
The meaning is that an agent a is sincere towards another agent b at point i if, at point i, a believes
that π holds of the agents that a wants b to believe it does.
Furthermore, I assume that the setA of agents is finite. This makes it possible to translate univer-
sal quantifications into finite conjunctions, which means the logic can be encoded in propositional
modal logic.
Moreover, in many of the following domains, I assume that π refers to a property of the speaker,
e.g. guilty. This reduces the definition of sincerity to believing π about oneself whenever intending
to make another believe it:
sin(i, a, b) ≡ ind(i, a, bel(i + 1, b, π(a)))→ bel(i, a, π(a))
I also restrict the set of modalities to only belief. I make the assumption that π is defined in such
a way for the particular domain in question, that all agents a have the implicit intention that all other
agents believe π(a).
Therefore, for any agents a and b and point i in the dialogue, the following conditions may
occur:
(a) bel(i, a, bel(i, b, π(a)) – a believes that b believes π about him. In this case, a has no reason to
change b’s belief, since it already is π(a) according to a’s belief.
(b) bel(i, a,¬bel(i, b, π(a)) – a believes that b does not believe π about him. In this case, a
produces an utterance with the intention to change b’s belief to π(a).
With this observation, I assume a produces an utterance with the intention that b believe π(a)
(i.e. ind(i, a, bel(i + 1, b, π(a)))), if a believe b does not believe π(a) (i.e. bel(i, a,¬bel(i, b, π(a))).
Then, the expressions of deceptive stance, sincerity, and perceived sincerity change in the
following way:
(a) deceptive stance: a does not believe π(a) but wants b to believe it.
¬bel(i, a, π(a)) ∧ bel(i, a,¬bel(i, b, π(a)))
(b) sincerity: a either believes π(a) or does not believe b does not believe it.
bel(i, a, π(a)) ∨ ¬bel(i, a,¬bel(i, b, π(a)))
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(from bel(i, a,¬bel(i, b, π(a)))→ bel(i, a, π(a))
(c) perceived sincerity: b believes either that a believes π(a) or that a does not believe b does not
believe it. By distributivity (K):
bel(i, b, bel(i, a, π(a))) ∨ bel(i, b,¬bel(i, a,¬bel(i, b, π(a))))
In the model I introduce in Chapter 8, I restrict this further to up to 2 levels of nested belief.
I make the assumption that all belief formulas only have atoms or other belief formulas in their
scope. This can be enforced by pushing all conjunctions and disjunctions out of the scope of belief
modalities by distributivity (K). In this form, I impose the constraint that there be no disjunction
and all negations be over atoms or belief formulas.
In this setting, I retain only the first terms of (b) and (c). I thus approximate sincerity with
believing π of oneself (i.e. bel(i, a, π(a))) and perceived sincerity with believing π of the other (i.e.
bel(i, b, bel(i, a, π(a)))).
In Chapter 7, I use these definitions to express the problem of deception detection in modal
logic. This makes it possible to answer queries regarding deception by reasoning in the logic. The





In this chapter, I instantiate the problem of deception detection for several domains, and discuss
how my model can be applied to each domain. I then focus on the two domains for which I evaluate
my models, and describe a dataset for each domain.
I first evaluate my model on games in which deception is necessary, in particular Werewolf
(Hung and Chittaranjan, 2010b). Then, I turn to the domain of dating, where establishing trust is
important and people might be tempted to misrepresent themselves. Here, I am using the SpeedDate
corpus (Jurafsky et al., 2009).
4.1 Deception Detection Domains
The first domain I talk about is the game of Werewolf. Each phase of the game requires players to
discuss in order to reach a consensus. Furthermore, due to the nature of the game, the participants
have to use deception in order to win. This is a simpler domain to analyze because deceptive or
non-deceptive stances are assigned to players at the beginning of the game and do not change.
Furthermore, the strict rules and the finite set of roles makes it easy to formalize and reason about
the domain.
The next couple of domains are relevant for real-world applications of this research. In particular,
deception can have serious destructive effects on people’s lives when used in dating, private chats
which involve children, and even conversations on social media.
Other domains where it is very important to distinguish truth from deception is that of law
enforcement. For example, in crime investigations, perpetrators are motivated to escape punishment
and may resort to misleading the investigators. Deception detection is useful in both identifying the




Werewolf (Hung and Chittaranjan, 2010b) is a game mimicking the interactions that happen in
highly-motivated high-conflict scenarios such as courtrooms and negotiations. In Werewolf, players
use dialogue either to hide their identities and intentions, or to learn other players’ hidden identities
and intentions, in order to make decisions.
Participants have the roles of either werewolves or villagers (non-werewolf). Initially, each
player knows their own roles and doesn’t know the other players’ roles. The werewolves learn each
other’s roles before the first round, while the non-werewolves have to infer all other players’ roles.
The game proceeds in turns, where each turn has an in-game night and an in-game day. During
the night, unseen by villagers, the werewolves decide together on a non-werewolf victim, which
they remove them from the game. The next day, all the remaining players discuss in order to decide
who is a werewolf. Then, they vote on who they believe is a werewolf. The player with the most
votes is removed from the game. The judge then reveals the removed player’s role.
The werewolves win the game as soon as they outnumber the villagers. The villagers win the
game as soon as there are no werewolves left. In general, games start with fewer werewolves than
half the number of villagers.
The deceptive roles in the case of Werewolf are the werewolf roles. Due to the nature of the
game, the roles are hidden, but fixed throughout the course of the game. What changes is each
player’s beliefs about roles and beliefs about beliefs. My model allows tracking these changes given
the players’ claims about other players’ roles. I use my model to detect the players’ roles given the
dialogue sequence observed so far.
In Section 4.2, I describe the dataset I use for experiments.
Example
The following is a fragment from the game of Werewolf (the names have been replaced by colors):
Green: Red is innocent.
Red: I think Green must be the seer.
Green: And therefore, not the werewolf!
Red: and y’all can kill me if you want.
Judge: Green votes to lynch Blue.
4.1.2 Speed Dating
In speed dating (Finkel et al., 2007; Finkel and Eastwick, 2008), people interested in meeting
potential romantic partners attend an event where they go on a series of 10 to 25 brief dates, each 3
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to 8 minute long, with other attendees. After the event, the participants choose which of their dates
they would like to see again. If two people choose one another, they are given each other’s contact
information in order to arrange more traditional dates.
Considering how little time people involved in speed dating have to form an opinion of each
other, it is easy for malevolent participants to misrepresent themselves. Furthermore, deception in
dating is correlated with the machiavellic trait (Dussault et al., 2013), which is in turn associated with
undesirable behaviors in a relationships. This makes it important to help people detect deception in
speed dating.
It is usally difficult to find data instances where people are malevolent and deceptive, as the
malevolent nature of the deceiver’s intent only becomes apparent after many episodes of interaction.
It is also difficult to connect undesirable outcomes with particular instances of dialogues. On the
other hand, dialogue participants can give an account on their own perception of the interlocutor’s
sincerity. This is the case for the dataset we describe in Section 4.3.
Example
The following is a small example of a conversational exchange in a speed dating setting. The names
have been changed to preserve anonymity.
James: Um, I have a motorcycle actually, a Harley that
I spend a lot of time with. Uh, it’s kind of great
to get out and see the area and --
Anne: The weather’s picking up.
James: The weather’s getting great finally.
4.1.3 Predator Detection
Identifying predators in chats with children is a very important and current problem (Pendar, 2007;
Kontostathis, 2009b; Inches and Crestani, 2012; Gudnadottir et al., 2013).
This can be cast as a deception detection problem, where the predator is deceptive about the
intention to harm the child. The child is not aware of the predator’s harmful intent, so both conditions
of deception are met: a speaker has deceptive intent, and the interlocutor believes the speaker is
sincere. Furthermore, the success of the predator’s harmful intent depends on the child’s belief that
the predator is sincere. As such, the predator acts to maintain this belief in the child, by entrapping
the victim in a deceptive relationship (Olson et al., 2007).
In our setting (Chapter 3), we can assume we have a set of agents A = {a, c}, where a is an
adult involved in a conversation with a child c. Our vocabulary V consists of binary predicate
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symbol harms and the agent symbols as constants: V = (C = {a, c}, P2 = {harms}). The meaning
of harms(x, y) is that the person denoted by x harms the person denoted by y.
Then a is a predator if there are points n < m in the dialogue where for every n ≤ i ≤ m:
(a) bel(i, c,¬ind(i, a, harms(a, c))) ∈ I∗i (a), meaning a intends c to believe that a does not indent
to harm c;
(b) ind(i, a, harms(a, c)) ∈ B∗i (a), meaning a believes a intends to harm c.
This is an instance of a intending to deceive (see Definition 15 in Chapter 3). Furthermore,
with the assumption that children tend to believe that their interlocutors are sincere, this is also an
instance of deception (Definition 19).
This definition can be simplified by introducing binary predicate symbol safe, where the meaning
of safe(x, y) is that the person denoted by y does not intend to harm the person denoted by x (x is
safe from y).
Since this is a highly sensitive issue, chatlogs containing real-world cases of predatory behavior
are not publicly available. A recent effort, Perverted Justices (perverted-justice.com, 2002) asks
volunteers to pose as children in online chats and submit the logs once they find a predator. However,
only positive examples of predatory behavior are made public.
A recent predator detection competition, PAN 2012 (Inches and Crestani, 2012) included
11,350 Perverted Justice logs as positive examples and chatlogs from other sources as negative
examples. There are two kinds of negative examples: 267,261 non-predatory conversations that
contain consensually abusive and sexual language (from www.omegle.com), and 79,011 non-abusive
non-sexual IRC conversations. There are several problems with research on this dataset: the label
distribution is very unbalanced; the positive and negative examples come from very different
populations; and there is no guarantee the negative examples do not contain predatory behavior.
Example
The following is an excerpt from a Perverted Justice chat log. The user IDs have been removed, but
the language used was not altered.
Child: it says ur a truck driver. what kind do u drive?
Other: i drive 18wheeler for now i may hve to stp here
soon do to my driving record
Child: how come?
Other: i drive a peterbuilt truck
Child: whats that?
Other: hav a few tickets i will only have to stop for
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6months then i hope to get bac on the road
Child: do u drive fast?
Other: brand name of a truck
Other: kinda did driv fast
Other: are you ok with my job it will take you places with me
4.1.4 Law Enforcement (Fiction)
Many police investigations focus on identifying the perpetrator of a crime. There is a set S of
suspects and the problem is to decide, for each suspect s ∈ S , whether s is guilty or not. We can
define S as a set of constant symbols and guilty as a unary predicate symbol, where guilty(x) has
the meaning that the person denoted by x is guilty.
The set of agents consists of the set of S suspects and a set L (law enforcement) of investigators
A = S ∪ L.
Most often, people deceive in order to escape being punished rather than in order to be punished.
We will therefore assume that a suspect will only lie when guilty.
Then a suspect s ∈ S is deceptive if for some point i of the investigation:
(a) bel(i, l,¬guilty(s)) ∈ I∗i (s) for all l ∈ L (s intends all investigators to believe s in not guilty);
(b) guilty(s) ∈ B∗i (s) (s believes s is guilty).
During trials, usually S is a singleton set containing only the defendant s, and the set of agents
consists of the defense lawyer d, the prosecutor p, the set W of witnesses, and the set J of jurors:
A = {s, d, p} ∪W ∪ J
The defense is deceptive if for some point i in the trial:
(a) bel(i, j,¬guilty(s)) ∈ I∗i (d) for all j ∈ J (the defense lawyer d intends all jurors to believe the
defendant s is not guilty);
(b) guilty(s) ∈ B∗i (d) (the defense lawyer d believes the defendant s is guilty).
The defendant is deceptive is for some point i in the trial:
(a) bel(i, d,¬guilty(s)) ∈ I∗i (s) (the defendant d intends the defense lawyer to believe d is
innocent);
(b) guilty(s) ∈ B∗i (s) (the defendant s believes himself guilty).
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Many books, movies, and shows portray law enforcement efforts (e.g. Agatha Christie novels,
the movie Twelve Angry Men, or the show Law and Order – Criminal Intent). These can be used as
data to model suspect or defense deception in real life.
However, it is not clear that the language used in fiction can successfully model real-world
deception. One reason we believe this to be the case is that many of the cues for deception are used
unconsciously, because of the effect that deceiving has on other psychological processes (Chapters
5 and 6). It is not always clear to what extent the author of the fictional work either understands or
is able to portray these psychological processes. It is also not clear to what extent the author is able
to capture the variability in language used by people in the real world. In many cases, we expect
the author’s own bias in language use will be stronger than any of the characters’ biases can be
translated from the real-world into fiction.
Example: Law and Order – Criminal Intent
The following is an excerpt from the episode Tuxedo Hill from the series Law and Order – Criminal
Intent. In the episode, Elizabeth Dawson is investigated for murdering her boyfriend. She is involved
in a car accident and claims not to be able to remember what happened before. The investigators
believe she is lying in order to cover her tracks. In the end, it turns out she was framed for murder
by the company she was working for because she discovered their illegal transactions.
In the excerpt, the investigator visits Dawson’s workplace to gather information about her. The
discussion is between the investigator and one of Dawson’s coworkers.
Investigator: How well do you know Ms. Dawson?
Coworker: As well as anybody here. She’s a very honest person.
Investigator: You happen to know her boyfriend?
Coworker: Elizabeth rarely discusses her private life.
Investigator: Meaning, sometimes she does? So, what did she tell
you? I mean, if she’s as honest as you say she is, you
shouldn’t have a problem answering.
Coworker: A few days ago, I found her crying in the ladies’ room.
She was upset because she thought her boyfriend was
cheating on her.
Investigator: Well, any details? Boyfriend’s name or...?
Coworker: No. I think she was embarrassed to have even
said that much. Sorry.
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4.2 The Werewolf Dataset
The raw data set for Werewolf consists of 86 game transcripts collected by Barnwell (Barnwell,
2012). The transcripts have an average length of 205 messages per transcript, including judge
comments. The games were played online, so players only communicated through writing.
In the transcripts, the judge is a bot, which means there is a small fixed set of phrases it uses to
make announcements. As part of the system, the judge knows all the roles as they are assigned. It
reveals those roles in an announcement as follows: every time a player is removed from the game,
their role is made known; and the roles of the remaining players are revealed after the game is
concluded.
4.2.1 Deception Detection
I automatically extracted role assignments by looking for phrases such as was a, is a, turns out to
have been, carried wolfsbane.
I manually checked the assignments and found the werewolf roles were correctly assigned for
72 out of the 86 transcripts. The remaining 14 games end before they should because the judge bot
breaks down. However, the players do reveal their own roles after the game ends. By looking at
their comments, I manually annotated these remaining games.
The fact that the judge is a bot makes it easy to identify both roles and votes. Using the judge’s
claims, I assign the ground truth for role assignment (by looking for player names and roles) as well
as ground truth for votes (by looking for player name pairs). I manually checked the assignments
and corrected any mistakes.
Removing judge messages and any dialogue after the end of the game results in 8455 utterances.
Preprocessing for Baseline Models
For the baseline feature-based models, all the utterances from each player in each transcript translate
to one data instance. The label is 1 or 0, for whether the player is or isn’t a werewolf. I do not
consider the judge as part of the data. The resulting data set consists of 701 instances, of which 116
are instances of a werewolf role.
Given the small size and the skewed distribution of the dataset, I balanced the data with
resampling so that I have enough instances to learn from.
4.2.2 Perceived Sincerity
I do not have ground truth for perceived sincerity for this dataset. Instead, I use players’ votes and
vote outcomes as a measure of perceived sincerity.
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Figure 4.1: Label distribution for perceived sincerity in Werewolf
For each individual day of the game, we assume that the players vote according to their beliefs
regarding the other players’ deceptive roles. Therefore, a non-werewolf player x will vote for
another player y if x perceives y’s role as deceptive. We therefore use vote prediction as a proxy for
perceived sincerity prediction, for our sequence models.
Alternatively, we can directly assign perceived sincerity according to votes. The more turns a
player lasts without being voted out and the fewer votes that player had in general, the higher the
perceived sincerity. Therefore, perceived sincerity would be:
(a) directly proportional to the number of turns a player lasts;
(b) inversely proportional to the number of votes a player has throughout.
Players who are not voted at all are assigned the highest perceived sincerity.




where N is the number of turns a player lasted and p is the player’s proportion of the total number
of votes.
The resulting labels are between 0 and 4, with the distribution in Figure 4.1. I notice a similarity
to the label distribution for the SpeedDate corpus.
For the experiments in Section 9.3, I remove the werewolves’ perceptions and only focus on
those of the non-werewolves. This is because werewolves already know who has a deceptive role
and who does not.
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4.2.3 Human Baselines
I used Amazon Mechanical Turk (Buhrmester et al., 2011) to evaluate how good people are at
detecting werewolves. I randomly picked 58 games and selected, for each, the dialogue segment
between the start of the game and the end of the first day, before the result of the voting is announced.
I asked for 2 annotators per task. Each task consists of reading one such fragment and answering
the following questions, according to the turker’s own beliefs:
(a) Who will be voted out at the end of the current day?
(b) Who are the werewolves, knowing their total number?
I measured observed inter-annotator agreement po, as well as Cohen’s Kappa score κ. Cohen’s




I then measured the accuracy on the instances on which the annotators agreed.
Vote Prediction for Perceived Sincerity
The observed agreement between annotators is 0.35, while Cohen’s Kappa measure is 0.323. On
the small subset of dialogues on which annotators agree, the accuracy is 95.24%.
Deceptive Role Detection
For werewolf detection, the observed agreement between annotators is 0.25 and Cohen’s Kappa
measure is 0.229. The accuracy and F1 on the agreement subset are 67.44% and 22.22%, respec-
tively.
These numbers show the difficulty of the problem. There are many cases on which the annotators
do not agree on who the deceptive person is, or who is perceived as deceptive. This means there
are many hard cases, in which people are successful at hiding their deceptive intent. In such cases,
different people may be relying on different heuristic to decide, resulting in different decisions.
Even when annotators do agree, the human performance in deceptive role detection is not high.
4.3 The SpeedDate Dataset
The SpeedDate dataset has been used before to detect flirting (Ranganath et al., 2009) and other
interpersonal stances (Ranganath et al., 2013). It consists of 1100 recordings of anonymized
4-minute dates.
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I am using the transcriptions of those recordings. Many paralinguistic features are not present
in the transcriptions. However, each utterance is marked with the begining and end timestamps.
Laughter is also marked.
There are 163 dialogue participants, 54 female and 109 male. Each conversation happens
between a female and a male and has up to 331 utterances (123.14 on average).
The dialogue participants have also been asked to provide the following information:
(a) (met) – how well they know the partner (1-6: never met to very familiar).
(b) (willng) – whether the person is willing to give out their e-mail to the other.
(c) (timemtch) – the time it took to decide whether to select that partner or not (1-5 minutes, or
6 for later).
(d) self stance, of the person reporting – how often (1-10) was the person friendly (s-fndly),
flirtatious (s-flirt), awkward (s-awk), or assertive (s-assert).
(e) other’s stance, or the perceived stance of the interlocutor – how often (1-10) was the other
person friendly (o-fndly), flirtatious (o-flirt), awkward (o-awk), or assertive (o-assert).
(f) other’s qualities, or the perceived qualities of the interlocutor, on a 1-10 scale – how attractive
(o-attrct), sincere (o-sincre), intelligent (o-intell), funny (o-funny), ambitious (o-ambits), or
courteous (o-crteos) was the other person.
This dataset has no labels for deceptive intent.
4.3.1 Perceived Sincerity
Since the task is to classify perceived sincerity, I use self-reported perceived sincerity as a label (in
others’ qualities – o-sincre). I consider both the multiclass and the binary classification problem.
Since the value of this label is on a scale from 1 to 10, I use various thresholds for binarization. The
label distribution is shown in Figure 4.2. The most balanced binarization is for T=3: instances with
labels between 1 and 3 are negative (label 0 meaning insincere) and instances with labels between
4 and 10 are positive (54.06% negative). In this context, label 0 means the person is perceived as
insincere, whereas label 1 means the person is perceived as sincere.
I also performed significance testing to evaluate the extent to which other labels correlate with
the perceived sincerity label. I did not find significant correlations.
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Figure 4.2: Label distribution for perceived sincerity in SpeedDate
4.3.2 Human Baselines
I randomly picked a subset of 10 dialogues and asked 2 annotators whether they thought each of the
dialogue participants believed the other to be sincere. They each gave both a yes/no answer and a
score from 0 to 10.
For the yes/no answer, the annotators agreed on 16 out of 20 instances and the accuracy was
100% on this set (all ground truth labels were positive). Both the observed agreement and the
probability of chance agreement were 80% for the sample, so Cohen’s kappa score is 0.
For the 0-10 score, the observed agreement was 0.3 and the probability of chance agreement
was 0.185, for a Cohen’s kappa score of 0.141. I also computed Pearson’s correlation coefficient
between the sequences of 0 − 10 scores that the two annotators assigned. The correlation was





2 + (µ1 − µ2)
2
where µ1, µ2 are each of the annotators’ rating’s mean and σ21, σ
2
2 are the corresponding variances.
The concordance coefficient was ρc = 0.029.
On the agreement subset, accuracy was 0 for 0 − 10 labels, but Pearson’s correlation coefficient
was 0.447.
As in the case of the Werewolf game, the agreement between annotators and the performance as
compared to the ground truth is low, which shows that the problem is hard.
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tm, o-sincre 64.24 62.99
tm, o-sincre, o-attract 75.85 75.96
o-all, tm 73.71 75.86
o-all - {o-sincre}, tm 73.98 75.64
s-flirt, o-attrct, o-funny, tm 74.89 75.68
o-attrct, o-funny, tm 75.83 75.94
Table 4.1: 10-fold cross validation accuracy of classifying willng based on various subsets of
outcomes. Bolded are the best feature sets. Shorthand notation used: stances = {fndly, flirt, assert,
awk}; o-all = {o-fndly, o-flirt, o-assert, o-awk, o-attrct, o-intell, o-funny, o-ambits, o-crteous,
o-sincre}; tm = time to decide; X - {o-sincre} = X except o-sincre; os-X = stance X self-reported by
other
4.3.3 Willingness to Give Contact Information in Speed Dating
I expect that trustworthiness plays a large part in whether a person is willing to give out their e-mail
to the other (willng). In this subsection, I test this hypothesis by evaluating the extent to which the
other labels can predict willingness to share this information.
My intuition is that giving out the e-mail (willng) is a statement of trust. I therefore expect
perceived sincerity (o-sincre) to be a strong predictor of willng. To test this, I evaluated the
relationship between various labels in the dataset and willng.
I use subsets of the other labels as features and logistic regression (LR) and SVM, with 10-fold
cross validation (Table 4.1). Specifically, I use self stances reported by oneself (e.g. s-assert), other’s
perceived stances (e.g. o-assert), and self stances as perceived by the other (e.g. os-assert). I also
show significant correlations of other labels to (willng) in Table 4.2.
Willingness to give out the e-mail is a binary variable, with 45.31% positive responses.
Perceived sincerity
As Tables 4.1 and 4.2 show, perceived sincerity (o-sincre) has little influence on deciding
whether someone is willing to give out their e-mail address.
Perceived stances and flirting
As expected, perceived stances (o-stances) have more influence on the decision than self-
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Table 4.2: Correlation between outcomes and willng. Bolded are the most relevant other labels.
reported stances (os-stances). This holds for each stance individually (assert, awk, fndly, flirt), as
well as all together. However, the strongest influence is flirting.
On flirting, I note that whether or not one is flirting (s-flirt) has a greater influence on one’s
own stance, than whether they are perceived as flirting or whether the other is flirting. This is also
understandable when considering the common cause: if someone already decided to give out their
e-mail to meet again, they may be more likely to flirt.
Time it takes to decide
As expected, the time it takes to make the decision (timemtch) is negatively correlated to the
willingness to give out the e-mail (Table 4.2).
Qualities of the interlocutor
Of the perceived qualities of the interlocutor, the ones that do influence the decision on whether
to give out e-mail or not are attractiveness (o-attrct) and humor (o-funny).
Conclusion
The strongest predictors of the willingness variable seem to have little to do with how honest the
interlocutor is perceived. Thus, my conclusion is that willingness to give out e-mail is a statement
of attraction, not of trust.
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Chapter 5
Psycholinguistic Features for Deceptive Role
Detection
In this chapter, I focus on the problem of detecting deceptive intent. My aim is to understand how
hard the problem is when the input is written text, with poor paralinguistic signal. I also investigate
the extent to which psycholinguistic features are helpful in discriminating between deceptive and
non-deceptive intent. Psycholinguistic features are evidence for the cognitive processes underlying
deception, and thus implicitly model the cognitive state of dialogue participants.
The domain I focus on is the Werewolf game. Werewolf roles are deceptive, as they rely on
deception to win the game, whereas all the other roles are nondeceptive (Hung and Chittaranjan,
2010a). For my purpose, all these roles are collapsed together according to whether they help the
werewolves or not. I consider all the utterances of each player in each game as one distinct instance.
This is a first step towards building a model of deception in the Werewolf game. More generally,
such a model will be useful in scenarios where deception can be used to achieve goals. The model
can then be used to predict future actions, e.g. the vote outcomes in Werewolf.
I show that by analyzing this dialogue genre I can gain some insights into the dynamics of
manipulation and deception. These insights would then be useful in detecting hidden intentions and
predicting decisions in important, real-life scenarios.
5.1 Features
I first discuss several psycholinguistic cues that have been found to be indicative of deception in
general. In the next section, I show to what extent these features can be used to predict deception in
written dialogues for the Werewolf game. In the second part of this section, I discuss how I expect
part-of-speech (POS) and syntactic features to help in prediction.
5.1.1 Psycholinguistic Features
(Tausczik and Pennebaker, 2010) suggest word count and use of negative emotions, motion, and
sense words are indicative of deception.
I counted the negative emotion words using the MPQA subjectivity lexicon of (Wilson et al.,
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2005). I also experimented with the NRC word-emotion association lexicon of (Mohammad and
Yang, 2011), but found the MPQA lexicon to perform better. Since I didn’t have access to LIWC
(Tausczik and Pennebaker, 2010), I used manually created lists of motion (arrive, run, walk)
and sense (see, sense, appearance) words. The lists are up to 50 words long. I also considered
the number of verbs, based on the intuition that heavy use of verbs can be associated to motion.
However, I don’t expect the number of motion words to be as important in my domain. This is
because deception in the Werewolf game does not refer to a fabricated story that other players have
to be convinced to believe, but rather to hiding one’s identity and intentions.
(Tausczik and Pennebaker, 2010) also talk about honesty features : number of exclusion words
(but, without, exclude, except, only, just, either) and number of self references (I used a list of
first person singular pronoun forms). They claim that cognitive complexity is also correlated with
honesty. This is because maintaining the coherence of a fabricated story is cognitively taxing.
Cognitive complexity manifests in the use of: long words (longer than 6 letters), exclusion words
(differentiating between competing solutions), conjunctions, disjunctions, connectives (integrating
different aspects of a task), and cognitive words (think, plan, reason).
(Porter and Yuille, 1996) observe that for highly motivated deception, people use longer utter-
ances, more self references, and more negative statements. I used those as features, as the average
number of words per utterance and the number of dependencies of type negation from the Stanford
parser.
Another set of features cited by (Porter and Yuille, 1996) comes for ex-polygrapher Sapir’s
training program for police investigators. He notes that liars use too many unneeded connectors
and display deviations in pronoun usage – most of the times by avoiding first-person singular. This
seems to contradict the discussion on highly motivated deception (Porter and Yuille, 1996) and is
aligned with (Tausczik and Pennebaker, 2010)’s findings. It is possible that the natural tendency of
a liar is to avoid self references (e.g. due to cognitive dissonance), but that a strong motivation can
cause one to purposefully act against this tendency, ignoring any mental discomfort it may cause. In
my experiments, I didn’t observe any tendency of werewolf to either avoid or increase use of self
references.
There are differences in language when used to recount a true memory versus a false one (reality
monitoring) (Porter and Yuille, 1996). In this context, a true memory means a memory of reality, i.e.
of a story that actually happened, whereas a false memory is a mental representation of a fabricated
story. People talking about a true memory tend to focus on the attributes of the stimulus that
generated the memory (e.g. shape, location, color), whereas people talking about a false memory
tend to use more cognitive words (e.g. believe, think, recall) and hedges (e.g. kind of, maybe, a
little). An explanation is that the process of fabricating a story engages reasoning more than it does
memory, and people tend to resist committing to a lie. I used the noun and adjective count as a
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rough approximation of the number of stimulus attributes, as adjectives and nouns in prepositional
phrases can be used to enrich a description, e.g. of a memory. However, it is important to note that
Werewolf players do not actively lie, in the sense that the discussion does not involve events not
directly accessible to all players. Therefore it’s impossible for players to lie about the course of
events, so there is no false memory to recount.
Another characteristic of the game is that the werewolves actively try to persuade other players
that their intentions are not harmful. (Hosman, 2002) notes that language complexity is indicative
of persuasive power. A measure of language complexity is the type-token ratio (TTR). On the other
hand, hesitations (um, er, uh), hedges (sort of, kind of, almost), and polite forms are markers of
powerless language (Sparks and Areni, 2008). I did not find any polite forms in the data, the context
being a game where players adopt a familiar tone.
The complete list of features is as follows (words are stemmed): TTR (type-token ratio), number
of hesitations, number of negative emotions, number of words, number of words longer than 6
letters, number of self references, number of negations, number of hedges (50 hedge words), number
of cognitive words (50 words), number of motion words (20 words), number of sense words (17
words), number of exclusion words, number of connectors (prepositions and conjunctions), number
of pronouns, number of adjectives, number of nouns, number of verbs, number of conjunctions,
number of prepositions.
5.1.2 POS and Syntactic Features
Following the intuition that cognitive complexity can also be reflected in sentence structure, I
decided to look beyond lexical level for markers of deception and persuasion and experimented
with POS and syntactic features. I used the Stanford POS parser (Lee et al., 2011) to extract
part-of-speech labels as well as dependencies and production rules.
The syntactic features are based on both constituency and dependency parses, i.e. both produc-
tion rules and dependency types.
5.2 Experimental Results
I use the MPQA subjectivity lexicon of (Wilson et al., 2005) to extract emotion features and the
Stanford POS parser (Lee et al., 2011) to extract part-of-speech labels and syntactic features. I use
hand-built word dictionaries for the other psycholinguistic features.
I used Weka and 10-fold cross-validation. In order for the labels to be balanced at 50%, I
rebalanced the data with resampling. I experimented with: logistic regression (LR, 108 ridge), SVM,
Naive Bayes, perceptron, decision trees (DT), voted perceptron (VP), and random forest (RF).
49
Model Acc. F1 Prec. Rec. AUC
SVM 57.2 56.2 58.9 57.2 57.9
Perc 62.77 62.6 63.5 62.8 67
LR 64.91 64.9 65.1 64.9 66.8
NB 55.92 53.7 58.9 55.9 68.6
DT 84.45 84.4 84.9 84.5 87.4
VP 65.34 62.2 70.7 65.3 65.6
RF 90.87 90.8 91.2 90.9 98.1
Table 5.1: Werewolf classification: Perc - Perceptron, LR - Logistic Regression, NB - Naive Bayes,
DT - Decision Tree, VP - Voted Perceptron, RF - Random Forest
5.2.1 Psycholinguistic Features
The results are summarized in Table 5.1. DT and LR performed best among basic classifiers. DT
outperforms LR, and the ensemble methods (VP and RF) far outperform both. An explanation is
that there are deeper nonlinear dependencies between features. I believe such dependencies are
worth further investigation beyond the scope of this chapter. I plan to address this in future work.
In Table 5.1, I underlined the results for the two best basic classifiers, since I further analyze
the features for these. Table 5.3 summarizes the feature selection results. I used Weka’s feature
selection. The selected features (with a positive/negative association with a deceptive role) were:
number of words (negative); number of pronouns, adjectives, nouns (positive).
In order to observe each feature’s individual contribution, I also performed manual feature
selection, removing one feature at a time. Removing the following features improved or did not
affect the performance, increasing the F1 score from 64.9 to 66.1 : number of self references,
number of adjectives, number of long words, number of conjunctions or of connectors (but not
both), number of cognitive words, number of pronouns.
Human baseline
I repeated the experiment for the best feature set and logistic regression, for the case where the
labels are not balanced. The 10-fold cross-validation accuracy for this case was 79.75% and the F1
score was 0.723.
I then held out the sample annotated by human annotators, and trained the classifier on the
remaining data. Table 5.2 shows the results of testing this classifier on the held-out annotated
sample, as well as the human performance on the same sample. The system far outperforms the
human baseline, which shows humans are not very good at detecting deceptive intent.
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Model Accuracy (%) F1 (%)
HB 67.44 22.22
LR 80.83 72.3
Table 5.2: Comparison with human baseline. LR – Logistic regression trained on the remaining
data. HB – Human baseline
Model Acc. F1 Prec. Rec. AUC
bfs 64.91 64.9 65.1 64.9 66.8
afs 62.625 62.4 62.6 63.4 63.4
mfs 66.76 66.8 66.9 66.8 68.9
Table 5.3: Experimental results using logistic regression: bfs - baseline feature set; afs - model
on a subset of features generated with CFS-BFS feature selection; mfs - model on a manually
selected subset of features
5.2.2 POS and Syntactic Features
I repeated the experiments with POS tags as features (POS model) and then with syntactic features
(POS+syn model). The syntactic features I used were dependency types (POS+dep model) and
production rules (POS+con model).
Some of examples of dependency types are: iobj (indirect object), pobj (object of a preposition),
det (determiner), cc (coordinating conjunction), amod (adjective modifier). Some of these features
describe the same phenomena as the psycholinguistic features described before, for example use of
conjunctions and prepositions.
Some examples of production rules are:
(a) ADJP→ RB JJR – this rule also captures some hedges e.g. rather worse or almost better;
(b) S→ ADVP , ADVP NP VP . – the two adverbial phrases introducing the sentence may be
markers of tentative language;
(c) SQ → MD NP ADVP , ADVP VP – a yes/no question, the modal and adverbs may cover
some cases of hedges;
(d) S→ S , CC S . – this rule also captures conjunctions;
(e) VP→ VB ADJP , VB NP – a possibly complex statement, the sequence of verbs may indicate
either motion or hesitation (e.g. by means of repetition).
For each model, the baseline feature set is the set of psycholinguistic features used in the
previous section. The subsequent models use both the baseline features and the syntactic features,
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Feature set Acc. F1 Prec. Rec. AUC
baseline 64.91 64.9 65.1 64.9 66.8
POS 67.33 67.3 67.3 67.3 72.1
POS+dep 76.87 76.8 76.9 76.9 79.9
POS+con 90.59 90.6 90.8 90.6 92.1
POS+syn 91.58 91.6 91.8 91.6 91.2
POS+syn (tf-idf) 92.287 92.3 92.3 92.3 91.8
Table 5.4: POS and Syntactic Features (Logistic Regression): baseline - lexical psycholinguistic
features, also used in subsequent models together with new features; POS - POS features; dep
- dependency features; con - constituency features (production rules); syn - syntactic features;
POS+dep/con/syn - POS and dependency/constituency/syntactic features
e.g. POS+con uses lexical-level psycholinguistic features, POS tags, and production rules. I also
used tf-idf weighting.
Table 5.4 suggests that production rules highly improve performance. An explanation is that
complex syntax reflects cognitive complexity. For example, the utterance: Player A said that I was
innocent, which I know to be true has many subordinates (SBAR nodes , SBAR→ IN S, SBAR→
WHNP S), whereas Anyone feeling particularly lupine? has elliptical structure (missing S→ NP
VP). There is also overlap with lexical features (IN nodes).
5.3 Discussion
Inspecting the decision tree, I found that most non-werewolf players used few words, no connectors,
and no negations. Most werewolves use more words, adjectives, few negative emotion words, and
not many words greater than 6 letters. Some werewolves use sense words and few negative emotion
words, whereas others use no sense words and few or no hedges, self references, or cognitive words.
The conclusion is that werewolves are more verbose and moderately emotional, whereas non-
werewolves are usually quiet, non-confrontational players. Werewolves also use moderately complex
language. This can be explained by the fact that they are actively trying to persuade other players,
while also under the cognitive load of constantly adjusting their plans to players’ comments and of
maintaining a false image of themselves and others.
This aligns with previous findings on low cognitive complexity for maintaining a lie (Tausczik
and Pennebaker, 2010) and verbosity for highly motivated deception (Porter and Yuille, 1996).
Inspecting the odds ratios (OR) of the features in the logistic regression classifier, I found the
following features to be most relevant: TTR (3.49), number of hesitations (0.91), number of negative
emotions (1.16), number of motion words (1.25), number of sense words (0.76), number of exclusions
(1.31), number of connectors (0.92), number of conjunctions (0.92), number of prepositions (1.32).
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On the connection between werewolf roles and persuasion, TTR is indicative of persuasive
power as well as of a werewolf, while the number of hesitations is a marker of powerless language
and is negatively associated with a werewolf role.
The fact that the number of prepositions is indicative of a werewolf role aligns with Sapir’s
findings, whereas the positive influence of negative emotion and motion words and the negative
influence of connectors and conjunctions is as predicted by (Tausczik and Pennebaker, 2010).
However, (Tausczik and Pennebaker, 2010) cite the number of sense words as highly associated with
deception and the number of exclusions, with honesty. I found that in my case these associations
are reversed.
One possible explanation regarding the number of sense words can be the fact that seeing, a
family of sense words, is overloaded in this data set, since seer is a legitimate game role, with
actions (seeing) that carry a specific meaning. Another explanation is that, since the transcripts are
from online game, there is no actual sensing involved.
As for the number of exclusions, (Tausczik and Pennebaker, 2010) list it as a marker of cognitive
complexity, which should be affected by any attempt to maintain a false story. But here most
players do not actively lie, so there is no false story to maintain and, therefore, no toll on cognitive
complexity.
Another observation is that features suggested for highly motivated deception (longer utterances,
more self references, and more negations) are not important for this data set. It is possible that this
is not a case of highly motivated deception, since any motivation is mitigated by the context, which
is a game. This suggests that deception in dialogue contexts as well as game contexts is different
than in the story-telling contexts analyzed in previous work in psycholinguistics (Hosman, 2002;
Porter and Yuille, 1996). On the other hand, identity concealment is different than other kinds of
highly motivated deception – in this particular case it might be more helpful to appear logical, rather
than emotional.
5.4 Conclusion
My findings indicate that detecting deceptive intent is hard, and it is particularly hard for humans.
The psycholinguistic features I introduced are helpful in identifying deceptive roles in the
Werewolf game. These features implicitly model the cognitive processes involved in deception and
sincerity. I discuss possible connections between these cognitive processes and language use.
One important conclusion is that cognitive state is important in modeling deception. This is an
insight that the belief-over-belief models I further introduce in Chapters 7 and 8 exploit by explicitly




Decoding the Perception of Sincerity
In this chapter, I aim to address the following questions:
1. How hard is the problem of decoding perceived sincerity with no or poor paralinguistic
context?
2. Which psycholinguistic features are helpful in assessing perceived sincerity in two challenging
written dialog settings: games and dating?
My contribution is an analysis and experimental evaluation of my novel psycholinguistic features
of perceived sincerity.
I focus on the two domains described in Chapter 4: dating (Jurafsky et al., 2009) and online text
dialog games. For dating, the gold standard is self-reported perceived sincerity of interlocutor after
4 minutes of dialogue. The game I focus on is Werewolf (Hung and Chittaranjan, 2010b), where I
have no self-reported gold standard. As such, I assign scores to players based on the extent to which
other players agree, through voting, on that player’s deceptive role.
I first discuss the features I introduce, then describe my experiments and results.
6.1 Features
I propose new features for perceived sincerity. The main insight is that qualities of the participant
and of the interactional style affect perception of sincerity. Therefore I use new features that
I hypothesize are indicative of qualities associated with perceived sincerity. In addition to new
features, I also consider features used before for different tasks, such as: persuasion (Hosman, 2002),
deception (Porter and Yuille, 1996), (Hirschberg et al., 2005), (Niculae et al., 2015), interactional
style identification (Jurafsky et al., 2009), and stance detection other than deception (Ranganath
et al., 2009), (Ranganath et al., 2013).
6.1.1 Sincerity Perception Features
The presence and duration of silent pauses have been found to be associated with perceived sincerity
(Loy et al., 2016). In my datasets, I have no means to identify silent pauses. I have, however,
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Feature Description Comment/Example
changes no. false starts (’–’) Are you–I’m a
repeat no. repeated words Don’t you –you
utterances number of utterances
duration average utterance duration (SpeedDate only)
sprate ratio of syllables to duration (SpeedDate only)
Table 6.1: Current features of perceived sincerity (Loy et al., 2016)
Feature Description Example
hedge no. hedges somewhat, nearly, maybe
ttr type-token ratio
hesitations no. hesitations uh, um, er
Table 6.2: Description of persuasion features (Porter and Yuille, 1996)
considered other features used in this line of work (Table 6.1), such as false starts, repetitions, and
for the SpeedDate dataset, utterance duration and speech rate (number of syllables per second).
6.1.2 Persuasive Language
My intuition is that gaining trust is to some extent equivalent to persuading a person of one’s
sincerity.
Language complexity is a marker of persuasive language (Hosman, 2002), and one measure of
language complexity is the type-token ration (TTR). On the other hand, hesitations (e.g. um, uh)
and hedges (e.g. rather, kind of ) are indicative of weak, unconvincing language (Table 6.2).
6.1.3 Deception
LIWC (Tausczik and Pennebaker, 2010) identifies the following words as associated with deception:
words that denote movement (motion words), sensing (sense words), cognition (cognitive words),
exclusion words (e.g. only, either, without), conjunctions, prepositions, self-references, and long
words.
Psycholinguistic investigations (Porter and Yuille, 1996) also show a link between deception
and utterance length, self-references, negative statements, cognitive words, hedges (mitigating or
tentative words), and first-person singular pronoun usage.
My previous investigations (Chapters 5) found motion words, negative emotions, conjunc-
tions, prepositions, and exclusions to be indicative of a deceptive stance in dialogue. Other work
(Hirschberg et al., 2005) has also found hesitations correlated with honest rather than deceptive
stances. Both results point to deceptive language being more planned and purposely powerful.
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Feature Description Example/Comment
posemo no. positive emotion words sleek, sagely, regal
motion no. words denoting motion arrive, went, walk
sense no. sensing words view, saw, hear
cog words denoting cognition think, plan, believe
exclusion no. exclusion words but, without, either
self self-references I, mine, myself
longwords no. long words (6+ charachters)
avgwords avg. words per utterance
neg number of negations no, none, nor
negemo no. negative emotion words foul, protest, hate
hesitations no. hesitations uh, um, er
conj no. conjunctions and, but, whereas
prep no. prepositions to, with, above
Table 6.3: Description of features of deception (Hirschberg et al., 2005; Tausczik and Pennebaker,
2010; Niculae et al., 2015)
Positive emotion and pleasantness have also been found indicative of deception (Hirschberg et al.,
2005; Niculae et al., 2015).
I summarize these features in Table 6.3. I use the MPQA lexicon (Wilson et al., 2005) for
sentiment polarity.
6.1.4 Interaction Style and Stance Detection
Previous work has analyzed stance and perception of interactional style in dating conversations
(Jurafsky et al., 2009; Ranganath et al., 2009; Ranganath et al., 2013). While I did not find significant
correlations between stances and perceived sincerity, sincerity can be thought of as similar to a
stance. Therefore, I consider the features previously used for stance detection.
I use swear words, sexual words, and words that denote anger, assent, and dissent (Table 6.4). I
use LIWC (Tausczik and Pennebaker, 2010) to assign values to those features for each utterance.
The SpeedDate corpus has laughter specifically marked, so I use laughter as a feature for this dataset.
I use discourse features as well, such as the number of turns and number of questions (I counted
question marks).
I use existing word lists (Jones, 2012) for my swear word lexicon. In my experiments, I found
this feature to be particularly useful. Indeed, one investigation (Feldman et al., 2017) found that
people who use profanity are less likely to be associated with lying and deception by other people.
The neurological basis (Bergen, 2016) for this phenomenon is as follows: while the brain’s language
center is in the left hemisphere of the cerebral cortex, swearing is controlled by the limbic system
– the part of the brain that processes emotions. Therefore, swearing is processed in the emotion
center, creating the impression that it isn’t planned or scripted, but rather more authentic and
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Feature Description Example/Comment
swear no. swear words heck, damn, crap
anger no. anger words stupid, sucks, hate
assent no. assent words yes, cool, agree
politeness no. polite words please, thank, excuse
dissent no. dissent words no, actually, yes but
laugh laughter instances (SpeedDate only)
you no. references to the other you’d, you’ll, your
us no. us words our, we, ourselves
insight no. insight words think, feel, figure
qmark number of question marks
turns number of turns
Table 6.4: Description of stance and interactional style features (Jurafsky et al., 2009; Ranganath
et al., 2009; Ranganath et al., 2013)
passionate. Other explanations (Adams, 2016) note that swearing carries a social risk, and that
sharing unharmful but socially unacceptable behaviour is a catalyst of bonding.
6.1.5 New Features
Inspired by the observation that pleasantness can be indicative of deception (Hirschberg et al., 2005;
Niculae et al., 2015), I add politeness as a marker of pleasantness. I use the Stanford politeness
system (Danescu-Niculescu-Mizil et al., 2013) to calculate the odds of politeness for each utterance.
Many of the features in Section 6.1.4 are associated with pleasantness (e.g. laughter, anger,
dissent) as well. I also expect that the extent to which someone shows interest in social issues
affects how pleasant they are perceived.
Regarding assent, work on the influence of agreement on perceived sincerity (Eisinger and
Mills, 1968) has found that agreement influences perceived competence rather than sincerity, and
that the more extreme a position one has on an issue, the more sincere they are perceived. I use
intensifiers and exclamations as markers of how extreme one’s position is. On the opposite side, I
included features indicative of uncertainty, such as tentative, anxiety, and discrepancy words. With
the intuition that idea flow is also important to how well argued a position is perceived, I included
causation words, as well as commas, which can be indicative of an either detailed or tentative idea
flow.
As observed in (Mairesse et al., 2007), many of these features are also markers of openness. In
an intuitive sense, I expect openness to be related to perceived sincerity. As additional markers of
openness, I include words indicating informal speech, affective processes, and family (examples
are shown in Table 6.5). I use LIWC (Tausczik and Pennebaker, 2010) for those features.
On affective processes, I want to underline the distinction from emotion, which I also use as a
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Feature Description Example
politeness no. polite words please, thank
social no. words indicating mate, talk, child
social concerns
intens no. intensifiers very, super, highly
wow no. exclamation marks
anxiety anxiety words worried, nervous
discrepancy discrepancy words should, would, could
tentative tentative words maybe, perhaps, guess
affect no. words indicating happy, cried
affective processes
informal no. words indicating assent, fillers
informal speech netspeak, swear,
family no. family-related words mother, sister
ing words that end in -ing
shehe no. third-person she, her, him
singular pronouns
period no. periods
focuspast verbs in past tense went, ran, had
focuspresent verbs in present tense goes, is, has
focusfuture verbs in future tense will, gonna
comma no. commas
cause causation words because, effect, hence
Table 6.5: Description of my new features
feature (Section 6.3). Affect is the conscious subjective experience, while emotional affect is the
unconscious component (Panksepp, 2005). Features of emotion usually refer to the unintentional
display of emotion. Features of affect refer to intentionally discussing the subjective experience,
which is a sign of openness.
I considered words ending in -ing as marker of vagueness, which may be indicative of deflection.
Indeed, by inspecting the top tf-idf scoring words for perceived insincerity, there were several words
ending in -ing. Another sign of deflection can be referring to others who are not present. I therefore
counted third-person singular pronouns.
Other features I considered were simple periods (’.’), which can be indicative of calm, unemo-
tional conversation, and verb tenses, where I expect discussing about one’s past or future to be a
sign of openness.
6.2 Experimental Results
In this section I show experimental results for perceived sincerity in the SpeedDate and Werewolf
datasets I described in Chapter 4.
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I use the MPQA lexicon (Wilson et al., 2005) to count positive and negative emotion words. In
order to count swear words, I use existing word lists (Jones, 2012). In order to assign a politeness
score, I use the Stanford politeness system (Danescu-Niculescu-Mizil et al., 2013) and assign the
odds of politeness.
I explicitly calculate the type-token ratio and count commas, periods, exclamation marks,
question marks, turns, and utterances. I calculate the utterance duration and speech rate for the
SpeedDate dataset, where the start and end timestamp of each utterance is given. For this dataset, I
also count explicitly marked laughter instances.
For false starts, I looked for patterns such as ’–’. In order to count repetitions, I compared a
word with other words in a small surrounding window. To count intensifiers, I used a manually built
lexicon. For the other features, I used LIWC (Tausczik and Pennebaker, 2010).
6.2.1 Perceived Sincerity in Speed Dating
As a start, I want to see how well a bag-of-words baseline classifier performs. I use Naive Bayes
(NB), SVM, and logistic regression (LR) as classifiers, with 10-fold cross-validation. I report the
results for binary classification in Table 6.6 and 6.7 and for multiclass classification in Table 6.8.
For the binary classification problem, I use binarization threshold T=3, as it results in the most
balanced label distribution.
I repeat the experiments using the psycholinguistic features in Section 6.1. I normalize all
features.
I perform feature selection and show the results of the best performing sets in Table 6.6.
All psycholinguistic feature sets significantly outperform the bag-of-words baseline. The best
performing feature set (DALT) consists of average number of words per utterance, positive and
negative emotions, self-references, long words, and TTR. A different feature set with a similar
performance (DCLT4) adds insight words, swear words, dissent words, and number of turns.
By performing correlation analysis, I discover significant correlations between sincerity per-
ception and: type-token ratio, period use, positive emotion, focus on the past, affect, emotion, use
of long words, informal words, hesitations, social words, exclamations, sense words, and use of
third-person singular (CORR-SD).
In addition to accuracy (Table 6.6), I also show precision, recall, and F1 (Table 6.7). I can see
that while BOW performs slightly better in precision, the psycholinguistic features have a much
better recall and F1.
Since the gold standard is perceived sincerity, a false negative is a situation where the listener
perceives the speaker as sincere, but my system thinks he perceives him as insincere. False negatives
put the listener at a higher risk of deception. For example, if the speaker was indeed deceptive, and
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Feat. NB (%) SVM (%) LR (%)
BOW 44.94 ± 3.67 50.03 ± 5.12 43.93 ± 6.13
All 49.43 ± 4.94 53.98 ± 0.11 49.94 ± 6.38
DALT 53.92 ± 0.19 53.98 ± 0.1 52.77 ± 4.4
DCLT4 54.33 ± 1.4 53.98 ± 0.1 52.77 ± 4.7
CORR-SD 53.98 ± 4.13 53.98 ± 0.11 49.49 ± 3.83
Table 6.6: 10-fold cross validation accuracy of binary classification of o-sincre with psycholinguistic
features. T=3 is the cutoff threshold for label binarization: [1–3] negative, [4–10] positive. Bolded
results are better than BOW at p<0.05.
Features F1 Precision Recall
BOW 39.97 ± 7.84 47.64 ± 17.58 40.63 ± 13.61
Psi 54.8 ± 6.78 46.43 ± 4.27 67.9 ± 13.71
Table 6.7: 10-fold cross validation F1, recall, and precision of binary classification of o-sincre
(T=3). For each feature set, I show the best result across all classifiers (NB, LR, SVM). Psi – all
psycholinguistic features. Bolded results are significantly better than BOW at p<0.01.
the system thinks the listener is already wary, it may not issue a warning. On the other hand, if the
listener is distrustful, but the system labels him as trusting (a false positive), then the worst case
scenario is an unnecessary warning.
Therefore, false negatives are more costly than false positives, so recall is a better measure for
decoding perceived sincerity.
I also show experiments for the multiclass classification problem (Table 6.8). I show experimen-
tal results for bag-of-words features, all psycholinguistic features, and features correlated to the
label. Again, the psycholinguistic features outperform the bag-of-words features.
Overall, psycholinguistic features perform better than the bag-of-words baseline. The reason is
that the feature space is much sparser, and the new features capture connections between language
and psychological processes. I discuss these connections in detail in Section 6.4.
Features NB (%) SVM (%)
BOW 13.92 ± 2.77 17.97 ± 2.64
All 15.47 ± 3.16 20.94 ± 0.23
CORR-SD 18.12 ± 3.14 20.94 ± 0.23
Table 6.8: 10-fold cross validation accuracy of multiclass classification of o-sincre with psycholin-
guistic features. All – all psycholinguistic features. The bolded results are significantly better than
BOW at p < 0.01.
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Feature correlations per gender
The following features were significant for the SpeedDate dataset: number of periods, hesitation
and disfluencies, emotion, positive emotion, affective, informal, social, sense, and long words,
focus on the past, exclamations, third-person singular pronouns (negative); and type-token ratio and
politeness (positive).
It is interesting to note that women and men rely on very different cues to judge the other’s
sincerity.
For men, exclamations and focus on the past, others, and family are seen as insincere. These
features are markers of openness, which may be perceived as untimely.
On the other hand, women rely on many more cues to make a decision. In addition to the CORR-
SD features above, the following were negatively correlated with perceived sincerity: verbosity
(duration, number of utterances, number of turns), cognition (insight and cognitive words), conflict
words (anxiety and dissent words), laughter, focus on the present, weak language (tentative words,
discrepancies), and discourse (comma use, conjunctions, causation words). Exclamations and focus
on the past were not relevant, while politeness was negatively correlated to perceived sincerity.
Some of these features are understandable in the context of deception cues. Verbosity and
complex discourse can be seen as deflective, while weak language is a marker of uncertainty, which
makes people distrustful. Since they are more relevant for women than in general, I conclude that
women may be more alert to possible deception.
With the observation that talking about one’s past and future require more openness, one
conclusion is that women require more openness to judge the speaker as sincere.
On the other hand, while a marker of authenthicity, conflict diminishes pleasantness. Women
may see positive language as more sincere. This can pose a risk in online interactions, as pleasantness
is also associated with deception.
Human baseline
In order to compare my models to human performance, I held out the sample annotated by humans
and trained the logistic regression model on the remaining data, using the best feature set CORR-SD.
I computed accuracy and F1 for the binary classification problem (T=3) and Pearson’s correlation
coefficient for the multiclass problem. The results are in Table 6.9. The correlation coefficient
shows that the problem is as hard for my model as it is for the human annotators.
6.2.2 Perceived Sincerity in the Werewolf Game
I perform multiclass classification, with the label distribution in Figure 4.1, as well as binary
classification, with threshold T=2 (59.46% negative).
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Model Accuracy (%) F1 (%) Correlation
Human baseline 100 0 0.447
LR (CORR-SD) 44.44 54.54 0.454
Table 6.9: Comparison with human baseline. Accuracy and F1 are for the binary classification
problem (T=3). Correlation is for the multiclass problem.
Features NB (%) SVM (%)
BOW 35.73 ± 5.55 36.44 ± 5.39
All 32.16 ± 2.3 35.73 ± 4.96
DALT 28.44 ± 8.23 35.21 ± 7.48
DCLT 38.57 ± 1.7 36.5 ± 6.4
DCLT5 35.22 ± 7.66 39.34 ± 8.48
DCLT4 35.4 ± 6.01 38.8 ± 8.32
CORR-SD 37.35 ± 4.06 36.15 ± 7.18
CORR-WW 38.61 ± 3.91 38.81 ± 4.65
Table 6.10: 10-fold cross validation accuracy of multiclass classification. Bolded are the best results,
significantly better than BOW at p<0.05
I only found significant correlations with the assigned perceived sincerity label for hesitations
and swear words (positive correlation). I call this feature set CORR-WW.
I perform feature selection to identify the best performing subset of psycholinguistic features.
One such subset consists of cognitive words, positive and negative emotions, self-references, long
words, and TTR (DCLT). Another subset adds the following features to DCLT: us words (see Table
6.4); insight, dissent, sexual, and swear words; laughter, hesitations, questions, and turns (DCLT5).
Table 6.10 summarizes the best results. I also show results for the best performing feature
subsets for the dating dataset (DALT, DCLT4) and for the features correlated with perceived sincerity
in both datasets.
Several subsets of psycholinguistic features outperform the bag-of-words baseline. The corre-
lated features for both Werewolf and SpeedDate datasets perform best.
Features NB (%) LR (%)
BOW 57.83 ± 8.88 56.77 ± 6.29
All 57.61 ± 7.83 62.1 ± 8.51
CORR-SD 58.18 ± 7.31 59.81 ± 3.86
CORR-WW 59.28 ± 6.44 58.23 ± 5.5
Table 6.11: 10-fold cross validation accuracy of binary classification. Bolded results are significantly
better than BOW at p<0.1.
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6.3 Random Forest Experiments
I also used Random Forest classifiers for both the BOW and the psycholinguistic feature sets. After
careful tuning, the cross-validation accuracy for both feature sets reached the same point. This
point was 55.73 ± 0.23% for the SpeedDate dataset (binary classification) and 39.49 ± 0.97% for
the Werewolf dataset (multiclass classification).
For the BOW feature set, this accuracy was reached with 1500 decision trees of depth 1, while
for the psycholinguistic feature set, 100 decision trees of depth 1 were necessary. In both cases, each
decision tree was assigned at most log2 N of the features, where N is the total number of features.
Therefore, random forests perform feature selection, where each decision stump selects the most
informative feature for its sample. The classifier selected 24 psycholinguistic features and 1, 194
out of the 11, 090 word types.
My intuition is that some of the selected psycholinguistic features encode the categories that the
selected word types fall into.
Indeed, the following are some of the selected words:
(a) I, my, me (self-references);
(b) think, aware, consider, obviously, depend (insight words);
(c) yea, yes, cool, exactly (assent words);
(d) think, rigorous, study, known, debate, compared (cognition words);
(e) maybe, may, roughly, supposedly, hardly (hedges);
(f) overly, very, truly, mainly, obviously, super (intensifiers);
(g) thank, respect (polite words);
(h) complain, miss, terrific, limited, silly, ridiculous, passion, pleasure, desire, wish, attraction
(emotion words);
(i) fun, laughed, cool, enjoyable, enjoy, terrific, fresh (positive emotion words);
(j) hate, embarrassing, annoyed, boring, offended, affect, concerned, traumatic, stress, miss
(affect words);
(k) roommate, talk, speak, everybody, neighborhood, marry, buddy (social words);
(l) eh, aw, oh, huh (fillers, informal words);
(m) crap (swear word);
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(n) swim, happens, biking, skiing, go, leave, flew, traveled (motion words);
(o) heard, sensor, watched (sense words);
(p) except, whether, alternative, otherwise (exclusion words).
6.4 Discussion
At the beginning of the chapter, I raised the following questions:
1. How hard is the problem of decoding perceived sincerity with no or poor paralinguistic
context?
2. Which psycholinguistic features are helpful in assessing perceived sincerity in two challenging
written dialog settings: games and dating?
To answer Question 1, my experiments show that perceived sincerity in dialogues, using only
written language as input, is a hard problem. Shallow classifiers using both bag-of-words and
psycholinguistic features perform poorly. The gap between the classifiers’ performance and the
gold standard might be explained by the lack of non-verbal features and their combination with
verbal ones, which would support the 7% Rule.
Since context and complex cognitive processes are involved in deception and sincerity, it may
be useful to explore the role of deeper interactions not explicitly observed or labeled, for example
by adding latent variables to the model.
In the following, I will answer Question 2.
For speed dating, a rich vocabulary (type-token ratio) and politeness were positively correlated
with the label. These are markers of persuasive language (Hosman, 2002). This suggests that
powerful language is perceived as more sincere.
Inspecting the odds ratios of logistic regression: use of self-references, insight, dissent, and
swear words were found indicative of perceived sincerity. Since self-references are indicative of
honesty, it is not surprising that the listener picked up on such cues to decide the speaker was honest.
As expected, insight indicates perceived sincerity. On the other hand, swear words and dissent
can be seen as markers of speaker confidence. This can be linked to observations in the literature
(Eisinger and Mills, 1968) that taking an extreme position, whether in agreement or disagreement,
singals sincerity.
Some of the features indicative of perceived insincerity were related to verbosity (number of
turns, long words), cognition, uncertainty (number of periods, hesitations, and disfluencies). This
is not surprising, since negative emotion and average word count are indicative of deception, and
weak language does not inspire trust.
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On uncertain language, previous research (Hirschberg et al., 2005) has shown that, while filled
pauses signal discomfort with a topic and are thought of as markers of deception, they correlated
more strongly with truthful statements. The fact that people are more likely to label these statements
as insincere shows that humans may not be good at perceiving sincerity.
Other markers of perceived insincerity were related to pleasantness (politeness, positive emotion,
affective and social words) and openness (emotion, informal, exclamations). It is interesting to
note that pleasantness can indeed be indicative of deception (Hirschberg et al., 2005; Niculae et al.,
2015). Also, it is possible that, given the context (4 minute conversations), too much openness can
be perceived as unwarranted and therefore, inauthentic.
Other features can be described as story-telling features (focus on the past, third-person singular
pronouns), as they are used to relate events about other people. While relating events from the
past is conducive to bonding, focusing on other people is a form of deflection from oneself. The
combination can be seen as a one-sided request for trust.
For the Werewolf game, verbosity plays less of a role. On the other hand, use of cognitive words
was more important, a feature indicative of honesty. Features of pleasantness turned out to be more
important as well.
Features indicative of perceived sincerity are positive emotion, number of turns, hesitations,
and number of swear words. Features indicative of perceived dishonesty were dissent, cognitive
words, and insight words. These findings are similar to the case of the SpeedDate corpus, with the
exception of dissent, insight words, and hesitations.
Hesitations are, as noted before, markers of honesty. It is possible that players of Werewolf are
more alert to cues of deception and honesty. For dissent, one reason why it is seen as insincere may
be that, in the Werewolf game, the players who talk more (usually the werewolves themselves) are
also those who take charge of the problem of werewolf identification and are thus more likely to
use insight words. As for disagreement, in this setting there is one main issue to agree or disagree
on, namely the identity of the werewolves. In this context, disagreement is equivalent to defending
oneself or other players, often in the face of group consensus, which can be seen as an attempt to
deflect rightfully assigned blame.
It is also important to note that, for dating, the participants do have access to non-verbal cues
to rely on, even if the transcriptions do not contain them. They also have to pay attention to much
more stimuli and have less time to process them. On the other hand, in the Werewolf game, the
interaction between players is only through written text. It is therefore to be expected that Werewolf
players rely more on written language cues than the people in the SpeedDate dialogues, and have
more time to give them more weight.
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6.5 Conclusion
My classification experiments show that sincerity detection in written dialogues is a difficult problem
that requires further investigation.
I find that several psycholinguistic features are similarly correlated to perceived sincerity across
domains, such as language complexity (TTR), cognitive processing (cognitive words, long words),
strong opinion (dissent, swear words), positive emotion, and verbosity. Deception cues help in
identifying perceived sincerity only to the extent that they are not overriden by pleasantness features.
My findings show that, like for deceptive intent, implicitly modeling cognitive state is important
for decoding the perception of sincerity. The models in Chapters 7 and 8 explicitly model this
cognitive state by means of beliefs-over-beliefs and can be used to jointly reason about both
deceptive intent and perceived sincerity.
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Chapter 7
Reasoning about Nested Beliefs in
Multi-Party Dialogues
In Chapter 3, I defined the problem of deception in a dialogue as the conjunction of the following:
(a) the speaker a has the intention to deceive b on a statement π(a) about oneself;
(b) the speaker is perceived as sincere by b.
I expressed intention to deceive and perception of sincerity as agents’ beliefs about beliefs.
In this chapter, I formally describe the language and semantics of a logic capable of expressing
deception. I implement this formalization in Golog (Levesque et al., 1997) and perform reasoning
to infer players’ beliefs about other players’ roles in the Werewolf game (Chapter 4). I use these
beliefs over beliefs to predict who the players will vote for.
Models of beliefs about beliefs have been proposed and used in general settings. In particular,
models that combine beliefs and knowledge with actions have bee proposed and used (Moore,
1985; Scherl and Levesque, 2003; Delgrande and Levesque, 2012). Naïve use of these models for
reasoning about beliefs in dialogues have theoretical and practical difficulties. In this chapter, I
extend and slightly modify these approaches to effectively model and reason about nested beliefs in
dialogues.
Presently, it is natural to model changes of beliefs with illocutionary acts or utterances as actions
(Cohen and Perrault, 1979; Cohen and Levesque, 1985; Cohen and Levesque, 1990). Such an
approach is motivated by theories in pragmatics (Searle, 1976; Horn, 1984). This approach is
general, but unfortunately it is representationally and computationally hard. This is so because
action definitions need to account for exponentially many perlocutions, or possible effects an
utterance may have on a hearer. The inherent parallelism of utterances in multi-party dialogues adds
further complexity.
Since the world does not change during the dialogue between acting stages, the illocutionary
acts result in changes in each agent’s beliefs. Therefore, this approach also needs an account of
belief change.
Whereas Belief Revision is concerned with axiomatizing how beliefs change, my goal here is to
provide a language that can be used to reason about nested beliefs in dialogues. I overcome the need
to represent perlocutions by assuming an observation model of beliefs, which consists of axioms
67
describing how beliefs and hidden world properties are exposed by utterances. The agents’ belief
states are filtered (Shirazi and Amir, 2011) with the observed utterances, resulting in an updated
Kripke Structure.
In this chapter, I present a new approach for modeling such dialogues whereby utterances are
observations on the belief states of agents. The main contribution of this chapter is a framework
for the representation of such observation models that are both representationally compact and
computationally feasible, as an extension of Golog programs (Levesque et al., 1997). The main
insight of this chapter is that modeling of beliefs about beliefs can be done compactly by using a
belief observation model to filter agents’ belief accessibility relations. I illustrate the benefits of
my new approach experimentally over one domain and show that my new model-based approach,
cobmined with a simple shallow feature technique, is superior to shallow feature based approaches.
I use models based on Kripke Structures and Situation Calculus (Moore, 1985; Scherl and
Levesque, 2003; Delgrande and Levesque, 2012) as a starting point for my own. The model can also
serve as a basis for building intelligent agents who participate in argumentative dialogues, modeling
other participants’ beliefs and intentions to achieve their own goals by means of interaction.
The chapter is structured as follows: In the next section, I describe the observation model and
show how it can be used in belief filtering. I then present the dynamic model and its interaction
with the observation model. In the following section I show examples of applying my model to
real-world domains. I then show experimental results on a small set of examples.
7.1 The Belief Observation Model
In order to use the sequence of utterances in a dialogue to reason about beliefs regarding deception,
it is essential to describe the relationship between utterances and beliefs. I do this by means of a
belief observation model.
The belief observation model is a set of belief observation axioms. A belief observation axiom
describes what an observation exposes of an agent’s internal state and under which conditions of
the world. I show how this model is used to update modalities with sequences of observations.
A domain I use throughout for illustratory purposes is the Werewolf game (see Chapter 4).
Players are assigned the roles of either villagers or werewolves. The game proceeds in alternating
day and night rounds. By night, unseen by villagers, the werewolves choose and kill a victim. The
victim’s identity is announced by a judge at the beginning of the next day. Then, the rest of the
villagers discuss and vote to execute one person who they agree is a werewolf. Frequently there is
another role, that of a seer, who can ask the judge about the identity of one player every night. The
problem is to predict the outcome of each player’s vote.
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7.1.1 Preliminary Definitions and Notation
I build upon the framework of Situation Calculus (McCarthy, 1983), using successor state axioms
as introduced by (Reiter, 1991) as a solution to the frame problem and the complete axiomatization
of (Scherl and Levesque, 2003) for knowledge and belief in Situation Calculus.
I define the model with the following building blocks: a set Ag of agent symbols; a set R of
roles; a set Pp of properties; and a set S A of speech acts.
The predicate symbols used to express the agents’ properties that are relevant to the dialogue are
split into those that describe the agent’s internal state (this is part of the hidden state an observation
exposes) and the agent’s external state. This split is useful in writing the belief observation axioms,
in that it helps in deciding what is and is not directly observable about an agent.
The roles are unary predicate symbols that indicate an agent’s internal state in a certain situation
and, depending on the domain, may include: emotions (e.g., angry, defensive), roles in a game (e.g.,
seer in the Werewolf game) or a transaction (e.g., parent in a transactional analysis domain).
Persistent (not situation dependent) roles are assumed by agents throughout the entire dialogue
(set Rp ⊆ R).
The properties are predicate symbols that indicate an agent’s external state, known by all
agents in any situation. These may be unary public roles (e.g. jury, judge, defendant), observable
properties of an agent (e.g. alive), or binary relationships between agents, e.g. an agent’s attitude
towards another (e.g., positive), an agent’s feelings towards another (e.g., angry_at).
The speech acts (Austin, 1975; Searle, 1976) are predicate symbols that indicate speech acts.
All the speech acts considered are uttered by a speaker and directed towards all the other participants
in the multi-party dialogue - so all utterances are public. The speech acts are of the following kinds:
(a) S A1 = {µ1}µ∈S A - speech acts with no specified subject and object of the propositional content
(e.g., a request that the door be open, request1(x, u) ∧ be_openo(door, u))
(b) S A2 = {µ2}µ∈S A - speech acts where the subject, but not the object, of the propositional
content is specified (e.g., a request that a certain other agent open the door, request2(x, y, u) ∧
openo(y, door, u))
(c) S A3 = {µ3}µ∈S A - speech acts where the subject and object of the propositional content are
specified (e.g., a request that a certain other agent open a certain door, request3(x, y, z, u) ∧
is_door(z) ∧ openo(y, z, u))
Modal logic signatures
The signatures describe the language of the domain and consist of a setM of modalities (e.g.,
belief or intention) and signatures in the underlying formalism, i.e. multi-sorted first-order logic,
with the following components:
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(a) sorts, describing the kinds of objects in the domain;
(b) constant symbols;
(c) predicate symbols.
The sorts are: the agent sort a, the observation sort o, and the observation sequence sort ω (with
o as subsort). Utterances are observations, meaning they are variables of sort o.
I use the notation x : a to indicate that x has sort a.
The constant symbols are the agents C = {c : a}c∈Ag.
The predicate symbols are the internal roles R (e.g. werewolf, angry) and external properties
Pp (e.g. jury, alive)
P = {ρ : a}ρ∈R ∪ {π : a}π∈Pp
and the claims about them, which I call observation predicates
OP = {po : āo}p∈P
.
Situation calculus signatures
As described in Chapter 2, translating the problem to situation calculus requires the following
changes to the signature:
(a) a new situation sort σ and a new action sort α;
(b) a new constant symbol s0 of sort σ, for the initial situation, as well as constant symbols A of
sort α for the actions in the world:
(c) translating the predicates to fluents that depend on situation and adding predicate symbol
Poss : ασ and function symbol do : aασ→ σ;
(d) translating each modality M ∈ M to an accessibility relation between situations.
The new set of constant symbols is therefore:
C = {c : a}c∈Ag ∪ {s0 : σ} ∪ A
The set of fluents is:
F = {p : ās}p∈P ∪ {po : āos}p∈P
Predicate symbol Poss : ασ is used to define the preconditions of actions ac : α. Specifically,
Poss(a, s) means that ac : α is possible in situation s : σ.
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Function symbol do : aασ→ σ simulates the execution of actions. Since this is a multiagent
context, the action execution function do also specifies who does the action. It is thus a ternary
function that takes as arguments agents, actions names, and situations, in this order, and yields the
new situation. For example, do(x, ac, s) is the situation that results by agent x : a executing action
ac : α in situation s : σ.
The effects of actions in A are encoded by successor state axioms as part of a dynamic model. I
discuss this dynamic model in Section 7.2.
The modalities M ∈ M are the agents’ accessibility relations on situations (Scherl and Levesque,
2003) and are new predicates of sort aσσ. Specifically, M(x, s′, s) means situation s′ : σ is
accessible from situation s : σ to x : a via modality M.
In order to express how these accessibility relations change with sequences of obesrvations, I
introduce extended modalities {Me}M∈M of sort aωσσ. Specifically, Me(x,w, s′, s) means situation
s′ : σ is accessible from situation s : σ to x : a via M ∈ M, after sequence of observations w : ω.
The relationship between modalities and extended modalities is more formally established later
when I discuss belief filtering.
This translation encodes the semantics of modal logic into situation calculus.
The semantics of FOL sentences φ is translated to situation calculus by means of the holds
predicates. In particular, holds(φ, s) defines what it means that φ holds in situation s. If we denote by
φ(s) the translation of φ by replacing all predicates in φ with their corresponding fluents grounded
in s, then holds(φ, s) ≡ φ(s). For example, if φ = angry(x), then holds(angry(x), s) ≡ angry(x, s).
For modal formulas, the translation is defined using the accessibility predicates:
holds(M(x, φ), s) ≡ ∀s′ : σ.M(x, s′, s)→ φ(s′)
and analogously for extended modalities:
holds(Me(x,w, φ), s) ≡ ∀s′ : σ.Me(x,w, s′, s)→ φ(s′)
7.1.2 Belief Observation Axioms
In my model, the utterances are treated as observations about the belief states of the agents.
A belief observation axiom is an axiom of the form:
∀u : o.∀s : σ.∀~x : ~a.φ(~x, s, u) ∧
∧
i, j∈I
xi , x j →
∨
k
(φk ∧ φMk )
where:
(a) φ(~x, s, u) is a well-formed formula
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(b) ~x is the vector of free agent variables in φ
(c) I is a subset of the indices of ~x
(d) each φk is a formula not containing modalities
(e) in each φMk , every formula not containing modalities is in the scope of a formula that does
contain modalities
Formula φ(~x, s, u) is the observation and encodes any fact that becomes available to all agents.
Variable u of sort o is the utterance it refers to. In particular, φ can be encoding:
(a) the function and propositional content of an utterance or an announcement result
In this case, φ is of the form
φ(~x, s, u) ≡ µ(~x, u) ∧ φo(~x, u, s)
(b) a directly observable property of the world or the agents
φ(~x, s, u) ≡ αo(x, y, s, u)
where there are indices i, j such that x = xi, y = x j
Formulas φk encode facts that are not available to all agents (e.g, internal states). Formulas
φMk describe the agent intentions or beliefs that, in the conditions described by φk, resulted in the
observed value of the fluent encoded by φ. Formulas φk and φMk describe the hidden state.
For readability, I refer to the components of a belief observation axiom as:
(a) speaker variable x;
(b) utterance φ, with the speaker x as the first argument and the current situation s and observa-
tion u as the last arguments;
(c) guard g, a non-modal formula describing what the state of the world must be, in conjunction
to the hidden modal state, in order for the speaker x to produce the utterance in situation s:
φk = g(..., x, ..., s)
(d) exposed hidden modal state e, with the first argument referring to the speaker x, i.e. the
agent whose hidden modal state this is:
φMk = e(x, ..., s)
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Then, the general form of a belief observation axiom is:
∀u : o.∀s : σ.∀x : a.φ(x, ..., s)→ ∨(g(..., x, ..., s) ∧ e(x, ..., s)) (7.1)
The belief observation model is known by all agents.
Example: For the game of Werewolf (see Chapter 4), a belief observation axiom would be
accusing another player of being the werewolf:
∀u : o.∀x, y : a.(claim2(x, y, u) ∧ wolf o(y, u, s) ∧ x , y)→(




¬wolf (x, s) ∧ holds(B(x,wolf (y)), s)
)
This states that, for any claim u that x makes about y, such that according to u, y is a werewolf in
situation s, either the speaker x is a werewolf who believes y is a non-werewolf who suspects him,
or the speaker x is a non-werewolf who believes y is a werewolf.
7.1.3 Modality Axioms
In my model I define axioms that relate agent intentions and other modalities to the way beliefs
influence those modalities. These axioms are generally domain specific.
The persistent modalities P do not depend on the situation and do not depend on any sequence
of observations either.
∀x : a.∀ss′ : σ.P(x, s′, s)→ ∀w : ω.Pe(s,w, s′, s)
In (Scherl and Levesque, 2003) all modalities are persistent in that the accessibility relations
are the same for all situations. It’s the fact that the situation changes, that makes other situations
become available to the agent via the modality. In my approach, instead, sequences of observations
change modality accessibility relations. The observations do not change the situation and are all
received in the same situation. Disconnecting belief update from situation change allows us to model
each agent’s belief change independently. It also allows us to model the effects of an utterance
(the perlocution) independently of the act itself. By contrast, using my starting point (Scherl and
Levesque, 2003) as-is, I would have to model the act as an action in Situation Calculus. In that
scenario, the act would have to include all the possible effects on the hearer. An utterance would
also result in a new situation for the entire dialogue, which means that agents would have to either
synchronously update their beliefs, or do so in a given sequence of situations, thereby breaking the
natural parallelism in a group of agents’ individual belief change. I give formal details of my belief
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update process in the following section.
7.1.4 Belief Filtering
Observations (utterances) are used in the process of logical filtering (Shirazi and Amir, 2011) to
select the situations to be believed or intended.
The situations that are inconsistent with the new observation become unaccessible to the agent.
The intuition is that the result of filtering the belief accessibility relation with an observation is a
new accessibility relation. This is what the second argument of the extended modality predicates,
the sequence of observations, captures.
For modality M, agent x, situations s, s′, and formula φ,
filter(φ,M, x, s, s′)
holds if s′ is M-accessible to x from s after filtering with φ.
In the following, I call a formula φ objective if φ does not contain any modalities.
Filtering is defined recursively as follows:
(a) In the base case, filtering accessibility from s with an objective formula φ translates to keeping
the target situations s′ in which φ holds:
filter(φ,M, x, s, s′) = φ(s′) ∧ M(x, s′, s) if φ is objective (non-modal)
(b) Similarly, filtering accessibility from s with a modal formula M′(y, φ′) translates to keeping
the target situations in which the formula may hold:
filter(M′(y, φ′),M, x, s, s′) = ∃s′′.filter(φ′,M′, y, s′, s′′) ∧ M(x, s′, s)
(c) Conjunction and disjunction are distributed according to the distribution axiom (K):
filter(φ ∧ ψ,M, x, s, s′) = filter(φ,M, x, s, s′) ∧ filter(ψ,M, x, s, s′)
filter(φ ∨ ψ,M, x, s, s′) = filter(φ,M, x, s, s′) ∨ filter(ψ,M, x, s, s′)
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(d) Quantification:
filter(∀x.φ,M, x, s, s′) = ∀x.(filter(φ[x/S ],M, x, s, s′))[S/x]
filter(∃x.φ,M, x, s, s′) = ∃x.(filter(φ[x/S ],M, x, s, s′))[S/x]
(e) Negation is distributed according to de Morgan’s laws and reduces to applying previous rules.
filter(¬φ,M, x, s, s′) = ¬φ(s′) ∧ M(x, s′, s) if φ is objective
filter(¬(φ ∧ ψ),M, x, s, s′) = filter(¬φ ∨ ¬ψ,M, x, s, s′)
filter(¬(φ ∨ ψ),M, x, s, s′) = filter(¬φ ∧ ¬ψ,M, x, s, s′)
filter(¬M′(y, φ′),M, x, s, s′) = ∀s′′.filter(¬φ′,M′, y, s′, s′′) ∧ M(x, s′, s)
filter(¬∀x.φ,M, x, s, s′) = filter(∃x.¬φ,M, x, s, s′)
filter(¬∃x.φ,M, x, s, s′) = filter(∀x.¬φ,M, x, s, s′)
Now I can use sequences of observations to filter the belief state. Extended modalities express
the accessibility relation between situations after a sequence of observations. Their meaning can be
defined recursively.
For the base case, with no observation, the extended modality is the same as the modality:
Me(x, ε, s′, s) ≡ M(x, s′, s)
If an observation matches the utterance φ(x, ..., s) of a belief observation axiom (Equation 7.1):
φ(x, ..., s)→ ∨(g(..., x, ..., s) ∧ e(x, ..., s))
then for any agent z, the belief accessibility relation is filtered with the right-hand side of the
belief observation axiom. More formally, if Γ is the belief observation model, i.e. the set of belief
observation axioms:
Me(z, uw, s′, s) ≡ Me(x,w, s′, s)∧∧
φ(~x,s,u)∧
∧








filter(φk,M, x, s, s′) ∧ filter(φMk ,M, x, s, s
′)
))
The consequences of an agent’s previous beliefs and the new observation φ are also believed:
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Theorem 2. For any modality M ∈ M, agents ~x ∈ Ag∗, y ∈ Ag, situation s, formulas φ, ψ, ψ′,
utterance u, and observation sequence w, such that {ψ, φ(~x, s, u)} |= ψ′, it is the case that
{Me(y,w, ψ, s)} |= Me(y, uw, ψ′, s)
Conversely, only those consequences of previous beliefs that are consistent with the new
observation φ are believed:
Theorem 3. For any modality M ∈ M, agents ~x ∈ Ag∗, y ∈ Ag, situation s, formulas φ, ψ, ψ′,
utterance u, and observation sequence w, such that {ψ, ψ′} |= ¬φ(~x, s, u), it is the case that
{Me(y,w, ψ, s),Me(y, uw, ψ′, s)} |= 2
Theorems 2 and 3 can be proved by induction on the structure of extended modalities.
7.2 The Dynamic Model
So far I described how to use the content of utterances in the dialogue as observations on the belief
state of agents. I model the actions that change the world (i.e., not the content of beliefs) as actions
in Situation Calculus. This involves writing successor state axioms for the actions in the domain.
Belief filtering and action execution are orthogonal. Likewise, actions and observations are
treated separately, which means domain-specific successor state axioms only need to be written
for non-modal predicate, i.e. fluents F. For modality predicates, I only need the following belief
continuity axiom:
∀ac : α.∀s : σ.∀y : a.∃w : ω.∀x : a.∀s′ : σ.M(x, s′, do(y, ac, s)) ≡ Me(x,w, s′, s)
This axioms states that, for any action ac executed by agent y in situation s, there is a sequence
of observation w after which the action is executed. After that, all agents’ accessibility relations are
the same as they were before execution, with no observation received in the new situation.
7.3 Formalization of the Werewolf Game
The components I described so far, belief observation axioms, modality axioms, belief filtering, and
successor state axioms, can now be used to formalize deception in a given domain. In this section, I
show how to do this for the Werewolf game (Chapter 4.2).
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For Werewolf, I consider as observations claims about the agents’ roles. Other utterances only
expose their propositional content.
The deception domain is then described by the following:
(a) the roles R are the game roles (e.g. R = {judge,wolf , seer, peasant}) and Rp = R;
(b) the properties are Pp = {alive1, dead1, voted2}, where alive(x, s) is used to indicate that x is
alive in situation s (analogously for dead(x, s)), and voted(x, y, s) is used to indicate that x
voted for y in situation s;
(c) the actions are A = {vote(x)} ∪ {roundn(x)}3≤n≤|C|;
(d) the speech acts are S A = {claim2}, where I use claimr(x, y, s) (where r ∈ R) as a shorthand
for
∃u : o.claim2(x, y, u) ∧ ro(y, u, s);
(e) the modalities are beliefs (B) and intentions (I);
(f) the extended modalities are Be, which specifies beliefs after observation sequences, and Ie,
which specifies intentions after observation sequences.
7.3.1 Observation Axioms
I assume only players can make and be the object of claims, for all roles r ∈ R, claims c ∈ {r,¬r},
situations s:
∀x, y : a.claimc(x, y, s)→ ¬(judge(x, s) ∨ judge(y, s))
The observation model is known by all agents and consists of the following axioms:
(a) Accusing another player of being the werewolf: A player x accuses y of being a werewolf
either if x is not a werewolf and believes y is a werewolf, or if x is a werewolf and believes y
is a suspecting non-werewolf:
∀x, y : a.(claimwolf (x, y, s) ∧ x , y)→ ¬wolf (x, s) ∧ holds(B(x,wolf (y)), s)∨
wolf (x, s) ∧ holds(¬B(x,wolf (y)), s) ∧ holds(B(x, B(y,wolf (x))), s) (7.2)
(b) Defending another player: Defending another player y depends on whether or not the
defending player x believes other players believe y is a werewolf, which is expressed as
holds(B(x,∃z : α.z , x ∧ z , y ∧ B(z,wolf (y))), s)
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Then, a non-werewolf player x will defend another player y if x believes y is suspected by
others, but is not a werewolf.
A werewolf x does not have an interest to rescue other players. However, a werewolf will
defend another player y if there is at least another player who believes y should be defended.
∀x, y : a.(claim¬wolf (x, y, s) ∧ x , y)→
(¬wolf (x, s) ∧ holds(¬B(x,wolf (y)), s)
∧ holds(B(x,∃z : α.z , x ∧ z , y ∧ B(z,wolf (y))), s))∨
(wolf (x, s) ∧ holds(¬B(x,wolf (y)), s)
∧ holds(B(x,∃z : α.z , x ∧ z , y ∧ ¬B(z,wolf (y))), s)
∧ holds(B(x,∃z : α.z , x ∧ z , y ∧ B(z,wolf (y))), s)) (7.3)
(c) Defending oneself: Both a werewolf and a non-werewolf will defend themselves if they are
suspected.
∀x : a.claim¬wolf (x, x, s)→ holds(B(x,∃z : α.z , x ∧ B(z,wolf (x))), s) (7.4)
(d) Claiming the role of seer: Either a werewolf or a seer may claim the seer role for oneself. A
player claiming another player y is a seer is a non-werewolf believing y really is a seer and
that another player intends to remove y from the game.
∀x : a.claimseer(x, x, s)→ wolf (x, s) ∨ seer(x, s)
∀x, y : a.(claimseer(x, y, s) ∧ x , y)→
(¬wolf (x, s) ∧ holds(B(x, seer(y)), s) ∧ holds(¬B(x,wolf (y)), s)
∧ holds(B(x,∃z : α.I(z, dead(y))), s)) (7.5)
(e) Claiming that someone is not a seer: A seer will claim another person y is not a seer if she
believes y is thought by others to be a seer.
∀x, y : a.claim¬seer(x, y, s)→ seer(x, s) ∧ holds(B(x,∃z : α.B(z, seer(y))), s) (7.6)
(f) Not only utterances can be seen as observations that alter beliefs and intentions. Executing an
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action such as voting can affect fluents such as voted, so those fluents can also be modeled as
observations:
voted(x, y, do(z, a, s))→ I(x, dead(y, _), s) (7.7)
7.3.2 Belief and Intention Axioms
I use a set of axioms that describes the interaction between intention and belief. A first set of axioms
describe the end goal of each agent, which in the game of Werewolf is to stay alive.
∀s : σ.holds(P(x,¬dead(x)), s)
Game rounds end with agents voting to have someone executed, which also reflects in the agents’
intentions:
∀s : σ.holds(P(x,∨y∈C,y,xdead(y)), s)
Persistent intentions are intentions and are known by all.
In a reciprocal manner, any agent will intend another agent be dead if she concluded the latter
intends her death:
∀s : σ.holds(B(x, I(y, dead(x)))→ I(x, dead(y)), s)
If an agent knows who the werewolf is, unless she is herself a werewolf, she will intend the
werewolf be dead:
∀s : σ.holds(B(x,wolf (y)) ∧ ¬wolf (y)→ I(x, dead(y))), s)
The werewolf will have a similar approach to the seer.
Conversely, an agent’s belief about another agent’s intention will also inform her belief regarding
who the werewolf is:
∀s : σ.∀x, y : a.holds(I(x, dead(y))→ (¬wolf (x) ∧ B(x,wolf (y))) ∨ (wolf (x) ∧ B(x,¬wolf (y)))), s)
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7.3.3 Initial Situation
In this section, I describe the initial state of the world by what holds in the initial situation s0.
Initially, the agents are assigned and thus know their roles:
∀x : a.r(x, s0)→ holds(B(x, r(x)), s0) for all roles r
Since each agent has at most one role, for the unique roles r ∈ Ru we have that each agent who
holds a unique role believes no other agent holds this role.
∀s : σ.∀x, y : a.r(x, s)→ (y = x ∨ holds(B(x,¬r(y)), s0)) ∧ holds(B(x,¬B(y, r(y))), s0) (7.8)
Each game will specify a role assignment. The roles will be assigned in the initial situation, but
this assignment will not be available to the agents.
7.3.4 Dynamic Model
The actions are voting and ending a round of game.
Voting is available to any player and any living player can vote for any living player she intends
the death of:
Poss(x, vote(y), s) ≡ ¬judge(x, s) ∧ ¬judge(y, s) ∧ holds(I(x, dead(y)), s)
Ending a game round of n players with x voted out (roundn(x)) is available to the judge. This is
possible if there are at least n different players in the game, who are alive and not the judge, and if
more than half of them voted.
Poss(u, roundn(x), s) ≡∃y1...yn : a. (∧1≤i≤n(alive(yi, s) ∧ ¬judge(yi, s)) ∧ (∧1≤i, j≤nyi , y j)
∧(∀z : a.alive(z, s) ∧ ¬ judge(z, s)→ ∨1≤i≤nz = yi))∧
judge(u, s)∧ ¬dead(x, s) ∧ ∃y1...y1+n/2 : a.(∧1≤i≤1+n/2voted(yi, x, s))
Ending a game round is also an announcement action, where the judge announces the identity
of the player who was killed by werewolves during the night. Similarly to a sensing action (Scherl
and Levesque, 2003), it has associated an announcement result AR.
Specifically, AR(roundn(x), s, r) expresses that player x, who was voted out by executing roundn
in situation s, had role r. This is a partial function as, depending on the roles, there may be rounds
with no victims.
AR(roundn(x), s, r) ≡ ∨c∈Ag(r = c ∧ dead(c, s))
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AR(roundn(x), s, r) ∧ AR(roundn(x), s, r′)→ r = r′
7.3.5 Successor State Axioms
The successor state axioms describe the effects of executing an action on any of the fluents:
(a) The roles do not change:
r(x, do(y, ac, s)) ≡ r(x, s) ∧ ¬dead(x, do(y, ac, s))
(b) Players are dead because they were: already dead; voted out at the end of the current round;
or killed by werewolves at the end of the current round:
dead(x, do(z, ac, s)) ≡dead(x, s) ∨ (ac = roundn(x) ∧ Poss(z, ac, s))∨
∃y : a.(ac = roundn(y) ∧ Poss(z, ac, s) ∧ AR(ac, do(z, ac, s), x))
(c) A player’s vote is counted when she performs the action of voting and does not change unless
she votes for another player:
voted(x, y, do(u, roundn, s)) ≡(voted(x, y, s) ∧ (u , x ∨ ∀z : a.roundn , vote(z)))
∨ (roundn = vote(y) ∧ u = x ∧ Poss(x, roundn, s))
Note that belief filtering and action execution are orthogonal, in that the first only affects
accessibility relations, whereas the latter only affects the current situation. Action execution results
in a new situation, and new observations will lead to refining the accessibility of situations believed
or intended from the new situation.
7.4 Formalization of Deception Domains
In this section I illustrate my model on two real-world domains I introduced in Chapter 4, those
of speed dating and jury discussions, as well as on dialogues between sales representatives and
customers. These domains are more complex than the Werewolf game. Therefore, it is advisable
that the belief observation model be learned from annotated jury dialogues rather than hand-coded.
This is a direction I explore in Chapter 8.
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7.4.1 Speed Dating
In the speed dating domain (see Chapter 4), pairs of people participate in 4-minute dialogues in
order to gauge their interest in dating each other.
Possible statements that a speaker may be deceptive about can be either interested(a), i.e. the
speaker is interested in the listener, or safe(a), i.e. whether the speaker does not intend to harm the
listener. I discuss the case where the speaker may be deceptive on whether they are interested.
The possible actions refer to whether or not a dialogue participants gives their contact information
to the other, give_contact_info.
I assume that, as in the case of the Werewolf game, utterances can be represented as claims
about each other’s or oneself’s sincerity claimsin or deception claimdec. In Chapter 8, I discuss how
this assumption can be satisfied in practice.
Therefore, in this domain:
(a) the role R is the interest R = {interested};
(b) the properties refer to the observed proprieties of an agent’s language
Pp = {positive1, negative1, polite1, talkative1, informal1},
where positive(x, s) and negative(x, s) refer to the polarity of the emotion displayed by x
toward the interlocutor in situation s;
(c) the actions are A = {give_contact_info};
(d) the speech acts are S A = {claimsin, claimdec};
(e) the modalities are belief (B) and intention (I);
(f) the extended modalities Be and Ie express beliefs and, respectively, intentions, after se-
quences of observations.
A possible belief observation model is as follows:
(a) If a speaker believes the interlocutor has a different level of interest, but intends the speaker
to believe the opposite, the speaker’s utterance will encode a claim of the interlocutor’s
deception.
∀x, y : a.claimdec(x, y, s) ∧ (x , y)→
(interested(x, s) ∧ holds(B(x,¬interested(y)) ∧ B(x, I(y, B(x, interested(y))), s))∨
(¬interested(x, s) ∧ holds(B(x, interested(y)) ∧ B(x, I(y, B(x,¬interested(y))), s))
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(b) If the speaker believes that the interlocutor has the same level of interest and that she intends
to convey it, the utterance will encode a statement regarding the interlocutor’s sincerity.
∀x, y : a.claimsin(x, y, s) ∧ (x , y)→
(¬interested(x, s) ∧ holds(B(x,¬interested(y)) ∧ B(x, I(y, B(x,¬interested(y)))), s))
∨ (interested(x, s) ∧ holds(B(x, interested(y)) ∧ B(x, I(y, B(x, interested(y)))), s))
(c) An utterance will represent a claim about the speaker’s sincerity if the speaker believes the
listener incorrectly perceives her interest. The speaker’s intent will then be to correct that
assumption about oneself. This is similar to a Werewolf player defending oneself if suspected.
∀x : a.claimsin(x, x, s)→
(interested(x, s) ∧ holds(B(x, B(y,¬interested(x))) ∧ I(x, B(y, interested(x))), s))∨
(¬interested(x, s) ∧ holds(B(x, B(y, interested(x))) ∧ I(x, B(y,¬interested(x))), s))
(d) A speaker’s utterance will convey the speaker’s deception if the speaker intends the interlocu-
tor to believe she has a different level of interest than the case is, because the interlocutor has
a different level of interest than the speaker.
∀x : a.claimdec(x, x, s)→
(interested(x, s) ∧ holds(B(x,¬interested(y))), s) ∧ holds(I(x, B(y,¬interested(x))), s))
∨ (¬interested(x, s) ∧ holds(B(x, interested(y))), s) ∧ holds(B(x, B(y, interested(x))), s))
In Chapter 8, I discuss how the belief observation model can be made more general, by
expressing the relationship between claim and beliefs-over-beliefs in terms of parameters that can
be learned from domain data.
7.4.2 Jury Discussion
The domain of jury discussions is exemplified in the movie 12 Angry Men (Lumet and Rose, 1957).
The movie describes the deliberations of the twelve jury members, punctuated by voting phases
where the jurors express their opinion on the guilt of the defendant. The votes are anonymous,
we only know the vote counts after every phase. The model can be adapted to the jury domain to
predict the vote outcomes.
A more complex version of this domain would include primitive for reasoning about time.
Formalizing the entire domain is however not the aim of this chapter and will make the subject of
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future work. For a simplified version of the jury domain:
(a) the agents are the jurors ji, the defendant d, the witnesses wi, and the victim v;
(b) the roles R are the emotional states of the agents and the guilt of the defendant (e.g. R =
{angry, calm, doubtful, confident, guilty}) and Rp = {guilty};
(c) the properties are the public roles, the observable properties, the relationships between jurors,
and the jurors’ attitudes towards the defendant Pp = {defendant1,witness1, victim1, juror,
foreman1, dead1, old1, aggressive1, positive2, negative2, neutral2};
(d) the actions are A = {vote, kill, harm, sense};
(e) the speech acts are S A = {claim2, claim1, prove1, order1, order2, agree2, disagree2, support2,
challenge2, thank2, scorn2}
(f) the modalities are beliefs (B), intentions (I), desires (D)
A first belief observation axiom states that an agent x making a claim u that another agent y
is guilty in situation s exposes that the speaker is either angry and negative towards the accused,
or confident and believes the accused is guilty, or calm and neutral towards the accused whom he
believes guilty, or doubtful and does not believe the accused is not guilty:
∀u : o.∀x, y : a.
(
















calm(x, s) ∧ neutral(x, y, s) ∧ holds(B(x, guilty(y)), s)
))
A second belief observation axiom states that scorning another agent shows an agent is angry
and negative towards that other agent:
∀u : o.∀x, y : a.scorn2(x, y, u)→ (angry(x, s) ∧ negative(x, y, s))
I consider the following sequence of utterances:
No. 3: [to NO. 8] You come in here with your heart bleeding all over the floor about slum
kids and injustice and you make up these wild stories, and you’ve got some softhearted old ladies
listening to you. [...] This kid is guilty!
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which translates to:
u1 :scorn2( j3, j8, u1)
u2 :claim2( j3, d, u2) ∧ guiltyo(d, u2, s)
Using my model, I get that for all other jurors ji, Be( ji, u2u1, negative( j3, d, _), s) holds. This
means all other jurors believe, after the sequence of utterances u2u1, that juror j3 is negative towards
the defendant d.
7.4.3 Sales Representatives and Customers
Another application I consider is prediction using dialogues between sales representatives and
customers. The goal here is again to model the beliefs of the seller and the buyer in order to predict
whether or not the buyer will buy the product and whether or not the seller will lower the price. In
this domain:
(a) the agents are the buyer b, the seller s, and his competitors ci
(b) there is a set of product features F
(c) the roles R are again emotional states (e.g. R = {doubtful, confident}) and Rp = ∅
(d) the properties are the roles of the agents, the offered and desired product features, the
attitudes between agents, and the relationship between competing sellers in terms of product
Pp ={seller1, buyer1, competitor1} ∪ {has_feature_f 1,wants_feature_f 1} f∈F
∪ {positive2, negative2, neutral2, better_product_than2}
(e) the actions are A = {lower_price, close_deal}
(f) the speech acts are
S A = {claim1, prove1, object2, handle_objection2, agree2, disagree2, acknowledge2}
One belief observation axiom states that if x makes an objection u to y that y’s product is better than
z’s in situation s, then the speaker is either confident and believes y’s product is not better than z, or
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doubtful and does not believe y’s product is better than z’s:
∀u : o.∀x, y, z : a.
(
x , y ∧ x , z ∧ z , y ∧ object2(x, y, u) ∧ better_product_thano(y, z, u, s)
)
→((
doubtful(x, s) ∧ holds(¬B(x, better_product_than(y, z)), s)
)
∨(
confident(x, s) ∧ holds(B(x,¬better_product_than(y, z)), s)
))
Another belief observation axiom states that proving the product is better than the competitor’s
makes the hearer disbelieve it is possible for this not to be the case:
∀u : o.∀x, y, z : α.prove1(x, u)∧better_product_thano(x, z, u, s)→
holds(¬B(y,¬better_product_than(x, z)), s)
These two axioms can be used to infer
Be(s, u2u1, doubtful(c, s), s)
where prove1(s, u1) ∧ better_product_thano(s, c1, u1, s) and
object2(c, s, u2) ∧ better_product_thano(s, c1, u2, s), meaning that the seller believes the buyer is
doubtful even when making an objection after the seller proves the product is better than the
competitor’s.
7.5 Vote Prediction for the Werewolf Game
I implemented the framework described in Section 7.3 for the Werewolf domain over Golog
(Levesque et al., 1997) and used my implementation to predict players’ votes. Golog is a logic
programming language for modeling a dynamic world in situation calculus.
The problem I address is, given a game round, consisting of a series of utterances, to predict
who each player will vote against. I chose this formulation in order to show how the model can
guess what players think about other players.
My test set consists of 44 instances of a day game round, manually parsed to the language of the
model, with 3-6 players and 2-11 observations. The random baseline for vote prediction is 33.63%
(Figure 7.2).
In order to transform the dialogue to a sequence of claims, I identify the Werewolf roles and the
subject of the statement within each utterance, and check whether the statement is that the subject
holds this particular role. I discard the utterances that do not match these criteria.
For example, considering the following fragment:
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Figure 7.1: Usage of the system: the system uses the instantiation in Section 7.3 to reason about the
truth of a modal formula.
P: E is innocent.
E: I think P must be the seer.
P: And therefore, not the werewolf!
E: and y’all can kill me if you want.
The translation is the sequence:
(a) claim¬wolf (P, E, s) ≡ claim2(P, E, o1) ∧ wolf o(E, o1, s)
(b) claimseer(E, P, s) ≡ claim2(E, P, o2) ∧ seero(P, o2, s)
(c) claim¬wolf (P, P, s) ≡ claim2(P, P, o3) ∧ ¬wolf o(P, o3, s)




Figure 7.1 summarizes how my implementation is used. The instantiation is as described in
Section 7.3 and the queries are of the form holds(modal(bel,o,x,wolf(Y)),s), where
o is a sequence of observation such as [o1, o2, o3], x is a player name, and Y is any person that x
believes is a werewolf. The axioms and filtering rules are as discussed in Section 7.3.
My voting model is non-deterministic: a player x will vote for another player y in situation s
if they believe in s that other player is a werewolf, i.e. if holds(B(x,wolf (y)), s). This may lead
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Figure 7.2: Performance of model vs baselines
to multiple results, or no result. In the case of multiple results, we estimate the probability of
B(x,wolf (y)) by assigning equal probability to all possible situations from s:
P(holds(B(x,wolf (y)), s)) =
ΣB(x,s′,s)=1holds(wolf (y), s′)
| {s′ | B(x, s′, s) = 1} |




| {s′ | B(x, s′, s) = 1} |
I used a baseline model that predicts that each player will vote for that other player whom they
mentioned most throughout the game round. If a player hasn’t spoken, the vote goes to that other
player who was most mentioned (by any other player) during the game round. The accuracy of this
baseline model is 59.09%. I also used it as a fallback model in cases where my model could not
decide. The accuracy of my model with the baseline as a fallback was 63.64%.
Figure 7.3 shows how the accuracy changes as the model uses more of the observations in
the sequence. There are three points because some game rounds don’t have more than three
observations.
7.6 Conclusion
In this chapter, I introduced a formal language and semantics for reasoning about deception in
terms of beliefs and intentions. The problem of deception defined in Chapter 3 can now be directly
expressed in this language.
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Figure 7.3: Performance as the processing of observation progresses
I described how different deception domains can be represented in the language, and imple-
mented a formalization of the Werewolf domain in Golog. By using the implementation to predict
player votes, I showed its ability to reason about beliefs.
The real-world domain examples show how difficult it can be to formalize a new domain.
One issue is that domain knowledge must be directly expressed in the model. However, many
domains already have very descriptive ontologies. Therefore, it would be useful to rely on those
ontologies for domain reasoning rather than replicate the work already invested in building them.
So one idea is to make reasoning about the domain and reasoning about deception orthogonal. The
model I describe in the next chapter assumes that domain reasoning is orthogonal. The primitives of
this model refer only to agents’ deception and nested beliefs about deception.
Another issue is that each domain has to provide its own observation model. Ideally, knowing
the general form of an observation axiom, it should be possible to learn dependencies between
beliefs and claims from data, for each domain. In the next chapter, I describe how to do this.
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Chapter 8
Dynamic Probabilistic Beliefs over Beliefs
for Dialogues
In the previous chapter I discussed a formal model of deception in dialogues in terms of beliefs
and intentions and showed how to detect which participants are perceived by others as deceptive,
by performing logical reasoning in the model. Deception detection can be done in this model
by directly expressing the definition of deception in Chapter 3 and performing reasoning in the
formalism.
However, describing the primitives of each domain and designing the appropriate belief obser-
vation axioms requires a large amount of work. Automatizing this work by learning the axioms
from domain data would make the model more easily adaptable to new domains.
Furthermore, people generally don’t perceive other people as either clearly deceptive or clearly
sincere. A better model of human interaction should allow probabilistic statements about beliefs.
In this chapter I discuss how the belief-over-belief formalization of deception from the previous
chapter can be translated to a more flexible, probabilistic model that can learn the parameters of
the observation model from data. As in Chapter 7, I first focus on the Werewolf domain, and then
describe the model for the general case. In Chapter 9, I show how to do inference and learning.
The advantage of the model is that, compared to other machine-learning methods, it captures
deeper interactions about agents’ beliefs about other agents’ beliefs. Consequently, with the
new approach I am able to answer deep questions after a learning period about the domain and
observations about the dialogues to be processed.
The new model is a dynamic probabilistic graphical model of agents’ beliefs and beliefs-over-
beliefs. Just like the model in Chapter 7, it encodes utterances as observations on the belief states of
agents. Unlike the model in Chapter 7, the belief observation model is probabilistic. Rather than
describing the connection between an observed utterance and the belief state by means of rules, the
observation model is now a conditional probability distribution of the utterance given the belief
state according to which it was produced.
Modeling beliefs about beliefs in dialogues as I do allows me to estimate agents’ internal states
during dialogue, this way enabling answering deep questions.
My new model can also serve as a basis for building intelligent agents who participate in
argumentative dialogues and model others’ beliefs and intentions to achieve their own goals.
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8.1 A Relational Dynamic Bayesian Network for Beliefs over
Beliefs
In this section I show how to translate the model in Chapter 7 to a probabilistic setting. My model is
dynamic, in order to represent the sequential aspect of dialogues, and relational, in order to represent
similar participants in a similar way.
Dialogues occur between different numbers of participants. The models built for the conver-
sations naturally have symmetries and similarities between those participants. The model that I
build for dialogues captures the intuition that similar sequences of utterances of similar participants
should have similar impact on the model’s conclusions for these participants. At the same time,
interactions between participants naturally create dissimilarities between the model’s conclusions.
For those reasons, I choose to introduce my new model as a relational dynamic model (Sanghai
et al., 2003). The dialogue participants are treated as equivalent, meaning that the parameters of the
variables I use to represent their properties and nested beliefs are the same in any instantiation. This
imposes an equivalence relation over the random variables I use to represent my world.
Equivalent variables are seen as being part of the same class. Each class is associated with a set
of propositional attributes (e.g. deceptive roles) and a set of relational attributes. The description of
a set of classes, a set of propositional attributes, and a set of relational attributes define a relational
schema (Koller, 1999).
An instantiation of a schema defines a set of objects for each class with a description of which
their attributes are and which relationships hold between them. A probabilistic relational model
(PRM) defines a probability distribution over instantiations.
A relational schema allows us to make general statements about the properties of participants
and beliefs in a dialogue. I can reason about the truth of such formulas by instantiating my relational
model to a specific dialogue and performing probabilistic inference. The formulas are instantiated
by grounding the logical variables to actual players in the world.
8.1.1 From Modal Logic to Relational DBNs
As in Chapter 7, the class is that of participants (corresponding to the agent sort). The attributes
for my domain refer to a set of roles. Thus, the state of the world is described using statements
about participants’ roles (e.g., werewolf ). The relational attributes describe beliefs, e.g. the roles
participants believe other participants have.
In my model, I assume one type of statement π that each agent may be deceptive about. For
example, for the dating domain, this statement may be interested or safe (as discussed in Chapter
7). Since for the Werewolf domain there are multiple interacting roles, I focus on whether a role
91
is deceptive or non-deceptive, according to whether the rules of the game imply a motivation to
deceive for the role or not. As such, all werewolf roles are deceptive and all non-werewolf roles are
non-deceptive.
I do not model additional properties of the world. In Chapter 11, I describe how to use a domain
ontology to reason about the interaction between domain properties and deception.
The propositional content of utterances in the dialogue is also mapped to statements about roles.
In Chapter 7, these were the observations claimr for each role r. In this case, the observations are
claimπ and claim¬π, where π is the statement that agents may be deceptive about, e.g. deceptive
roles. These statements serve as evidence for the hidden state of the world.
I use only belief as a modality. As I describe in Chapter 3, I approximate sincerity with
believing π of oneself (i.e. bel(i, a, π(a))) and perceived sincerity with believing π of the other (i.e.
bel(i, b, bel(i, a, π(a)))).
The model I describe in this chapter can be used to make inference about any or both of sincerity
and perceived sincerity, at one or several points I throuhgout the dialogueD:
P({bel(i, a, π(a)), bel(i, b, bel(i, a, π(a)))}i∈I | D[1 : n])
In the following, I describe how I adapt the belief model from Chapter 7 to the relational DBN
setting and explain the random variables in more detail. I then include my observation model and
transition model.
8.1.2 Beliefs over Beliefs
In Chapter 7, belief is modeled as an accessibility relation between situations bel(a, s′, s). As
discussed in Chapter 2.3, in probabilistic modal logic, the accessibility relation is a conditional
probability distribution over possible worlds, given the current state s of the world Pa(s′ | s) (for
each agent a).
In Chapter 7 the possible worlds were represented by situations, with a focus on histories of
actions rather than the set of facts that are true in each world. In this chapter, I explicitly represent
possible worlds as complete descriptions of the world.
In particular, if Ag is the set of agent symbols and π is the deceptive role, a world is a conjunction
of the form ∧a∈Agwa(a), where each wa ∈ {π,¬π}. Then, the belief accessibility relation of each
agent a becomes
Pa(∧a∈AgZ′π(a) | ∧a∈AgZπ(a))
where each Zπ(a) models whether or not agent a has a deceptive role π.
As described in Definition 7, this conditional probability distribution can be factored as a
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graphical Kripke model, with random variables Z = {Zπ(a) | a ∈ Ag}.
This graphical Kripke model is a Bayesian network where:
(a) The nodes of M are {Zπ(a) | a ∈ Ag} ∪ {Z′π(a) | a ∈ Ag}.
(b) Pa(Z′ | Z) is defined by the edges of M.
(c) There are no edges between the nodes of Z.
The graphical Kripke model (GKM) has the advantage of carrying over to indefinitely many
levels of nested belief. For my current model, I unroll the GKM up to a second layer of belief over
belief. In order to do this, I assume there are no edges between any nodes Z at the same level of
belief. This means that for each agent a:
Pa(Z′ | Z) = Pa(Z′π(a) | Z)
I use the following notation:
(a) for each agent a, the role variable is wa = Zπ(a);
(b) for each two agents a and b, the belief-about-role variable (of b about a) is wa|b = Z′π(a) such
that:
P(wa|b | {wx}x∈Ag) = Pb(Z′π(a) | Z)
(c) for each three agents a, b, and c, the belief-about-belief variable (of c about b’s belief about
a) is wabc = Z′′π(a) such that:
P(wabc | {wx|y}x,y∈Ag) = P(wabc | {wx|b}x∈Ag)
and
P(wabc | {wx|b}x∈Ag) = Pc(Z′′π(a) | Z
′)
The corresponding directed graphical model is in Figure 8.1. The additional arcs correspond to
the observation and transition model I describe in the next subsections.
Let n be the number of players and A the ordered set of agents, or players (n = |A|).
I use the following kinds of random variables: upkeep variables, role variables, belief-about-role
variables, belief-about-belief variables, and claim variables.
Upkeep variables
These variables help identify the speaker and the target of the current utterance. They are used to
keep track of whose turn it is to speak.
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Figure 8.1: Dynamic Bayesian Network for deceptive role modeling. The top layer refers to
participants’ roles. Subsequent hidden layers refer to participants’ nested beliefs about others’
roles. The observations are claims about participants’ roles. The variables are explained in detail in
Section 3.
More specifically, t, a are n-valued variables such that:
(a) t = i with 1 ≤ i ≤ n means it is player Ai’s turn to speak;
(b) a = i with 1 ≤ i ≤ n means the current utterance is about player Ai.
I assume that each of those variables only depends on the turn and target in the previous turn. I also
assume they directly influence the current claim.
I also keep track, for each player, whether that player was a source or target, respectively, of the
last utterance, by means of binary variables {sx, tx}x∈A.
Role variables
These variables refer to the deceptive or non-deceptive roles of all dialogue participants (top of
Figure 8.1). Specifically, {wx}x∈A are binary variables which determine, for each player, whether
that player is deceptive . If the roles are assumed constant throughout the dialogue, their values in
any time slice other than the first are deterministically assigned based on the previous roles.
94
Belief about role variables
These variables represent participants’ beliefs about other players’ roles (second level of Figure
8.1). {wx|y}x,y∈A]{s,t} are binary variables determining, for each two players x , y, whether or not
player y believes player x is deceptive . s and t are new symbols not already in the set of players,
standing for source and target of last utterance, respectively.
Belief about belief variables
These variables represent participants’ beliefs about other players’ beliefs (third level of Figure 8.1).
Direct belief over beliefs are binary variables {wxyz}x,y,z∈A]{s,t},x,y,y,z, determining, for each players
x , y, y , z, whether or not player z believes that player y believes that player x is deceptive.
I also use existential quantification variables {wx?y}x,y∈A]{s,t}, defining whether or not player y
believes there is any other player who believes that player x is deceptive (with the possibility that
x = y). The values of these variables are deterministically assigned based on the current beliefs over
beliefs, so they are not explicitly represented in Figure 8.1.
Claim variables
These variables refer to the claims that the players make or would make (fourth level of Figure 8.1).
Observed variables are a subset of these variables together with the turn t and target a variables.
Direct claim variables {cwx|y, c!wx|y}x,y∈A are binary variables determining whether or not player
y would at this point claim that player x is deceptive and respectively, honest (with the possibility
that x = y).
The current utterance c describes which player attributes a role to which other player (so the
domain of c has size 2 · n2). Its value is deterministically assigned based on the claims players
would make ({cwx|y, c!wx|y}x,y∈A), the current turn t, and current target a. This is the reason why I
don’t explicitly represent it in Figure 8.1.
Markers s and t are introduced for the source and target, respectively, of the previous utterance,
in order to disconnect reasoning about the source and target of the utterance, which are treated
in a specific way, from reasoning about passive players, who are all treated in the same manner
with respect to belief change, differently from source and target. This allows a compact repre-
sentation and a manageable size of the transition model. The resulting variables are {sx, tx}x∈A,




In Chapter 7, I described an observation model by means of axioms of the form (Equation 7.1):
∀u : o.∀s : σ.∀x : a.φ(x, ..., s)→ ∨(g(..., x, ..., s) ∧ e(x, ..., s))
where φ(x, ..., s) is a claim made by speaker x, g(..., x, ..., s) describes the state of the world, e.g. in
terms of the speaker’s and other players’ roles, and e(x, ..., s) describes the speaker’s belief state.
A probabilistic observation model describes the production of utterances as the following
conditional probability:
P(Zφ(x,...,s) | Zg(...,x,...,s),Ze(x,...,s))
As described, I use claim variables cwx|y and c!wx|y to model the claim Zφ(x,...,s). These variables
are binary and I assume the probability distribution P to be binomial. The state of the world in
terms of roles, Zg(...,x,...,s), can be described by means of the role variables {wx}x∈Ag. The belief state
Ze(x,...,s) can be described by means of beliefs-about-role {wy|x}x,y∈Ag and beliefs-about-belief variables
{wzyx}x,y,z∈Ag.
The observation model thus governs the production of utterances based on each player’s decep-
tive or honest role, beliefs about roles, and beliefs about other players’ beliefs. I make the following
independence assumptions, which considerably reduce the size of the DBN:
Whether or not a player would claim one own’s innocence or guilt is independent of everything
else given that player’s role (Figure 8.2). This assumption seems limiting, but in practice, a player
more rarely makes assumptions about oneself than about other players.
Whether or not a player x would claim another player y is deceptive or honest (Figure 8.2) is
independent of everything else given that player’s role, belief about y’s role, and belief about y’s
belief about the claimer’s role. This assumption is based on the following intuitions:
(a) an honest participant would speak up against someone they believe is deceptive (i.e. if wx is
false and wy|x is true);
(b) a deceptive person x’s utterance is intended to make a listener believe x is not deceptive (see
Chapter 3, Definition 15). This means x will speak is x believes the listener believes x is
deceptive (i.e. if wx is true and wxyx is true).
Whether or not a player x would claim another player y is honest, or deceptive (Figure 8.2) is
independent of everything else given: that player’s role, belief about y’s role, belief about y’s belief
about the claimer’s role, belief about whether or not anyone believes y is guilty, and belief about
whether or not anyone believes the claimer, x, is guilty. This partitioning is based on the following
assumptions:
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Figure 8.2: Observation models: claims about oneself (top left), claims about another player’s
deception (top right), claims about another player’s innocence (bottom). cwy|x – x claims y is
deceptive; c!wy|x – x claims y is not deceptive; wx – x’s role; wy|x – x’ belief about y’s role; wyzx –
x’s belief about z’s belief about y; wy?x – x’s belief that anyone believes y is deceptive.
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Figure 8.3: Transition model for beliefs about roles. wx – x’s role; wy|x – x’ belief about y’s role; s –
last speaker; t – last target; sx – x was the speaker; tx – x was the target.
(a) an honest person would defend someone they think is honest if they believe anyone suspects
them of deception (i.e. if wx is false, wy|x is false, and wy?x is true);
(b) a deceptive person x would defend another deceptive person if suspected (i.e. if wx is true,
wy|x is true, and wy?x is true), unless x is already suspected (wx?x is true).
8.1.4 Transition Model
The transition model describes how roles, beliefs about roles, and beliefs about beliefs change
throughout the dialogue. In the following, I show the independence assumptions I am making.
Player x’s belief about player y’s innocence (Figure 8.3) is independent of everything else given:
x’s role, x’s previous belief about y, the previous utterance’s speaker’s belief about the target, x’s
belief about previous utterance’s both speaker and target, whether or not x was the last target, and
whether or not y as well was the last utterance’s source or target. In other words, an agent would
change their beliefs based on what was said, as well as based on their previous opinions and previous
opinions of the participants in the last interaction.
In addition to that, beliefs about any players not mentioned in the utterance do not change.
Player z’s belief about whether or not player x believes player y is deceptive (Figure 8.4) is
independent of everything else given: z’s belief about x’s role, z’s previous belief about x’s belief
about y, the previous utterance’s speaker’s belief about the target, x’s previous belief about x belief
about the speaker’s innocence, whether or not y was the last speaker, and whether or not any of x, y,
or z was the last utterance’s target. In other words, an agent would change their beliefs about one’s
beliefs based on what was said, as well as based on their previous beliefs over beliefs and previous
perceived beliefs about the last speaker.
In addition to that, analogously to beliefs about roles, perceived beliefs about a person not
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Figure 8.4: Transition model for beliefs about other players’ beliefs. wy|x – x’ belief about y’s role;
wyxz – z’s belief about x’s belief about y; s – last speaker; t – last target; sx – x was the speaker; tx –
x was the target.
involved in the exchange do not change.
8.1.5 Model Simplifications
I have so far described how to represent probabilistic beliefs over beliefs in the model in Figure
8.1. One issue with the model I described so far is that the number of dependencies in the graph
makes inference and learning hard. In particular, there are nodes with as many as 8 parents, while
quantification nodes have as many parents as there are dialogue participants.
Let n be the number of participants in the dialogue.
I assume that exactly one of the claims about players’ deception are directly observed in each
time slice. This removes the need to represent the claim variable c. This is useful since, as it can
be seen in Figure 8.1, c’s value is deterministically assigned based on the values of the source and
target (2 n-valued parents) and the individual claims of the agents (2n2 binary parents). This means
c requires n2 · 2(2n
2) probability distributions and has as many possible values itself.
Furthermore, the source and target nodes determine the values of the following nodes with O(n)
parents: sx and tx (n parents each); wx|s, wx|t, ws|x, and wt|x (n + 1 parents each); wsxz, wtxz, wxzs, and
wxzt (n + 1 parents each). This is a total of 4n2(1 + 2n+2) deterministic parameters.
Since I assume that each claim is directly observed, it means its speaker x and target y are
implicitly observed. This removes the need to explicitly represent speaker and target variables sx, tx,
s, and t, and reduces the number of parameters by 4n2(1 + 2n+2).
Even so, the existentially quantified variables wx?x,wx?y still have a number of parents that
depends on the number of players, specifically n − 1 and respectively n − 2 parents. This results in
6n · 2n−2 deterministic parameters.
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The resulting model still has variables with 8 parents (n(n − 1) belief-about-role variables wy|x
and n(n − 1)2 belief-about-belief variables wxyz), as well as the innocence claim variable c!wy|x with
5 parents. The number of parameters N to be learned for this model is:
n · N(wx) + n(n − 1) · N(wy|x) + n(n − 1)2 · N(wxyz) + 2n · N(cwx|x) + n(n − 1)(N(cwy|x) + N(c!wy|x))
therefore
N = 3n + (2 + 28)n2(n − 1) + 4n + n(n − 1)(23 + 25)
= 258 · n3 + 42 · n2 − 291 · n − 2
Considering the equivalences between random variables:
NI = N(wx) + N(wy|x) + N(wxyz) + 2N(cwx|x) + N(cwy|x) + N(c!wy|x)
Therefore there are NI = 563 independent parameters.
I make the simplifying assumption that what a player x says about a player y only depends on
x and y’s beliefs about themselves and the other. This removes the need to represent existential
quantification variables.
As a consequence (Figure 8.2), the variables used to represent x’s claim about y’s innocence and
x’s claim about y’s deception have the same parents. I assume these claims are mutually exclusive
and use a single variable cwty|x to represent claim about deception, with value 0 for innocence and 1
for deception.
Without source and target variables sx, tx, the transition model for a player x’s belief about y,
wt+1y|x (Figure 8.3), needs to take into account for what s and t may stand for, namely:
(a) s = t = x, in which case the parents are wtx|x (previous belief about oneself), w
t
y|x (previous
belief about the other), and wt+1x (self’s current role).
I assume the following axiom (Equation 2.1):
belaπ(a)→ π(a) for all unary predicates π
This means belief about oneself wtx|x reduces to oneself’s role w
t
x, which is constant throughout































(e) s < {x, y} or t < {x, y}. In order to restrict the number of parents, I assume everything stays
constant in this case.
In order to bring the number of parents under 3, I assume x’s belief about y does not depend on
y’s belief about x. This reduces the parent set to wty|x and w
t+1
x .
For belief (of player z) about belief (player x’s belief about y), specifically node wt+1yxz (Figure
8.4), removing again the case where s or t is any player other than x, y, or z, the remaining possible
parents are:
(a) the previous belief about belief, specifically z’s previous belief about x’s belief: wtyxz, w
t
zxz;





(c) the previous beliefs about roles: z’s previous beliefs and y’s previous beliefs;
(d) the current belief about role: z’s current belief about x’s role.
In order to restrict the transition models, I impose that the only arc between variables on the
same level of nesting be between a variable’s value at time t and the same variable’s value at time
t + 1. All the other parents of the variable correspond to the previous level of nesting.
In order to reduce the number of parents to 3, I go back to the relationships between variables
within one time slice. Considering the false consensus effect, that people tend to attribute their own
mental states to others (Bauman and Geher, 2002), I added wty|z as a parent to w
t
yxz. I also added w
t
y|x
as a parent, considering this is the content of the belief.
With these changes, the new model is shown Figure 8.5, with the following parents for each
type of variable:
(a) the parents of belief-about-role nodes wty|x are the role w
t
x of the current player x and the
previous belief-about-role wt−1y|x in Figure 8.3;
(b) the parents of belief-about-belief nodes wtyxz, about other than oneself (y , z), are: the current
belief-about-role that is the content of the belief of the belief, wty|x; the current false consensus,
wty|z; and the previous belief-about-belief w
t−1
yxz in Figure 8.4;
(c) the parents of belief-about-belief wtyxy, about oneself, are: the current content of the belief,
the belief-about-role wty|x; the false consensus, which is replaced by the current player y’s
knowledge about oneself, which reduces to the role wty; and the previous belief-about-belief
about self wt−1yxy.
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Figure 8.5: Simplified model in plate notation. Variables wx and wy are equivalent, as are variables
wx|y and wy|x. Since their transition model is already illustrated due to equivalence, I represent these
variables’ outgoing arcs in gray.
The effect of the false consensus on beliefs-about-beliefs about oneself represents the extent to
which a sincere person x assumes others believes them innocent, or a deceptive person assumes
others believe them deceptive.
The model in Figure 8.5 has a much lower number of parameters:
N = n · N(wx) + n(n − 1) · N(wy|x) + n(n − 1)2 · N(wxyz) + n · N(cwx|x) + n(n − 1)N(cwy|x)
= 3n + 6n(n − 1) + 12n(n − 1)2 + 2n + 8n(n − 1)
= 12n3 − 11n2 + 4n
The number of independent parameters for the relational model is NI = 31 < 563:
NI = N(wx) + N(wy|x) + N(wxyz) + N(cwx|x) + N(cwy|x)
8.1.6 Example
Let P, B, and E be three players involved in the following exchange, in a game of one werewolf:
P: E is not the werewolf!
E: I think P is the seer
In my framework, this would translate to the following sequence: in the first time slice, P claims
E’s innocence; in the next time slice, E also asserts P is not a werewolf. This corresponds to the
DBN in Figure 8.6.
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Figure 8.6: Dynamic Bayesian Network for a Werewolf game with three players (P, B, and E) and
one werewolf
In order to generate this sequence from text, the first step is to parse this exchange to a sequence
of claims. In order to do so, I first process the entire dialogue and identify the set of players. Then,
in each utterance, I look for mentions of players. If an utterance u with speaker x contains a mention
of a player y, I look for mentions of roles around the occurence of y. I use fixed sets of deceptive
and non-deceptive roles. I then check whether the statement between y and the role matches one of
a fixed set of phrases consisting of forms of the verb be, articles, modal verbs, and negations. If
there is a match, I generate a claim with speaker x, target y, and positive (deceptive) or negative
(sincere) role. If there was a negation, the polarity of the role is switched.
First person pronouns are resolved to the speaker and third person pronouns are not resolved.
Second person pronouns are resolved to the explicit target. In the data, listeners are explicitly
marked by the to keyword, as in:
A (to B): I don’t believe you!
The first utterance in the example, with speaker x = P, mentions y = E and a deceptive role
werewolf . This translates to an observed value of P’s claim about E, i.e. cwE|P. It also contains a
negation, therefore the positive (deceptive) polarity of the role is switched. Therefore the observation
is cwE|P = 0.
In the second utterance, I is resolved to the speaker E. However, P is closer to the sincere role
of seer and the subsequence between them matches with a phrase. The utterance is therefore parsed
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to a claim by E about P, cwP|E. There is no negation, thus the value of the claim is negative, since
the role is sincere: cwP|E = 0.
8.2 General Purpose Model
So far, I described my model of beliefs-over-beliefs in the context of Werewolf. I assumed that
the dialogue can be parsed to a sequence of claims that people make about each other’s deception
and sincerity. I now show how to generalize the model to a different deception domain. Then, I
explain how to handle a more general kind of input, in which people do not explicitly claim others
are deceptive or sincere.
8.2.1 Deception Detection for General Domains
According to Definitions 15 and 19, a speaker a is deceptive at point i in the dialogue if there is a
statement w and another participant b such that:
(a) a produces the utterance because a intends that b believe w;
(b) a does not believe w;
(c) b believes that a believes w.
The model I discussed so far captures one type of deceptive intention that refers to the identity
of the speaker. In other words, for the Werewolf domain, w is of the form ¬wolf (a), where a is
the speaker. The speaker then produces an utterance according to a’s belief regarding b’s belief
(a) and regarding a’s identity, wolf (a) (b), with the intention that b believes ¬wolf (a). Since I
do not explicitly model intention, I assume a’s utterance’s intention to make b believe w can be
approximated by reasoning whether a believes b does not believe w.
Then, deception occurs if the following conditions co-occur:
(a) wolf (a) holds;
(b) a believes b believes wolf (a) holds;
(c) after the uttrerance, b believes that ¬wolf (a).
In real world scenarios, reasoning about whether conditions (a) and (c) co-occur is enough to
issue warnings.
In general, our model can be applied to other domains with other kinds of deceptive intention.
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For example, as we discussed in Chapter 7, in the predator detection domain, w can be of the
form ¬safe(a), where safe(a) means the speaker a does not intend to harm the listener (the listener
is safe from a). In that case, our system can issue a deception warning if:
(a) safe(a) is not the case;
(b) after the uttrerance, b believes that safe(a).
Likewise, in the law enforcement case, w can be of the form ¬guilty(a). Deception can happen
if, for some speaker a and listener b, guilty(a) and b believes that ¬guilty(a) after the utterance.
For the dating domain model in Chapter 7, wa is of the form interested(a). In the setting where
the only modality is belief, the observation model for a claim of one’s own sincerity in the logic is
as follows:
∀x : a.claimsin(x, x, s)→
(interested(x, s) ∧ holds(B(x, B(y,¬interested(x))), s))∨
(¬interested(x, s) ∧ holds(B(x, B(y, interested(x))), s))
The corresponding probabilistic observation model is P(csinx|x | wx,wxyx) = P(csinx|x | wx,wx?x),
since for a dialogue with only 2 participants, the existential quantification variable is wx?x = wxyx.
In the general case, let w be the kind of statement that the deception can be about. Then we
denote by wx the statement as it describes dialogue participant x.
The model for the general domain is the same as the one in Figure 8.5, where:
(a) wx is the domain-specific statement about x that x may be deceptive about;
(b) wx|y stands for whether or not y believes wx;
(c) wxyx stands for whether or not x believes that y believes wx;
(d) cwx|y stands for whether or not y claims x is deceptive.
The observation model is a conditional probability P(cwx|y | wx,wx|y,wxyx) with parameters that
can be learned from data.
For this model, any x is deceptive at time t if:
(a) wtx is true;
(b) optionally, wtxyx is true;
(c) wt+1xy is false.
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Figure 8.7: Belief-over-belief model for the 2-participant case. a indicates whether a is deceptive.
a | b indicates whether b believes a is deceptive. aba indicates whether a believes b believes a is
deceptive. cab is whether b claims a is deceptive rather than innocent.
In this model I capture one type of deceptive intention per domain, by assuming there is only
one such w. In cases where there are more interacting deceptive intentions, the model needs to be
extended to capture this interaction. I am leaving this avenue of exploration for future work.
8.2.2 Deception Detection with Implicit Sincerity Claims
So far I discussed the belief-over-belief model for the case where utterances can be parsed as claims
regarding people’s sincerity or innocence. While in most real-word scenarios, most utterances are
not claims about each other’s deception, people may still implicitly express such sentiment through
their words.
In this subsection, I show how to decouple belief from language and model claims of deception
as hidden variables, using the psycholinguistic features I discussed in previous chapters as evidence.
I first consider the case where the conversation is between two people, a and b. The belief-over-
belief model I introduced in Chapter 8 for this scenario is shown in Figure 8.7.
I can split a claim a makes about b in the following components:
(a) whether the claim is about the other player or oneself. I call this variable t(a), the target of a’s
utterance. This is a binary variable with a binomial distribution P(t(a) | wa,waba).
(b) the polarity of the utterance. In my context, polarity does not refer to whether the sentiment
of the utterance is positive or negative, as in the sentiment analysis community. Rather, I use
it to encode whether the claim is of deceptiveness (negative polarity) or innocence (positive
polarity). This variable also has a binomial probability distribution P(p(a) | wa,wb|a,waba).
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Figure 8.8: Belief-over-belief model for the 2-participant case, with hidden claim variable. For
readability, I only show the new variables on a’s side (vs Figure 8.7), but I use analogous variables
for b. t(a) indicates whether the target of the claim is the other person or oneself. p(a) is a hidden
variables indicating polarity. utterance(a) is the bag-of-feature representation of the utterance. As
in Figure 8.7: a indicates whether a is deceptive. a | b indicates whether b believes a is deceptive.
aba indicates whether a believes b believes a is deceptive. cab is whether b claims a is deceptive
rather than innocent.
With this representation, I notice that I can directly infer the target of the utterance from linguistic
information, whereas detecting polarity is not as straightforward, especially given that in most
real-world cases people refrain from accusing other people.
However, I can model claim polarity as a hidden variables that governs the production of the
utterance. In this model (Figure 8.8), I can use the psycholinguistic features I discussed in Chapters
5 and 6 as evidence, decoupling them from the belief-over-belief model by means of the claim
polarity variable.
In this sense, given a set F = { f1, ..., f|F|} of psycholinguistic features, I use a categorical varible
f ai to model the value of the i-th feature in an utterance produced by a. I denote by | fi| the size of
fi’s domain. I assume πi = P( f ai | p(a)) is the same across all participants. Then:
P(utterance(a) | p(a)) = P( f a1 , ... f
a
|F| | p(a)) = Π
|F|
i=1πi
For the more general case of any number n of players, I assume that the target is a binary variable
ty|x describing whether x’s utterance refers to y, and that only one such variable is observed for each
turn. The polarity px and feature representation is the same as in the 2-participant case. The model
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Figure 8.9: Belief-over-belief model with psycholinguistic features, with hidden claim variable.
The new variables are: tx – the target of x’s utterance; px – the polarity of x’s utterance, i.e. whether
x claims deception or sincerity; utterancex – the psycholinguistic feature representation of x’s
utterance, as bag-of-features.
is shown in Figure 8.9 and the number N of parameters is:
n · N(wx) + n(n − 1) · N(wy|x) + n(n − 1)2 · N(wxyz) + n(n − 1) · N(ty|x) + n · N(px) + n · Σ
|F|
i=12(| fi| − 1)
therefore
N = 3n + 6n(n − 1) + 12n(n − 1)2 + 4n(n − 1) + 8n + 2n(N f − |F|)
= 12n3 − 15n2 + 13n + 2n(N f − |F|)
where N f = Σ
|F|
i=1| fi| is the total number of values across all features. The number of independent
parameters is NI = 33 + 2(N f − |F|):
NI = N(wx) + N(wy|x) + N(wxyz) + N(ty|x) + N(px) + Σ
|F|
i=12(| fi| − 1)
Since the target, polarity, and feature representation all have parents within the same time slice,
inference between slices is not affected by this change. Furthermore, since we make the assumption
that psycholinguistic features are independent given the polarity they model, inference within each
slice is also not affected. For learning, we have a hidden structure both before and after we make
the change, therefore we use EM in both cases.
Therefore, the change does not affect the algorithms used for inference and learning. I talk more
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about inference and learning in the next chapter.
8.3 Conclusion
In this chapter, I described a probabilistic belief-over-belief model of deception based on the
formalization in Chapter 7. This model can be more easily adapted to new domains, by selecting a
statement that people may be deceptive about and learning the observation and transition model
parameters from data. The psycholinguistic features in Chapters 5 and 6 can be used as evidence
for claims of deception and sincerity when those claims are not directly expressed in language.
In the next chapter, I describe inference and learning, discuss how inference can be done in a
scalable way, and show empirically that my model is helpful in detecting deception and sincerity.
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Chapter 9
Putting It All Together
I have so far described several approaches to deception detection that model cognitive state. In
Chapters 5 and 6 I show that psycholinguistic features that implicitly model the cognitive state of
dialogue participants are useful in decoding deceptive intent and its perception. In Chapter 7 I show
how to model cognitive state explicitly, by representing it in a modal logic of belief. In Chapter 8 I
translate this representation to a probabilistic dynamic model.
The model in Chapter 8 can be used for deception detection in dialogues by performing inference
to calculate the probability of deception given the dialogue. The parameters of the model can be
estimated from domain data. In this chapter I show how to do this. I refer to the first model I
introduced in Section 8.1 for deceptive role detection, where the observations are claims about
innocence or deception, and show experimental results for the game of Werewolf.
The key insight of this chapter is that a careful combination of known models can lead to
higher precision while maintaining tractability. Starting with the model in the previous chapter, I
apply (1) modifications of the straightforward model to help simplify inference, (2) approximate
non-sampling inference (Boyen and Koller, 1998; Murphy and Weiss, 2001) with attention given to
structures of outgoing interfaces, and (3) relational learning.
I illustrate experimentally that my new model, together with the three improvements, yield a
method that is scalable and precise enough.
The chapter is structured as follows: In Section 9.1 I show how the model can be used for
inference in a scalable manner. In Section 9.2 I describe parameter learning. Then, in Section 9.3 I
show experimental results for deceptive role detection in Werewolf.
9.1 Inference
Let D be a dialogue of length n between a set Ag of agents. The DBN in Chapter 8 models
the sequence of variables {wx}x∈Ag, {wy|x}x,y∈Ag, {wxyz}x,y,z∈Ag,x,y,y,z, {cwx|x}x∈Ag, {cwy|x}x,y∈Ag with the
following joint probability distribution:
P(({wx}x∈Ag, {wy|x}x,y∈Ag, {wxyz}x,y,z∈Ag,x,y,y,z, {cwx|x}x∈Ag, {cwy|x}x,y∈Ag)t0≤t≤n)
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Figure 9.1: Dynamic Bayesian Network for a Werewolf game with three players (P, B, and E) and
one werewolf
I assume the dialogue is parsed to a sequence of claims cwy0 |x0 , ..., cwyn |xn as described in Chapter
4.2.1. Then, according to Problem Definition 1 in Chapter 3, the model can be used to find whether
a speaker a deceives a listener b at point n by maximizing the probability that the speaker has
deceptive intent and b thinks a is sincere, given the dialogue so far:
P(wna = 1,w
n
a|b = 0 | cwy0 |x0 , ..., cwyn |xn=a)
I use the interface algorithm (Murphy, 2002) to perform this inference. As discussed in Chapter
2, the interface at time t is the set of nodes with children in the next slice, i.e
It = {wx}x∈Ag ∪ {wy|x}x,y∈Ag ∪ {wxyz}x,y,z∈Ag,x,y,y,z
Let J1 be the junction tree built from the initial time slice (used to reason about time slice t = 0)
and Jt be the junction tree resulting from the union of the interface for the previous time slice and
the nodes in current time slice (used to reason about time slice t > 0). For Jt, let I1 be the interface
of the previous time slice and Cin the contains it (the in-clique). Let I2 be the interface of the current
time slice and Cout the clique that con tains it (the out-clique).
The first step is to apply the evidence for the initial time slice, cwy1 |x1 , at J1, and marginalize the
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out-clique potential to get the interface I1 potential in J1(cwy0 |x0):
α0 = P(I1 | cwy0 |x0) = ΣCout\I1φCout (9.1)
Then, for every step t > 0 until n − 1 (inclusively):
(a) The resulting interface potential αt−1 from the previous step is multiplied to the in-clique of Jt
to get junction tree J′t .










y|x}x,y∈Ag | cwy0 |x0 , ..., cwyt−1 |xt−1)
(b) The current evidence cwy1 |x1 is applied to J
′





xyz}x,y,z∈Ag,x,y,y,z | cwy0 |x0 , ..., cwyt |xt)
(c) The interface I2 is marginalized out from the out-clique potential in J′t (cwyn |xn):
αt = ΣCout\I2φCout = P(I2 | cwy0 |x0 , ..., cwyt |xt)
In the final step n, the out-interface potential αn−1 is again multiplied to the in-clique of Jt and





xyz}x,y,z∈Ag,x,y,y,z | cwy0 |x0 , ..., cwyn |xn) (9.3)
In order to solve the deception inference problem:
P(wna = 1,w
n
a|b = 0 | cwy0 |x0 , ..., cwyn |xn=a)
Let Ca,b be the clique of J′t that contains wa and wa|b. Then:
P(wna = 1,w
n
a|b = 0 | cwy0 |x0 , ..., cwyn |xn=a) = ΣCa,b\{a,b}φCa,b
9.1.1 Boyen Koller Clusters
The interface algorithm described above uses the interface to pass messages between consecutive
time slices of the DBN. In order to do this, the algorithm ensures that all nodes in the interface are
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part of a clique. This means that the largest clique in inference is at least as large as the interface.
The outgoing interface contains the following nodes (Figure 9.2, top): the top-level state-of-the
world nodes (in my case, role nodes wx); the belief-about-world nodes (in my case, werewolf nodes
wy|x); the belief-about-belief nodes wxyz.
Therefore the size of the outgoing clique is on the order of O(n2) in the number n of dialogue
participants. This makes exact inference costly in terms of both space and time.
Among the approximate inference methods, particle filtering and sampling are very common
for the structures that I use. Unfortunately, in my experiments, sampling yielded poor results for
learning and inference. I therefore use the Boyen Koller algorithm (Boyen and Koller, 1998).
With the observation that every node’s parent in a cluster must also be part of the same cluster, I
topologically sort the outgoing interface and build the clusters starting from each of the nodes with
no parents in the interface in order to find clusters as small as possible.
For example, one node with no parents in the interface would be a wyxz node. I start with a
cluster only containing wyxz, then add its parents wy|z and wy|x, then add their parents wz and wx.
I found the following clusters (Figure 9.2, bottom):
(a) belief-about-belief-about-self clusters: {wx,wy,wy|x,wx|y,wyxy,wxyx} for x , y;
(b) belief-about-belief-about-other clusters: {wxyz,wz|x,wz|y,wz,wy,wx}, for x , y , z.
Since the only belief about belief nodes that influence observations are wxyx nodes involving
only two players (Figure 8.5), I am only using disjoint belief-about-belief-about-self clusters.
With this modification, each cluster Kxyz will belong to a clique Cxyz. The out-clique potential of




xyz | cwy0 |x0) = ΣCxyzout\KxyzφCxyzout






= P(Kxyz | cwy0 |x0 , ..., cwyt |xt)






The belief-over-belief model is relational in the sense that deception, belief, claim, and belief over
belief variables (wx, wy|x, cwy|x, wzyx) are equivalent.
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Figure 9.2: The outgoing interface of the DBN (top), with the Boyen Koller clusters (bottom right,
in purple).
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In addition to this kind of equivalence encoded in the relational nature of my model, and in order
to reduce the number of variables in an instantiation, I identify equivalent dialogue participants in
the data, which I map to the same variable in every instantiation.
I imposed the following constraints:
(a) two players cannot be equivalent if they have different (deceptive or non-deceptive) roles;
(b) two players cannot be equivalent if they appear as target and speaker in the same utterance.
Condition (b) reduces finding an optimal mapping to the map coloring problem for each player
role. Including conidtion (a) is possible as I have access to the labeled data. In practice, in
application on unlabelled data, one can use shallow psycholinguistic cues to detect the extent to
which players are equivalent. I leave this direction of exploration to future work.
9.2 Learning via Expectation Maximization
I use expectation maximization to learn the parameters of my model of beliefs-over-beliefs (Figure
9.1) from data.
Expectation maximization (EM) is a method for learning the parameters θ of a graphical model
from partially observable data. The algorithm iteratively updates the estimates of the parameters in
the following steps:
(a) E step: Express the expectation of the log-likelihood, with respect to the conditional dis-
tribution, in terms of the current estimates θ(t), of the unobserved variables Z given the
annotation.
(b) M step: Find θ(t+1) that maximizes the expectation.
The model I described in Chapter 8 has N(wx) + N(wy|x) + N(wxyz) + N(cwx|x) + N(cwy|x) = 31
independent parameters that can be learned from dialogue data. The parameters that the model has
to learn consists of:
(a) the role priors θ0x = P(w
0
x);


















































Each instance in the training data is a dialogue parsed to a sequence of utterances cwy0 |x0 , ..., cwyn |xn .
Some data points may have annotation for roles, as a sequence {wx}0x∈Ag, ..., {wx}
n
x∈Ag, or for perceived
sincerity, as a sequence {wy|x}0x,y∈Ag, ..., {wy|x}
n
x,y∈Ag, or for both.
I denote by W the subset of the hidden state for which there is annotation, and by Z the subset
of the hidden state with no annotation. Then, the annotation is a sequence W0, ...,Wn.














y|x) given a dataset






Since the data is partially observable, the parameters can be estimated with EM.
For random variable w, I denote by val(w) the domain of w.
For random variables w̄ and values v̄ ∈ val(w̄), let #D(w̄ = v̄) be the number of times w had
values v in the dataset D. When w̄ is clear from the context, I use notation #D(v̄) for readability.
For random variables w̄ and w̄′, where w̄′ are a subset of w̄, and values v̄ ∈ val(w̄) and v̄′ ∈ val(w̄′),
let #D(v̄→ v̄′) be the number of cases in D where w̄ have values v̄ in some time slice t and w̄′ have
values v̄′ in time slice t + 1.
I use the following additional notation for parameters:












(b) for observation probability θox|x′ = P(cwx|x′ | wx′′), let θ
o:v|v′′
x|x′ = P(cwx|x′ = v | wx′′ = v
′′);












E step The log-likelihood is:












Σx log θ0x + Σx,y log θ
0
y|x + Σx,y,x,z log θ
0
yxz + Σx log θ
o








Σx log θ→x + Σx,y log θ
→
y|x + Σx,y,x,z log θ
→
yxz + Σx log θ
o








x = v) log θ
0,v






+ Σi≤|D|Σθ∈{θ0,θo,θ→}ΣxΣv∈x#Di(v) log θvx
The expectation is then:
EP(Z|D,θ(t))[L(θ | D,Z)] = ΣZL(θ | D,Z)P(Z | D, θ(t))
= Σx
(
Σv#D(w0x = v) log θ
0,v








#Di(v)P(zi = vz | w, θ(t)) log θvx
)
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Let Q(θ | θ(t)) = ΣiΣx=w∪zΣv∈val(x)Σvz∈val(z)
(
#Di(v)P(zi = vz | w, θ(t)) log θvx
)
, then:
Q(θ | θ(t)) = ΣiΣx=w∪zΣv∈val(x)
(
Σvz∈val(z)#Di(v)P(z
i = vz | w, θ(t))
)
log θvx
= Σx=w∪zΣv∈val(x)EP(z|w,θ(t))[#Di(v)] log θvx
where EP(z|w,θ(t))[#Di(v)] is the expected count of x = v under P(z | w, θ(t)).
M step In the M step, the parameter estimates are updated to maximize Q(θ | θ(t)):
θ(t+1) = argmaxθQ(θ | θ
(t)) = argmaxθΣZL(θ | D,Z)P(Z | D, θ
(t))
The estimates for the role parameters θ0x and θ
→



























The estimates for the other parameters, θx, are updated according to:
θ(t+1)x=w∪z = argmaxθx Q(θx | θ
(t)) = argmaxθxΣv∈val(x)EP(z|w,θ(t))[#Di(v)] log θ
v
x
with respect to the constraint Σvθvx = 1. This can be solved by the method of Langrage multipliers,
by optimizing Q′(θx | θ(t)) = Q(θx | θ(t)) − λ · (Σvθvx − 1). Setting
∂Q′(θx |θ(t))
∂θx




The expected counts are calculated using inference. For example, for θoy|x:
EP(z|w,θ(t))[#Di(v)] = Σv,v′,v′′,u#Di(v, v′, v′′, u)P(wy|x,wxyx | wx, cwy|x, θ(t))
= Σ0≤ j≤|Di |,w jx=v,cw
j
y|x=u
P(w jy|x = v
′,w jxyx = v




This is an inference problem that can be solved as described in Section 9.1.
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Since EM is an iterative algorithm, requiring an inference step for each parameter and in each
iteration, it is much more important for learning that inference be scalable. While inference using
the interface algorithm (Section 9.1) is feasible for answering queries, the methods I introduced in
Sections 9.1.1 and 9.1.2 are essential to make learning scalable.
In order to approximate relational EM for BNT (Murphy, 2002), I randomly swap the sets of
parameters corresponding to equivalent variables every n EM steps. In my experiments, I found
n=100 to work well.
9.3 Experimental Results
I implemented the model using the Bayes Net Toolbox for Matlab (Murphy, 2002).
I tackled the problem of werewolf detection, which in my model (Figure 8.5) amounts to
computing the posteriors over player roles:
P(wix | cw
1:i) for each x ∈ A
My baseline model is a version of my DBN where there are no beliefs over beliefs. I call this
mdoel DBN-NoBoB. I use Boyen Koller inference for this model as well, where I build the clusters
following an analogous procedure to the one I described in Section 9.1.1
9.3.1 Data
I used the Werewolf dataset described in Section 4. I extracted the set of speakers in a first pass over
the data and automatically assigned claims in a second pass.
For each utterance, I first identified the target of the claim among the set of speakers, then looked
for mentions of roles in the utterance, as well as for negations. I used a fixed set of roles, with
negative (wolf, werewolf ) as well as positive (seer, villager, peasant, wolfsbane, vigilante, mason)
roles. If the utterance was negative and assigning a negative role, or positive and assigning a positive
role, I determined an observed claim of innocence, i.e. an observed cwx|y variable with value 0.
Otherwise, I determined a claim of guilt, i.e. an observed cwx|y variable with value 1.
This parsing method covers 766 utterances, for a 9.06% coverage of the dataset.
Of the 766 initial utterances, I extracted sequences of 1, 2, and 3 consecutive claims, with the
constraint that the entire sequence happen during the course of the same day phase (i.e., between
the same two voting phases), thus with the same amount of knowledge disclosed by the judge over
the course of the sequence. Since not all messages in these dialogues are claims, this resulted in 244





Table 9.1: Effect of belief over belief component for werewolf detection, for one slice with exact
inference: DBN-NoBoB – baseline model, DBN-BoB – belief over belief model
3 and 14, with close to 100 instances for each number of players between 5 and 10. I manually
checked the correct assignment of claims for this subset.
I focused on the 2-slice dataset, training on 200 instances and testing on 44.
I transformed my dataset by mapping equivalent players to the same player. In my transformed
training dataset, 4 instances have 2 players, 2 instances have 4 players, and 194 instances have 3
players. In the test dataset, all 44 transformed instances have 2 players. I thus instantiated my model
to the 3 player case.
9.3.2 Inference with Default Parameters
For a first set of experiments, I used the full model described in Section 8.1 for which I manually
set the parameters. For inference, I fully instantiated the relational DBNs to each dialogue in the
test set.
I set the parameters of the observation model by transforming the non-probabilistic observation
model in Section 7.3 into a probabilistic one. The random variables in my model correspond to
a subset of the variables in the Werewolf formalization from Chapter 7. I therefore described the
belief observation axioms in terms of values of the random variables, by means of truth tables. The
truth tables define deterministic conditional probabilities of the claims given beliefs. I made the
observation model non-deterministic by adding Gaussian noise. Specifically, I replaced parameters
with non-zero and strictly less than 1 values in the neighborhood of their original values.
I set the initial belief probabilities to be uniform, then I added a small level of random noise as
above. The transition models were set close to deterministic, as the observation models, such that
the new belief most closely aligns to the result of filtering (Chapter 7).
I used exact inference for one time slice for both the baseline and the belief-over-belief model
(DBN-BoB), and approximate inference (belief propagation) for subsequent slices.
The results for one slice are summarized in Table 9.1. The belief-over-belief model outperforms
the baseline model in both accuracy and F1. The large majority of players are not werewolves, thus
the F1 looks much worse than the accuracy. Since I only use one message, both models’ estimate is
discouraging.
Table 9.2 shows the effect of considering an additional time slice. The results show that
considering further time-slices in the model improves the prediction.
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Model Accuracy F1
1 slice 70.09 14.63
2 slices 79.49 29.411
Table 9.2: Belief-over-belief model for werewolf detection, with 1 vs 2 time slices (approximate
inference)
Model Acc. (A) Acc. (B) Coverage (B)
DBN-NoBoB 44.88 16.67 20
DBN-BoB 39.15 20 46.67
Table 9.3: Effect of belief over belief component for vote prediction, for one slice with exact
inference: DBN-NoBoB – baseline model, DBN-BoB – belief over belief model; (A) – each
candidate was considered with equal probability; (B) – no assignment was made when several
candidates have the same posterior
I also considered the problem of vote prediction. This amounts to computing posteriors over
beliefs about roles:
P(wix|y | c1:i) for each x , y ∈ A




I used two policies for tie breaking : (A) – random assignment; and (B) – no assignment in cases
were several candidates with the same posterior. The results are summarized in Table 9.3.
9.3.3 Parameter Learning
Due to the large number of connected variables and the sizes of potentials in the outgoing interface
as well as each individual slice, exact DBN inference quickly becomes infeasible in the full model
of Section 8.1. This makes parameter learning difficult as well.
I instantiate my relational model to represent cases with 3 players. Using the equivalence
mapping described in Section 9.1.2, I find that most cases in my dataset are mapped to 3 player
dialogues.
In order to produce another baseline model, I remove the belief variables. Since the source and
target speaker no longer play a role in the modeling, I also remove them. Thus, the resulting model
is a simple Naive Bayes (NB). I use exact inference for this baseline model.
I compare the AUC of my models after 2 slices in Figure 9.3. The Naive Bayes baseline performs
close to random. My model, trained in the non-relational settings, shows very slight improvements,
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Figure 9.3: Effect of belief component for werewolf detection: NB – baseline model (Naive Bayes),
RDBN-NoBoB – relational DBN without beliefs over beliefs, RDBN-BoB – relational belief over
belief DBN, DBN-BoB – non-relational belief over belief DBN
while relational learning improves the performance greatly. As it can be seen, the belief-over-beliefs
model perfoms better than the DBN without beliefs-over-beliefs.
Figure 9.4 shows the running time of each component of inference (in seconds), using both the
interface algorithm (3p-interface) and BK clusters (3p-BK, 4p-BK), for both a model with 3 players
(3p-interface, 3p-BK) and a model with 4 players (4p-BK). The 4-player model without BK clusters
ran out of memory, so it is not represented in the graph. As it can be seen, modeling additional
players greatly impacts the performance of the model, therefore it is useful to reduce the number
of players as suggested in Section 9.1.2. Furthermore, the BK clusters introduced in Section 9.1.1
significantly improve inference time and make it possible to perform reasoning in models with more
dialogue participants.
9.4 Conclusion
In this chapter, I described inference and learning for the probabilistic model in Chapter 8. I showed
experimentally that explicitly modeling cognitive state with beliefs over beliefs is advantageous in
terms of performance, and that it is computationally feasible.
The model has several advantages over a non-sequence model:
(a) After training, it can be used to jointly reason about both components of deception, deceptive
intent and perceived sincerity, at any point in the dialogue.
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Figure 9.4: Effect of using Boyen-Koller (BK) clusters and of modeling additional players on
inference time (in seconds). 3p-interface – 3-player model using the interface algorithm; 3p-BK –
3-player model using BK clusters; 4p-BK – 4-player model using BK clusters.
(b) It can be used to jointly infer the deceptive roles and perceptions of all participants in the
dialogue, modeling the interactions between those variables.
(c) It can be used for sequence prediction, to infer the hidden roles and beliefs at every point in
the dialogue, given the claims, by maximizing the following probability.:
P(({wx}x∈Ag, {wy|x}x,y∈Ag, {wxyz}x,y,z∈Ag,x,y,y,z)t0≤t≤n | cwy0 |x0 , ..., cwyn |xn)
It may be possible to capture the interactions between deception and perception and between
multiple players by adding constraints to an optimization objective that seeks to minimize error on a
deception dataset. However, such a model could not be used for sequence prediction. Furthermore,
the DBN can be used to reason about various statements regarding beliefs and deception, at various




I defined deception detection and introduced a formalization and a practical model that performs
well for deception detection in written text. I introduced new psycholinguistic features useful for
decoding each of deception and sincerity perception. I offered insights into how language connects
to deception and its perception.
Scherl and Levesque (Scherl and Levesque, 2003) introduce a situation accessibility relation
predicate for the knowledge modality for a single-agent scenario. They also introduce a sensing
result function for knowledge producing actions. The knowledge of the agent changes only through
sensing and there is no discussion of actions that specifically change the possibly nested beliefs,
leaving the world unchanged.
Belief Revision (Alchourron et al., 1985) enables modeling and reasoning about changes of
beliefs as a result of new information. The work on knowledge in situation calculus (Scherl and
Levesque, 2003) has been extended (Shapiro et al., 2000),(Delgrande and Levesque, 2012) for
Belief Revision and Update. The authors introduce plausabilty as a mapping from possible worlds to
natural numbers, defining a total order on possible worlds in which one believes the most plausible
possible world. Belief revision changes plausability. Applying Belief Revision to my domain is
hard because agents need to reason about beliefs over beliefs.
R. Demolombe and P. P. Parra (Demolombe and del Pilar Pozos Parra, 2000) define an epistemic
logic for the multi-agent case, using belief as a simple modality that qualifies sentences but does not
allow nesting. Their fragment is tractable, but the fact that it does not allow nested belief makes it
inapplicable to domains where agent’s actions are oriented mainly towards changing other agents’
beliefs, both about the world and about themselves and other agents.
It is on this (Demolombe and del Pilar Pozos Parra, 2000) tractable fragment that most of the
work (Demolombe et al., 2005),(Parra et al., 2004) on formalizing intentions or the BDI framework
in Situation Calculus is built upon. These formalizations therefore inherit the limited expressing
power of the fragment, also not allowing nested beliefs. Here, intentions are about actions, referring
to plans, as sequences of actions that are intended, in that specific order, in order to reach the goals.
I do not consider planning, in my setting intentions refer to the states of the world currently most
desirable to the agent.
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None of these approaches can straightforwardly be used in my domain, by enconding utterances
as actions. The reason is that I need to account for both the change in nested beliefs and the
variability in how an utterance affects the hearer. Early approaches to modeling speech acts as
plan operators (Cohen and Perrault, 1979) propose a solution to the latter problem by defining
mediating acts between the speech acts and the perlocutionary effects. These acts describe the
conditions in which the direct effects of the illocutionary act result in the intended effects. This
amounts to defining perlocutionary effects as actions with preconditions on the hearer belief state,
and illocutionary effects as actions with preconditions on the speaker belief state. The illocutions’
effects are carried over to the mediating act’s preconditions. A disadvantage is that the set of
perlocutionary effects is virtually unbounded for any utterance.
Early work on dialogue modeling (Cohen and Levesque, 1985), (Cohen and Levesque, 1990)
assumes that the dialogue participants are rational, intentional agents that hold beliefs and choose
to intend actions according to their goals. This work builds upon earlier theories in pragmatics by
Searle (Searle, 1976) and Horn (Horn, 1984). The authors axiomatize some speech acts as actions
in an event calculus. They use modal operators for beliefs and goals and add event operators such as
DONE and AFTER. Intention in this framework refers to the intention to execute an action according
to a plan in order to reach a goal, so an agent may intend an action, not a set of possible worlds
described by a formula.
My work is closely related to epistemic logic (Lakemeyer and Lespérance, 2012), probabilistic
modal logic (Fagin and Halpern, 1988; Friedman and Halpern, 1994; Shirazi and Amir, 2007), and
belief revision (Alchourron et al., 1985).
While multiagent epistemic logics (Lakemeyer and Lespérance, 2012) allow a more compact
encoding of beliefs over beliefs, relational graphical models have the advantage of more effective,
more robust, and less costly reasoning. Compactness can also be recovered by making only the
necessary distinctions between equivalent random variables, as I showed in Section 9.1.
Probablistic modal logic (Fagin and Halpern, 1988; Friedman and Halpern, 1994; Shirazi and
Amir, 2007) serves as a starting point to my model. I use the idea of modeling nested belief by
means of a probablity distribution over accessible worlds, as well as the directed graphical model
semantics. I adapt these insights to model dynamic data such as dialogues.
My work also relates to conversation modeling, dialogue systems, and deception detection in
dialogues.
There are three main approaches to conversational modeling. One approach uses logic and
directly builds on speech act theory and pragmatics (Searle, 1976; Horn, 1984). A second kind of
work (Ritter et al., 2010; Paul, 2012) uses surface features and Bayesian models to discover threads,
speech acts, topics, or decision-making sub-dialogues. The third and most recent approach (Luan
et al., 2016) uses deep learning to model roles and topics.
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Logic-based models generally use utterances as actions (Cohen and Perrault, 1979; Cohen
and Levesque, 1985; Cohen and Levesque, 1990). They have broad applicability, but are repre-
sentationally and computationally hard. This is so because action definitions need to account for
exponentially many possible effects an utterance may have on a hearer. The inherent parallelism of
utterances in multi-party dialogues adds further complexity.
One way to capture effects of utterances is to define mediating acts between speech acts and
effects (Cohen and Perrault, 1979). These mediating acts describe conditions for speech acts to
result in intended effects. These approaches result in a possibly unbounded number of actions, so
they are unfeasible from a representational perspective (Marcu, 1997; Gu, 1993).
Conversation modeling (Ritter et al., 2010; Paul, 2012) is currently done using knowledge poor
models. This representation may be used for restricted prediction, but not for a deeper understanding
of how agent beliefs and intentions change.
Deep neural network models such as LSTM have also been used for conversation modeling
(Luan et al., 2016), however, these models require large amounts of data and so far have not been
useful in gaining insight into language use in dialogues.
Other lines of work on reasoning about hidden belief states of dialogue participants have been
explored in dialogue systems. The purpose of dialogue state tracking (Williams et al., 2013) is to
estimate the intention of a human user of a dialogue system. Successful approaches have used either
reinforcement learning (Singh et al., 1999) and POMDPs (Thomson and Young, 2010), or deep
learning (Henderson et al., 2013; Henderson et al., 2014).
Another work (Hung and Chittaranjan, 2010a) using phonetic features shows promising results
in detecting werewolves. My focus is on using the propositional content of utterances only, with no
linguistic features, to solve the same problem. I believe this serves as a good starting point for a
model combining textual linguistic features with propositional content for detecting deceptive roles
in situations where audio signal is unavailable, such as Internet forums and IRC channels.
Most research on deception in written language focuses on non-interactive media such as
opinions (Mihalcea and Strapparava, 2009b), product reviews (Ott et al., 2013), or dating profiles
(Toma and Hancock, 2010). The focus of my work is on the interactive setting of dialogues.
Research in computational linguistics on deception in dialogues considered the domain of inter-
views (Hirschberg et al., 2005; Enos et al., 2007) or games like Werewolf (Hung and Chittaranjan,
2010b) and Diplomacy (Niculae et al., 2015)) (see (Fitzpatrick et al., 2015)) for a summary of work
in deception detection). Such games require players to discuss and use deception in order to win.
Some approaches focus on written language only, whereas others (Hung and Chittaranjan, 2010b)
use audio data as well. My focus is on the related but different problem of perception-of-sincerity.
A recent computational paralinguistic challenge (Schuller et al., 2016) has drawn attention to
the problem of deception and sincerity in dialogues. The focus of the proposed datasets, as well as
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the winning models of the sincerity challenge (Kaya and Karpov, 2016), is on acoustic signal. In
my setting, I am interested in modeling perceived sincerity using written language.
Most research in deception and sincerity in conversation has been conducted in psycholinguistics
(Porter and Yuille, 1996; Loy et al., 2016). In particular, there is work (Loy et al., 2016) investigating
both deception and perception-of-deception in dialogues. However, the data they use contains
acoustic information as well. Most of the features they analyze refer to prosody, disfluency, and vocal
characteristics. They identify the proportion and duration of silent pauses as the most indicative
features of perceived deception. However, my dataset does not contain enough information to
encode such pauses.
Work in mapping psychological dimensions to word categories (Tausczik and Pennebaker, 2010)
has identified several classes of words for deception. This work does not focus on dialogue and
does not tackle deception in particular.
For the problem of identifying stances in dialogues (Ranganath et al., 2009; Ranganath et al.,
2013), several such word categories as well as discourse features were shown to perform better than
the human baseline (human perception) in the dating domain. Deception or its perception were
however not considered among the stances.
My work draws attention to the task of decoding perceived sincerity in an interactive setting
where written language is the only input. I introduce new features that are helpful for this task. I
also show that the problem, while important, is much more difficult than in the multimodal case of
face-to-face dialogue.
There has been little work on deception detection in written language and most of it has focused
on either discriminating between sincere and insincere arguments (Mihalcea and Strapparava, 2009a)
or opinion spam (Ott et al., 2011; Jindal and Liu, 2008). One method of data collection has been to
ask subjects to argue for both sides of a debate (Mihalcea and Strapparava, 2009a). While lies about
one’s beliefs are also present, the manipulative behaviour and the motivation are missing. Since
none of the previous work focuses on dialogue, the change in participants’ beliefs, intentions, and
plans reflected in the interaction between players is also absent.
More related is the work of (Hung and Chittaranjan, 2010a), who recorded a total of 81.17 hours
of people playing the Werewolf game and used phonetic features to detect werewolves. While their
results are promising, my focus is on written text only.
I have also been inspired by psycho-linguistic studies of deception detection (Porter and Yuille,
1996) as well as by psycho-linguistic research on persuasive or powerless language (Greenwald
et al., 1968; Hosman, 2002; Sparks and Areni, 2008). I build upon findings from both of these
lines of research, as Werewolf players use both deception, to hide their roles and intentions, and




In this thesis I formally defined deception and introduced models that improve over baselines by
encoding the participants’ cognitive state. My experiments show this improvement on detecting
deceptive roles in the Werewolf game and for decoding sincerity in speed dating.
One direction of future work is to implement and test the model for other real-world problems,
as outlined in Chapters 4 and 8.
An orthogonal direction of future work would be to extend the expressive power of the model.
One extension is to reason about a larger set of statements on which people may be deceptive, as
well as the interaction between them. Another extension could be to explicitly model intetnion
as a modality. Furthermore, in many cases people change their beliefs through logical reasoning,
therefore I expect allowing reasoning about domain-specific knowledge to be beneficial.
11.1 Harassment and Predatory Behavior Detection
Research in deception in Internet conversation, particularly with a focus on vulnerable groups facing
phenomena such as bullying, trolling, and predatory behavior, would be helpful in building systems
that alert either or both the deceived person and a moderator or a support system capable of taking
action regarding the deceiver. A possible future development is to consider use of deception and the
type of deception, along with other indicators of how a person behaves in online conversations, as
evidence for the person’s mental health. Such a system can then be integrated with other systems
capable of suggesting or offering help.
The most harmful kinds of deception happen in private conversations, however. Privacy and
sensitivity concerns make it hard to build large sets of useful data. One way forward is to focus
on public datasets of discussions in social media or forums. Present cyberbullying datasets are
labeled for use of offensive words and do not consider more subtle aspects of victimization, where
the perpetrator intentionally inflicts emotional pain using reasoning about what their statements will
make the victim believe. One step forward is to gather and annotate a new dataset for bullying or
trolling.
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11.2 High-Profile Deception Detection
High profile deception detection, refers to deception in trials, negotiations, and police investigations.
The language in public records of trials is very polished and I expect psycholinguistic cues will be
less helpful in drawing meaningful conclusions. However, one possible direction may be to define
a domain ontology for trials and jury conversations and use it in conjunction with the belief-over-
belief model to reason about the innocence or guilt of the defendants. It is important to note that
the outcome of a trial may have serious effects on the life of a person, so any end result of such
a research effort needs to be used with caution, as a way to gain new insights rather than make
decisions.
There are no publicly available datasets of police investigations, however, one possibility is to
use transcripts of shows that depict them, such as Law and Order: Criminal Intent. One problem is
that language in fiction may not successfully model real-world deception, so it is not clear to what
extent the conclusions drawn from such are meaningful for real-world scenarios. Again, it may be
worthwhile to add domain reasoning to my belief-over-belief model and only use the propositional
content of utterances, in order to alleviate the impact of the actor’s inherently insincere language.
11.3 Multiple Deceptive Intents
Let’s assume there is a set W = {w1, ...,wn} of intents that the agents may be deceptive about
throughout the dialogue.
If there is no interaction between them, or the interaction is weak enough that we can ignore
it, one possible way to track them is to build a different model for each possible intent. Then,
the problem of detecting deception at a point i in the dialogue, with speaker a, can be reduced to
detecting whether the prediction of any of the models is that a is deceptive at point i.
With the notation in Chapter 2,
P(dec(i, a, b) | D) = P(dec(i, a, b,w1) ∨ ... ∨ dec(i, a, b,wn) | D)
therefore
P(¬dec(i, a, b) | D) = P(¬dec(i, a, b,w1) ∧ ... ∧ ¬dec(i, a, b,wn) | D)
= Πnk=1P(¬dec(i, a, b,wk) | D)
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therefore
P(dec(i, a, b) | D) = 1 − Πnk=1P(¬dec(i, a, b,wk) | D)
One problem with this is that the more intents we want to model this way, the smaller the
probability that any agent is sincere at any point.
One solution would be to learn a good threshold for deciding between deception and sincerity
based on P(dec(i, a, b) | D).
Another solution would be to assign importances to the intents: ι : W → (0, 1). The importances
are also parameters that can be learned. The closer to 0 the importance is, the closer the probability
of sincerity comes to 1, meaning that being deceptive on an unimportant matter can be considered
being sincere. The closer to 1 the importance is, the closer the probability of sincerity comes to the
model’s prediction. Specifically:
P(dec(i, a, b) | D) = 1 − Πnk=1P(¬dec(i, a, b,wk) | D)
ι(wk)
If there is interaction between deceptive intents, P(¬dec(i, a, b) | D) cannot be factorized as
above. However, it may be possible to model the interactions between deceptive intents as a
Bayesian Network. In this case:
P(¬dec(i, a, b) | D) = Πnk=1P(¬dec(i, a, b,wk) | parentsW(wk),D)
where parentsW(wk) are the parent intents of wk in W. Using the ground truth for all deceptive
intents in the training set, the Bayesian Network structure and parameters can be learned from this
fully labeled data.
11.4 Handling Disjunction
In Chapter 3, I restricted the language to disallow disjunction. One extension of my model is to
allow reasoning about disjunction and implication.
Implication φ → ψ can be modeled by P(ψ | φ), and disjunction φ ∨ ψ can be expressed by
¬φ→ ψ or ¬ψ→ φ. One way to enforce consistency is to pick the expression with higher nesting as
the consequent, and if they have the same level of nesting, the simplest expression in the disjunction,
Therefore if e.g. ψ is the simplest expression, φ ∨ ψ can be modeled by P(ψ | ¬φ).
A larger disjunction φ1 ∨ ... ∨ φn ∨ ψ can be expressed as ¬(¬φ1 ∧ ... ∧ ¬φn) ∨ ψ thus can be
modeled as P(ψ | ¬φ1, ...,¬φn). For an expression of the form φ1 ∧ ... ∧ φn ∨ ψ we can introduce a
new formula φ such that P(φ | φ1, ..., φn) = 1 iff φ = φ1 ∧ ... ∧ φn, and model P(ψ | φ).
These probability distributions can thus be modeled with Bayesian Networks whose parameters
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are either set from deterministic truth tables or learned from data. Since the formulas contain
modalities, this will lead to additional arcs between levels of nesting.
If the model is extended to model at least 3 levels of nesting, in this setting it will be possible to
express sincerity and perceived sincerity as originally defined:
(a) sincerity:
bel(i, a,¬bel(i, b,wa))→ bel(i, a,wa) ≡ ¬bel(i, a,wa)→ ¬bel(i, a,¬bel(i, b,wa))
Sincerity can be modeled by P(¬bel(i, a,¬bel(i, b,wa)) | ¬bel(i, a,wa)). In the model intro-
duced in Chapter 8, this is P(waba | 1 − wa), resulting in a cross-nesting-level arc from wa to
waba.
(b) perceived sincerity:
bel(i, b, bel(i, a,¬bel(i, b, π(a)))→ bel(i, a, π(a)))
Perceived sincerity can similarly be modeled by
P(bel(¬bel(i, a,¬bel(i, b,wa))) | bel(¬bel(i, a,wa)))
or P(wabab | 1 − wa|b) in the model in Chapter 8.
11.5 Explicit Modeling of Intention
In the models I show in this thesis, I do not explicitly model intention. I assume that an agent a
produces an utterance according to the intention to deceive on w, if the agent believes another agent
believes the truth value of w, as it relates to a, is different than (a knows) it is.
One step further is then to explicitly model intention as defined in Chapter 2. This allows the
model to express more complex statements where intention and beliefs can form longer nesting
chains.
As a reminder (Chapter 3), deceptive stance, sincerity, and perceived sincerity are defined as
follows, for the case where there is a single deceptive intent:
(a) deceptive stance:
¬bel(i, a, π(a)) ∧ ind(i, a, bel(i + 1, b, π(a)))
(b) sincerity:
ind(i, a, bel(i + 1, b, π(a)))→ bel(i, a, π(a))
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(c) perceived sincerity:
bel(i, b, ind(i, a, bel(i + 1, b, π(a)))→ bel(i, a, π(a)))
To express such statements, a model needs to be able to express alternating belief and intention
levels. So an extension of the model can unroll the nesting in alternating belief and intention steps.
As these expressions show, up to 2 levels of each is sufficient. The extensions in the previous
subsections can be used in conjunction to allow expressing the statements as above.
A problem with the DBN representation is that these statements require reasoning about the
belief at the next time step in order to reach a conclusion at the current time step. The DBN structure
does not allow arcs going backwards in time.
One simple solution is to assume that everything under the scope of the intention modality refers
to the next time step. This corresponds to defining modality ind+ such that ind+(i, a, φ(i)) is true iff
φ(i + 1) is the case in all possible worlds accessible from the current world by agent i via ind+. With
this, ind+(i, a, φ(i)) ≡ ind(i, a, φ(i + 1)), and we can unroll the modality nesting according to bel and
ind+ rather than bel and ind.
11.6 Integrating Domain-Specific Reasoning
My models use claims regarding dialogue participants’ deception or sincerity, either directly
expressed or encoded indirectly, through psycholinguistic cues. However, in real world domain,
the propositional content of utterances may be important in identifying deception, even when it
does not refer to any such claims. In particular Definition 18 in Chapter 3 relates the propositional
content u of utterances to the deceptive intent w of the speaker a by imposing the condition that a
believe listener b’s belief of u will lead b to conclude w:
B∗i (a) |= (bel(i + 1, b, u)→ bel(i + 1, b,w))
If B∗i (a) |x is the set of statements that a believes x believes, i.e.
B∗i (a) = ∪x∈A{bel(i, s, v) | v ∈ B
∗
i (a) |x}
then understanding whether the speaker acts deceptively requires, in addition to inference in the
model I introduced, reasoning about the following:
B∗i (a) |x ∪{u} |= w
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This can be done by connecting a domain ontology to my model, with the condition that the
statements w on which people can be deceptive be part of that ontology.
Let’s denote the level of nesting of statement w by n(w) and the level of nesting of u by n(u), e.g.
n(bel(i, a, bel(i, b, π(a)))) = 2
For m < n(w), let w/m be the statement under the outermost m levels of nesting, e.g.
bel(i, a, bel(i, b, π(a)))/1 = bel(i, b, π(a))
If the belief model does not allow specifying rules as discussed in Section 11.4, then w can only
be inferred from u if w and u have the same level, n(u) = n(w). Then we can select all statements in
B∗i (a) |x with nesting level n(u) in a set B
∗
i (a) |x,n(u) and perform reasoning in the ontology on the
non-modal statements under the n(u) scopes of modality:
B∗i (a) |x,n(u) /n(u) ∪ {u/n(u)} |= w/n(u)
If the belief model has been extended according to Section 11.4 to allow disjunction and
implication, we can use any rules to increase the nesting of all statements up to the maximum of
n(u) and n(w), or decrease the nesting down to the minimum of n(u) and n(w). If u and w have
different levels of nesting and there are no such rules, then it can be concluded that w cannot be
inferred from u. Otherwise, let B∗i (a) |x,n(u) +, u+, and w+ be the sets of statements resulting from
increasing or decreasing the nesting. The underlying ontology can again be used to reason about the
following:




I define the problem of deception in dialogues in terms of dialogue participants’ beliefs regarding
each other deception or sincerity (Chapter 3). I identify deceptive intent and perceived sincerity as
two essential components of deception. I introduce psycholinguistic features associated with each
subproblem (Chapters 5 and 6) and show experiments for two domains (Chapter 4). I express the
problem in a formalism based on modal logic and situation calculus (Chapter 7) and introduce a
practical probabilistic belief-over-belief model (Chapter 8) that is useful in solving the problem of
deception detection (Chapter 9) .
I draw attention to the problem of sincerity detection in written dialogues, which has received
very little attention in this context. The human baseline performance and inter-annotator agreement
(Chapter 4) as well as my experiments in Chapters 5 and 6 show that this is a hard problem.
I showe feature-based baselines for deception (Chapters 5) and sincerity perception detection
(Chapters 6) in written dialogues, for the domains of Werewolf and speed dating (Chapter 4).
My features are based on studies in psycholinguistics and offer insights into the mechanisms of
deception and sincerity perception.
As expected for deception detection (Chapters 5), negative emotions, motion words, and number
of prespositions were indicative of deception, while conjunctions are indicative of honesty. Conjunc-
tion use and exclusion use are markers of cognitive complexity, so the finding about conjunctions is
in line with the cognitive load hypothesis that states that deception is cognitively taxing. However,
exclusions are indicative of deception rather than honesty. The distinction is that conjunctions
integrate ideas as part of a cognitive process, while exclusion words differentiate between competing
ideas. Given the context, where the goal of the players is to arrive at conclusions regarding who
the werewolf is, it is natural for the players’ discussion to revolve around differentiating between
hypotheses regarding the werewolf’s identity. Werewolves have a motivation in leading the discus-
sion, in order to be able to control the direction of the reasoning process. This may be a reason why
exclusions are important in this context.
Features of persuasive language are also important, supporting the hypothesis that deceptive
players try to convince others of the ideas that are most beneficial to them. Non-werewolf players
do not have as much motivation to plan out their discourse and convince others, therefore their
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language is more relaxed and more likely to display weak language cues, such as hesitations.
I find that several psycholinguistic features are similarly correlated to perceived sincerity (Chap-
ters 6) across domains, such as language complexity (TTR), cognitive processing (cognitive words,
long words), strong opinion (dissent, swear words), positive emotion, and verbosity. Deception cues
help in identifying perceived sincerity only to the extent that they are not overriden by pleasantness
features. Pleasantness is indicative of perceived sincerity even though it is a feature of deception,
while weak language, a feature of honesty, is perceived as insincere. This shows that humans are
prone to error in assessing sincerity, which underlines the need of a system that is able to assist in
sensitive situations.
I found there are gender differences between what cues men and women use to assess sincerity.
Women use more cues and are more prone to seeing politeness, conflict, and weak language as
insincere in men, but do not see openness as insincere. Men use fewer cues and tend to perceive
openness as insincere, in the context of a 4-minute conversation.
In Chapter 7, I present a model for beliefs in dialogues where agents have conflicting intentions.
I showed my model’s applicability for the Werewolf game and for speed dating. My model enables
reasoning about agent’s nested beliefs after any sequence of utterances in the dialogue. It can also
be combined with action in a natural way. Other domains can be formalized in a similar manner, by
writing the appropriate observation model and belief and intention interaction axioms.
The results on a small set of manually-parsed instances in the Werewolf domain show that my
model does improve over a majority-vote baseline. The model is still limited and performance
suffers from the fact that not all utterances can be translated satisfactorily to the formal language.
For example, the model does not handle sentiment and pragmatic cues. I later show how to add
probabilities and linguistic cues.
Then, in Chapter 8, I introduce a probablistic model of belief change in dialogues, where
utterances are treated as observations which also take into account participants’ beliefs about other
participants’ beliefs. I show how my model can be generalized to other domains and how it can
make use of the psycholinguistic features I introduced in Chapters 5 and 6.
In Chapter 9, I show that my model performs better than a baseline model that does not consider
beliefs over beliefs. I also show that modeling beliefs results in a much better performance than not
considering beliefs, even with very limited observations.
I thus lay the groundwork for a joint model of propositional content and textual linguistic cues
for deceptive role detection in written dialogues, as well as for other kinds of predictions based on
participants’ beliefs, such as vote prediction in games or negotiations, or predator detection. The
expressivity of my model can be extended in various ways, by modeling the interactions between
multiple deceptive intents, allowing the addition of rules, including multiple interacting modalities,
or reasoning about deceptive intent in the context of a domain-specific description of the world.
134
References
Adams, M. (2016). In Praise of Profanity. Oxford University Press. 57
Alchourron, C. E., Gardenfors, P., and Makinson, D. (1985). On the logic of theory change: Partial
meet contraction and revision functions. The Journal of Symbolic Logic, 50:510–530. 4, 123,
124
Allen, J., Ferguson, G., and Stent, A. (2001). An architecture for more realistic conversational
systems. In IUI, pages 1–8. ACM. 3
Allen, J., Manshadi, M., Dzikovska, M., and Swift, M. (2007). Deep linguistic processing for
spoken dialogue systems. In DeepLP. 3
Austin, J. L. (1975). How to do things with words. Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass. 4,
7, 69
Bacchus, F. (1990). Probabilistic belief logics. In ECAI, pages 59–64. 17
Barnwell, B. (2012). brenbarn.net. http://www.brenbarn.net/werewolf/. [Online;
accessed 30-April-2017]. 4, 5, 40
Bauman, K. P. and Geher, G. (2002). We think you agree: The detrimental impact of the false
consensus effect on behavior. Current Psychology, 21(4):293–318. 101
Bergen, B. (2016). What the F: What Swearing Reveals About Our Language, Our Brains, and
Ourselves. Basic Books. 56
Blackburn, P., van Benthem, J. F., and Wolter, F. (2006). Handbook of modal logic, volume 3.
Elsevier. 8
Boyen, X. and Koller, D. (1998). Tractable inference for complex stochastic processes. In UAI. 24,
110, 113
Buhrmester, M., Kwang, T., and Gosling, S. D. (2011). Amazon’s mechanical turk. Perspectives on
Psychological Science, 6(1):3–5. PMID: 26162106. 42
Cano, A. E., Fernandez, M., and Alani, H. (2014). Detecting Child Grooming Behaviour Patterns
on Social Media, pages 412–427. Springer International Publishing, Cham. 3
Cohen, J. (1960). A Coefficient of Agreement for Nominal Scales. Educational and Psychological
Measurement, 20(1):37. 42
135
Cohen, P. R. and Levesque, H. J. (1985). Speech acts and rationality. In Mann, W. C., editor, ACL,
pages 49–60. ACL. 67, 124, 125
Cohen, P. R. and Levesque, H. J. (1990). Performatives in a rationally based speech act theory. In
Berwick, R. C., editor, ACL, pages 79–88. ACL. 67, 124, 125
Cohen, P. R. and Perrault, C. R. (1979). Elements of a plan-based theory of speech acts. Cognitive
Science, 3(3):177–212. 67, 124, 125
Danescu-Niculescu-Mizil, C., Sudhof, M., Jurafsky, D., Leskovec, J., and Potts, C. (2013). A
computational approach to politeness with application to social factors. In ACL. 57, 59
Dean, T. and Kanazawa, K. (1989). A model for reasoning about persistence and causation.
Computational intelligence, 5(2):142–150. 22
Delgrande, J. P. and Levesque, H. J. (2012). Belief revision with sensing and fallible actions. In
Brewka, G., Eiter, T., and McIlraith, S. A., editors, KR. AAAI Press. 67, 68, 123
Demolombe, R. and del Pilar Pozos Parra, M. (2000). A simple and tractable extension of situation
calculus to epistemic logic. In Ras, Z. W. and Ohsuga, S., editors, ISMIS, volume 1932 of
Lecture Notes in Computer Science, pages 515–524. Springer. 123
Demolombe, R., Mara, A., and Fern, O. (2005). Intention recognition in the situation calculus
and probability theory frameworks. In In Computational Logic in Multi Agent Systems, pages
358–372. 123
Dussault, M., Hojjat, M., and Boone, R. T. (2013). Machiavellianism and dating: Deception and
intimacy. Social Behavior and Personality: an international journal, 41(2):283–294. 36
Eisinger, R. and Mills, J. (1968). Perception of the sincerity and competence of a communicator
as a function of the extremity of his position. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology,
4(2):224–232. 57, 64
Enos, F., Shriberg, E., Graciarena, M., Hirschberg, J., and Stolcke, A. (2007). Detecting deception
using critical segments. In Interspeech, pages 2281–2284. 3, 125
Fagin, R. and Halpern, J. Y. (1988). Reasoning about knowledge and probability. In TARK. 6, 124
Fagin, R. and Halpern, J. Y. (1994). Reasoning about knowledge and probability. Journal of the
ACM (JACM), 41(2):340–367. 17
Feldman, G., Lian, H., Kosinski, M., and Stillwell, D. (2017). Frankly, we do give a damn: The
relationship between profanity and honesty. Social Psychological and Personality Science. 56
Finkel, E. J. and Eastwick, P. W. (2008). Speed-dating. Current Directions in Psychological Science,
17(3):193–197. 35
Finkel, E. J., Eastwick, P. W., and Matthews, J. (2007). Speed-dating as an invaluable tool for
studying romantic attraction: A methodological primer. Personal Relationships, 14(1):149–166.
35
136
Fitzpatrick, E., Bachenko, J., and Fornaciari, T. (2015). Automatic detection of verbal deception.
Synthesis Lectures on Human Language Technologies, 8(3):1–119. 125
Friedman, N. and Halpern, J. Y. (1994). A knowledge-based framework for belief change part i:
foundations. In TARK, pages 44–64. 6, 124
Georgeff, M., Pell, B., Pollack, M., Tambe, M., and Wooldridge, M. (1998). The belief-desire-
intention model of agency. In International Workshop on Agent Theories, Architectures, and
Languages, pages 1–10. Springer. 9
Greenwald, A. G., Albert, R. D., Cullen, D., Love, R., and Have, J. S. W. (1968). Cognitive learning,
cognitive response to persuasion, and attitude change. pages 147–170. Academic Press. 126
Grice, H. P. (1975). Logic and conversation. In Syntax and Semantics: Vol. 3: Speech Acts. 7
Gu, Y. (1993). The impasse of perlocution. Journal of Pragmatics, 20(5):405 – 432. 125
Gudnadottir, E., Jensen, A., Cheong, Y.-G., Togelius, J., Bae, B., and Pedersen, C. (2013). Detecting
predatory behaviour in online game chats. 3, 36
Halpern, J. Y. and McAllester, D. A. (1989). Likelihood, probability, and knowledge. Computational
Intelligence, 5(2):151–160. 17
Hardaker, C. (2010). Trolling in asynchronous computer-mediated communication: From user
discussions to academic definitions. 2
Henderson, M., Thomson, B., and Young, S. (2013). Deep neural network approach for the dialog
state tracking challenge. In SIGDIAL. 3, 125
Henderson, M., Thomson, B., and Young, S. (2014). Word-based dialog state tracking with recurrent
neural networks. In SIGDIAL, pages 292–299. 3, 125
Herring, S., Job-Sluder, K., Scheckler, R., and Barab, S. (2002). Searching for safety online:
Managing" trolling" in a feminist forum. The Information Society, 18(5):371–384. 2
Hirschberg, J., Benus, S., Brenier, J. M., Enos, F., Friedman, S., Gilman, S., Girand, C., Graciarena,
M., Kathol, A., Michaelis, L., et al. (2005). Distinguishing deceptive from non-deceptive
speech. In Interspeech, pages 1833–1836. 3, 54, 55, 56, 57, 65, 125
Horn, L. (1984). Toward a new taxonomy for pragmatic inference: Q-based and r-based implicature.
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